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A STUDY OF THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the question of greatest concern to mankind 
today is that of how to prevent war. Those who think deeply 
on the subject, and a great many do, feel that the time has 
come when war must not merely be prevented from crisis to 
crisis, but that it must be eliminated as a social institu­
tion if civilization is to survive. Because of this urgent 
need to abolish war, the search for a permanent solution to 
man’s big problem is becoming increasingly intensified.
Among the efforts which he has made in recent times in his 
search for the answer to the problem of war is the North 
Atlantic Treaty which was signed in 1949 by 12 nations of 
the North Atlantic Area and joined later by 3 others.
Since its inception the organization of NATO has been 
the object of much and wide speculation and the question of 
its utility and/or success and even its functions is to date 
unresolved. To be sure almost everyone has an opinion about 
what NATO is or is not and about what it should or should not
1
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become. The disparity of opinions on NATO runs from the idea 
that it interferes too much with the political independence 
of its members to the view that it is a framework for a 
greater Atlantic union or community and as such is considered 
too narrow in its outlook; from the idea of its being an 
organization primarily concerned with the security of the area 
which the Treaty encompasses to one which extends the Alliance 
to deal in affairs of the entire world.
It is understandable that there is wide spread con­
fusion about the purposes, functions, capacities, and limita­
tions of NATO; for to date there has been no intensive study 
of the organization in terms of the possibilities of its 
becoming more than defense Alliance. There has been no 
plan, official or otherwise, whereby NATO would be politically 
or even economically united.
Most arguments advanced have been based on the dubious 
foundations of historical analogy, popular belief, and 
personal preference. There seems to be a sufficient amount 
of descriptive and analytical literature concerning NATO as a 
community as well as NATO as a defense pact, but no study has 
been made in which a criterion for analyzing mutual defense 
alliances in regard to their evolving into unified political 
alignments or for that matter the probability of their remain­
ing valid as defense arrangements was used.
The present study is an attempt to establish a frame­
work for an analysis of the political and strategic validity
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of mutual defense alliances with the intention of using the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a case study. It is 
hoped that the framework can be established from a study of 
the general problems of mutual defense alliances and of the 
essential conditions for establishing "security communities."
Common Problems of Mutual Defense Alliances 
Throughout recorded history mutual defense alliances 
have come and gone, some lasting over long periods whereas 
others have been short lived. All mutual defense pacts from 
the Ancient Greeks to the present time have been plagued with 
certain recurring difficulties which as basic problems may be 
grouped under three broad headings:^ The problem of establish­
ment, the problem of cohesion, and the problem of effective­
ness. It should be pointed out here that the fundamental 
problem, and one that can be included under all the broad 
headings, stems from the very definition of mutual defense 
alliances. By definition such alliances are agreements among 
sovereign states with each state bringing to the compact 
divergent national aims and policies. The members only bind 
themselves to exercise their sovereign power in prescribed
The common problems confonting mutual defense alli­
ances are adaptations from an excellent study by George Liska, 
Nations In Alliances; The Limits Of Interdependence (Balti- 
more; The Johns Hopkins Press, 19^2); See also Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; The Struggle For Power And 
Peace (4 ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967/, pp. 175-190» 
Arnold Wolfers (ed.) Alliance Policy In The Cold War (Balti­
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).
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ways when any other member may suffer an attack. Mutual 
defense alliances concluded among free nations are not only 
freely Joined but are also freely withdravm from by their 
members.
Defense alliances are not born; they are established, 
and therefore, must serve a given purpose. That is, a defense 
alliance is created for the purpose of defending the partici­
pating members against external physical force. Though the 
members may have divergent interests and reasons for commit­
ting themselves to an alliance (most members of most alliances 
do), they all have one thing in common; fear of an external 
threat. Once that fear disappears, the only thing that can 
hold the alliance together is the appearance of a new or 
greater menace. Thus the primary purpose of a defense alliance 
is to maintain security for its members. The alliance offers 
an alternative to being singled out and taken over by an 
adversary.
To create an alliance against hegemonic powers it is 
essential that the key state or core power make the first 
commitment. Smaller powers may lack the capabilities as well 
as the readiness to develop their strength, or they may not 
want to recognize that a threat exists. In any case, the 
larger power will then try to involve them despite their 
reluctance to become involved. Once the alliance is con­
tracted it is expected that it will remain intact until its 
purpose is fulfilled. In fact, however, defense pacts are
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highly vulnerable to break-up which brings up the major 
difficulty concerning mutual alliances— how to maintain 
cohesion.
The first and foremost problem concerning cohesion 
revolves around agreement by the participating parties on how 
much cohesion: that is, the question of how much unity does
the pact want? and how much particularism can the pact 
stand? Too much unity can destroy the sense of responsibility 
of the allies. On the other hand, pluralism tends to frag­
mentation of common efforts.
One kind of break-up in alliances is when separate 
agreements are concluded between a participating ally and 
the adversary. This is similar to making a separate peace 
during wartime and the dislodging of allies by this means is 
an important goal of alliances and counter alliances. Although 
the ramifications of a separate peace in war-time may be 
greater, separate agreements that concern the cohesion of a 
peacetime alliance may be just as important, especially if 
the alliance is to deter war. In any case, an alliance is 
only as strong as its weakest link; hence pressure by the 
enemy can be expected to be applied at this point. However, 
this weakness is only a relative matter which increases and 
decreases in respect to the ambitions and goals of the member 
subject to pressure and the support of the other allies. It 
also must be noted that the majcr power is also susceptible 
to a separate agreement if to do so would consolidate gains
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in its own national interest. Some of the techniques that a 
would-be defector uses to break away from the alliance are 
to: (1) propose a course for the alliance necessitating
sacrifices too great for the other allies, (2) apply for 
relief from some of his military burdens knowing that 
compliance cannot or will not be forthcoming, and (3) make 
demands for greater privileges and influence within the alli­
ance than is commensurate with his contributions. The 
would-be defector is then freed from his loyalty to the pact 
when the other members do not cooperate.
itoreover, a partial-defection can be distinguished 
in peacetime alliances. For example, a limited interpreta­
tion of an ally's commitment to the pact, or when a member 
places restrictions on the use of the facilities it makes 
available to other members. The latter is a crucial point in 
the era of highly mobile strategic forces.
If alliances are to remain intact in spite of 
unexpected reverses, the bases for them must be rationalized. 
This calls into creation an ideology, which is the most 
important factor for institutionalizing alliances. A typical 
mutual defense agreement will distinguish the basis and 
usually, by implication, the limits of unity; it will be so 
constructed as to incite collective action while at the same 
time it will gloss over or nide inter-allied differences, 
interests, and strains. It will characterize the identity, 
intentions and capabilities of the adversary definitively
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yet the statement of its own ulterior objective will be 
couched in tentative and general terms. All stages of an 
alliance— formation, implementation, and perpetuity— require 
special ideological support.
During the formative stages, the ideology must place 
emphasis on the collective interest of members and prospective 
members in combining their efforts and resources. Thus it 
must stress the common interests and at the same time ignore 
or at least minimize diversities among the members. During 
implementation the ideology must stress the seriousness of 
the opponents capabilities and intentions. And finally, to 
insure perpetuity, the ideology must stress the immutability 
as well as the immorality of the enemy; bestowing upon him 
magical powers of resurgence and incurable addiction to evil. 
However, this is not really enough since conflicts among 
allies tend to come to the fore. Thus to ensure cohesion 
the alliance will try to create a positive program to override 
disintegrative tendencies. But it must be said that creating 
a positive program is a formidable task, especially when the 
Ideology comes to be differentiated more and more along 
nationalist lines.
Another important factor in regard to cohesion is the 
question of consultation within the alliance: whom to con­
sult, what issues to consult on, and toward what objective? 
Consultation may, as cohesion, become an end goal; and may, as 
ideology, temporarily cover up basic discrepancies in alliances.
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Consultation can be either an asset or a liability. It can 
be an asset if it affirms the unity and equality among the 
members; on the other hand it becomes a liability if too 
great an emphasis is placed on consultation— to the extent 
that it impedes the overall effectiveness of the alliance.
As a general rule lesser powers in a coalition take a 
realistic view on consultation. Their main concern is to be 
consulted in such a manner as to give reality to their 
standing within the pact. Usually it is on matters where 
they are directly involved that they will demand and exercise 
their right of veto. It is the major ally, or allies, that 
demands consultation. This demand stems from his desire to 
remain flexible: i.e., to have the opportunity to approve or
veto certain actions, or to dissociate himself from the con­
sequences of the smaller allies' actions. The real problem 
arises when the policy initiated becomes potentially fatal to 
all members. In this case the leading ally not only has the 
right to be consulted; he has the duty to consult the other 
allies when he shares the major responsibility. Probably a 
good rule of thumb for claiming the right to consultation 
could oe based on capability, contribution to collective 
effort, and responsibility for allied action.
Nevertheless, the scope of consultation in any alliance 
will reflect the immediate needs and conveniences which also 
reflects the tendency of the coalition to be "limited" or 
"total" in respect to the degree of responsibility the allies
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assume for each other's actions. To be total, an alliance 
must meet two conditions: It must practice complete soli­
darity, that is, the principle of "all for one and one for 
all", and it must do so all over the universe. On the other 
hand, a limited alliance will specify the commitment in 
regard to action and area. Consultation in a total alliance 
will, therefore, conform with the unlimited liability, where­
as in the limited coalition, the limited commitment will also 
limit consultation. In any event, the degree of cohesion in 
a typical defense pact will be judged by separate actions
taken and by the failure to consult.
No coalition, and especially no defense alliance, can 
long endure unless it can provide for the security needs of 
the participating members. To provide their security above 
all other interests, the alliance must be able to resist the 
pressures of the enemy. Any coalition constructed around a 
major power must depend on the capability of the strongest 
power which will in turn determine the degree of cohesion.
This is especially true in a heterogeneous pact composed of 
nations of divergent interests. However the difficulty arises 
when national capabilities rise or decline. For example, the 
rising capabilities of the major power may give rise to 
cohesion and efficacy. On the other hand, coalitions of 
sovereign nations tend to seek some kind of balance within the
alliance. It is never in lesser states' interest to replace
the hegemonic tendencies of an enemy with those of a
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predominate state, at least if they can avoid it. Unequal 
gains in capabilities among allies never favor cohesion, 
even when the coalition is created to cope with only one 
major conflict. An alliance's cohesion is in less danger of 
disintegration when it is on the defensive and needs all of 
its capability no matter how it is distributed. However, 
this is only one side of the coin. When there is an absence 
of a single conflict, the members' concern over each other's 
capabilities rises to the extent that unequal gains raises 
the fear that the successful ally will abandon the pact over 
issues less vital to his national interest.
With the advent of nuclear weapons the rule of 
capability as an agent of cohesion has taken on a new impor­
tance. The core-power of the coalition has gained in 
importance especially if he controls the nuclear forces. In 
this case, cohesion is loosened if the major power loses the 
trust of the other allies in regard to his use of the nuclear 
force in their behalf; if the alliance leader loses his 
immunity to direct attack; and if no other means of defense 
are available to the lesser powers. The alternative, of 
course, is diffusion of nuclear devices which in turn could 
lead to disintegration of an alliance.
Another important factor concerning alliance cohesion 
is the problem of national domestic stability produced by a 
change in the governing elites in member nations. It is 
always possible that the new government may reject the
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alliance. Generally the new governing body will, in order 
to gain the confidence and respectability of continuity, 
retain membership in the coalition. On the other hand, 
rejection of the alliance is an important means of distin­
guishing the new group from the old regime. This can be 
especially important if the former governing elite was 
closely identified with, or used the alliance to keep itself 
in power. There is always the suspicion that an alliance 
serves to maintain the status quo within the member countries 
which in turn tends toward creating adverse reactions by the 
new government. There are recent examples where hard-pressed 
and shaky governments have sought concessions from alliances 
to avoid being deposed by the opposition.
Two factors that determine the cohesion of a defense 
pact are prestige and influence. Actually they are so similar 
in their use here that they can be incorporated in the common 
term status. Status is an especially devisive factor in 
heterogeneous coalitions. Ideally, higher status should 
derive from the amount of stability and security that a state 
contributes to the collectivity. In practice, there is the 
tendency to claim high status for past performance as well as 
for poor contributions in the areas of security and stability.
The importance of status is relatively new to alli­
ances. It has reached the importance of territory with which 
classical alliances were concerned. Before contemporary 
alliances, members could evaluate their gains and liabilities
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in concrete terms: expansion in territory for the price paid
in men and money. Modern ccalitionH are more likely to be 
concerned with savings provided by security as opposed to an 
increase in territory. In any case, status is intangible and 
cannot be measured, but in modern alliances it has become 
tangible and stated in such indices as number of committee 
memberships, number of times a member is consulted on major 
policy, and number of high military commands held by each 
country. This leads to an intensified inter-allied struggle 
over status especially in terms of the relative standing of 
the lesser allies to the major power.
The status struggle within an alliance is not pro­
duced by external forces; it stems from the fact that the 
roles and the offices are determined by the members themselves 
as well as the fact that status is relative in character and 
cannot, like security, be increased for all members at the 
same time— if it is increased for one it is decreased for 
another.
Effectiveness of an alliance denotes the capacity of 
the members to reconcile their various needs and interests 
with an effective strategy for all. Cohesion and efficacy 
may have the same requirement, but not necessarily in all 
cases. For example, an alliance that emphasizes consultation 
or unanimity voting in order to hold the coalition together 
could destroy the efficacy by so doing. Defense strategy is 
simply plans for using force with the intent to prevail against
13
an enemy in the eventuality of having to fight him. There­
fore, the essence of the defense alliance lies in its having 
an effective strategy.
Several difficulties surround the establishment of 
an effective strategy. The problem stems from the inability 
to know whether a strategy will succeed in operation unless 
and until it has failed of its basic purpose. Thus, accord­
ingly, a planned strategy will be based on speculation and 
abstractions which, in a heterogeneous coalition, subjects 
strategy planning to the divergent views of each member; 
moreover, the most devisive factor in strategic planning 
evolves from each member's view of the threat. In all mutual 
defense alliances the perception and interpretation of the 
threat will determine the commitment; the commitment will 
set the purpose of strategy; and the strategy will distinguish 
the means for carrying out the commitment. One example should 
suffice to show the problem of establishing an effective 
stragety; The geographic location of each ally in relation 
to the prescribed enemy— the danger of the threat will be 
viewed as being greater with the closeness of the enemy.
Other difficulties develop over the employment of 
capability, both individual and collective. Employment of 
capability is equally as important as distribution of capa­
bility among members. One problem rises from the deployment 
of the coalition resources in different regions and theaters 
of operation. In fact, strategy as well as alliance
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relationships themselves can be seriously strained when 
different members cannot agree on the importance of various 
areas, targets, and conflicts.
A major source of trouble in planning strategy is the 
enemy himself. The different ways in which the opposition 
applies pressure will affect the alliance's cohesion and 
strategy differently. For example, a sudden political demand 
or a military movement can and probably will cause a closing 
of ranks in the alliance. On the other hand, it can also ex­
pose inter-alliance conflicts or naked deficiency of strategy. 
The defense coalition is handicapped by the simple fact that 
it is a response to an external threat. Therefore, it does 
not have much leeway in planning strategy. Since alliances 
must respond to each new and different application of pressure 
they must remain flexiole. This is especially true when a 
certain strategy has been successful or when a change in 
strategy might cause an increase in burdens and liabilities.
Still another difficulty common to defense alliances 
is the tendency to become dogmatic, i.e., the tendency to 
become and end in itself. When the alliance's preservation 
becomes the overriding factor in all situations, the particu­
lar interests which it is to serve will become obscure and 
thereby create a gap between the outer appearance and the 
inner-reality. This is highly likely to destroy predictabil­
ity and stability which the alliance is supposed to create 
in relations among states.
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A final difficulty that plagues mutual defense 
alliances is the fear by the members of loss of sovereignty. 
This fear is directed toward the allies as well as toward 
the potential enemy and is a condition which stems from the 
fact that each member has its own identity, prestige and 
interests which it is determined to preserve. Ideally, the 
members would prefer to make their own defense, but this 
being impossible the next preference is the defense of their 
own specific interests within a climate of alliance political 
agreement, i.e., each to have the support of its allies for 
its own position. Fear of losing sovereignty also directs 
members to avoid agreements that would limit their freedom 
of action. Thus allies will generally shun binding decisions 
on individual or collective activitiea outside the area 
covered by the treaty, A related fear in this regard 
revolves around the possibility that an ally's outside 
activity could involve the entire coalition in an unwanted 
confrontation.
This difficulty has become amplified with the develop­
ment of nuclear weapons. Nuclear capability has to many 
states become the symbol of power and, therefore, the symbol 
of independence. Thus the allies in contemporary pacts tend 
to desire to retain an independent military posture for all 
eventualities. To do so it is necessary to develop a sub­
stantial nationally controlled nuclear capability. The 
stronger the capability, the stronger becomes the nation in
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the realm of negotiations. A nuclear state must be taken 
into oondideration in diplomacy and military strategy by 
both allies and adversaries alike. In other words, national 
control over nuclear weapons enhances a country's position 
in cold-war diplomacy by increasing the likelihood of the 
country's inclusion and strengthening its voice in serious 
negotiations.
In sum it is possible to say that almost every defense 
pact voluntarily entered into from earliest history has been 
based upon self-interest of the contracting nations. Not 
only does history show that alliances are based on temporary 
self-interests of their members, it also shows another simple 
fact— almost all coalitions have broken up the moment they 
cease to serve the members' interests. It is, therefore, 
possible to say that the real test of all alliances revolves 
around one central question; Do the terms of the agreement 
still offer mutual advantages? If the conditions are such 
that the interests of the alliance members no longer converge 
and the changing trend cannot be reversed, the coalition will 
be held together only by the inertia created by institution­
alization which may keep an organization going after interests 
cease to be served.
Characteristics of "Security-Communities"
The topics of "political integration," "political- 
communities," and "security-communities," concerning
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integration in the political, social, and economic spheres
of such communities, have been the subject of extensive
2research by various authors in recent years. These studies 
made extensive analyses of several cases in which political 
order-building had attained the level of "security-communities," 
a level at which war among the members is practically out of 
the question. These authors distinguished two types of 
"security-communities:" "Amalgamated," i.e., one resulting 
from a formal federation of two or more independent entities 
into a single larger unit (e.g. the United States, or Switzer­
land) ; and the second, "pluralistic," made up of legal 
independent separate governments (e.g. the United States, 
Britain and Canada).
Though little enough is still known about the neces­
sary requirements for successful integration, or in what
2Among these studies are found the following: Karl
W. Deutsch, Political Community At The International Level 
(Kew York: Doubleday & Company! 1954); Karl W. Deutsch et~al, 
Political Communities and The North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957)» Amitai Etzioni, 
"The Dialectics Of Supernational Unification," American 
Political Science Review. Vol. LVI, No. 4 (1962), pp. 927-936; 
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rine­
hart & Winston, Ï965); Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting Of Europe 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957); Ernest 
B. Haas, "The Challenge Of Regionalism," International Organ­
ization, Vol. XII, No, 3 (1958)» pp. #0-448; Philip E. Jacob 
and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guidelines For 
The Analysis Of The Bases Of Political Community," in Philip 
Jacob and James Tasco (eds) The Integration Of Political 
Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); Bruce M.
Russett, Communities And Contention; Britain And America In 
The Twentieth Century (Cambridge. Mass.; M.I.T. Press. 1963).
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order they need occur, these authors have identified several 
conditions as important and perhaps crucial. Among others 
they include: a degree of cultural similarity or at least
agreement on the major politically relevant values, economic 
interdependence, and the existence of formal institutions with 
substantial concensus-building effects. In other words, the 
researchers found a compatibility of values among the 
participating states. These common values were most helpful 
when they were united in similar types of political institu­
tions, thus creating a common "way of life."
Another characteristic is an increase in the politi­
cal and administrative capabilities of the participating 
entities, along with the superior economic growth within the 
region. Other characteristics of the "security-community" 
appear to be the presence of a multiplicity of unbroken links 
of social communications and considerable social mobility 
of people among the states concerned. And finally, a degree 
of mutual predictibility of behavior is considered a pre­
requisite for any "security-community."
No one of these is a sufficient condition for 
successful integration and research has not yet established 
with certainty whether any are necessary conditions. Yet it 
seems likely that they are essential for any successful 
federation of previously political entities (amalgamated 
security-community); and they are probably of major importance, 
though to a lesser extent for long-term peaceful cooperation
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among legally separate sovereign states (pluralistic security- 
community).
Despite the fact that there were several positive 
findings, it should also be noted that there were some nega­
tive findings regarding the integrative process. For example, 
the authors destroyed or at least subjected to serious doubt 
the basic myths for those who argue that the nation state is 
on the way to extinction, and that there is a trend toward 
political universality. In fact, it was found that it is 
hard to find the successful formation of a security-community 
in the twentieth century. Also the belief that the success 
of one security-community leads to the establishment of 
others (the bandwagon effect), was found to be invalid. And 
finally, the popular notion that fear of war or of anarchy 
among themselves led states to regional integration is un­
founded. On the other hand, it is discovered that external 
threats usually lead to mutual defense pacts, but mutual 
defense alliances are generally transitory and do not turn 
out to be a good road toward establishing a "security- 
community."
In summary, and especially for the frame of reference, 
the concern is in the realm of political union. Here 
political union means any arrangement under which autonomous 
policy formulation is given up by existing states in regard 
to an important area of policy. Political Union covers a 
wide spectrum or range of situations— from the confederal
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agreement between two or more entities with shared political 
interests and goals to the federal unified state. However, a 
confederation among states may or may not meet the require­
ments of a political union. The mark of union is whether or 
not there is actually a delegation of political power to a 
central governmental institution. Any arrangement that merely 
sets up an institutionalized council composed of states 
instructed delegates without the power to finalize decision 
makeing is not a political union in the real sense of the 
term. On the other hand, the successful or true political 
union is reached when the governing elites of the compacting 
states cease to identify themselves and their loyalty solely 
with their national state, and when power is delegated to 
the larger unit and lodged in a centralized organ for final 
decision-making.
Scope
In order to apply the North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
zation to the above criterion in the form of a case study, 
this work will concern itself with some of the Organization's 
major problem areas. However, to set the groundvjork for a 
fuller understanding of the problems confronting the 
alliance, the study will begin with a descriptive analysis 
of NATO respecting the reason for, the purpose of, and the 
growth of the Orgainzation. In addition, a description of the 
political and military organizational structure that has 
evolved out of the treaty will be given.
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The first, and major, part of the study will be a 
thorough examination of the problem area of the development 
of the Alliance's strategy and the role of nuclear weapons 
within that strategy. In this area particular emphasis will 
be placed on the problems arising out of the United States' 
domination of the Organization's strategic planning and 
United States control of nuclear weapons. Included in the 
examination will be an investigation of ^/ashington's efforts 
to establish an acceptable NATO nuclear force. An examina­
tion will also be made of what is possibly NATO's foremost 
problem— the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Though 
adverse ramifications from the spread of nuclear weapons 
could be almost unlimited, four seem of major importance to 
this study: the increased possibility of accidental wars,
the possible effects of a nuclear-armed West Germany, the 
possible effects on disarmament, and the possible effects 
on NATO strategy.
Further, an analysis will be made of some nuclear 
strategies from which the Alliance may choose in face of 
nuclear diffusion. These alternatives will include the 
rejection of nuclear weapons, the establishment of independent 
nuclear forces, the establishment of a NATO nuclear force, 
and the complete control of all of the Alliance's nuclear 
weapons by the United States.
The remaining part of the study will look into the 
problem area arising out of changing world conditions, the
22
changing nature of the Alliance, and the changing views of 
the nature of the Soviet threat. Here the opinions of the 
leaders of NATO member nations will be examined in regard to 
how they view NATO’s role within these changed conditions.
An inquiry will be made into Soviet policy statements, 
idiology, and action in foreign relations in order to determine 
the nature of the Soviet threat. And finally, the views of 
some of the leaders of NATO nations will be examined in an 
effort to determine the present need for and purposes of the 
Organization.
Since this study is primarily concerned with the 
political and strategic problems of mutual defense alliances 
in general, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
particular, and not in community-building, the emphasis will 
concern the political sphere. No attempt will be made to 
discuss the social and economic spheres. Not that the 
economic and social spheres are less important, but that they 
in themselves constitute the subject of a broader and more 
thorough treatment than can be here undertaken.
Another limitation to the scope of this study re­
volves around the amount of coverage given each problem in 
relation to the number of different possible views on each 
problem. For example, the organization is made up of fifteen 
signatory powers which means it is safe to say there are at 
least fifteen divergent views on every action— yet there can 
be, and is, agreement on the great majority of actions taken.
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However, this study is going to emphasize, in the main, the 
problems as they affect the four leading members of the 
Alliance— Britain, France, West Germany, and the United 
States. Here again this limitation is not due to lack of 
importance of the lessei states but more to the lack of time 
and space in this undertaking. The smaller states are 
important to the organization, not only in respect to their 
geographical location and population, but also as a part of 
the glue or unifying factor of the Alliance. It is possible 
to make the statement that although the lesser nations are 
not completely pleased with the organization they seem to 
more or less accept the United States' domination in return 
for their security and still feel that they are making a 
contribution. The position and attitude of the smaller 
members is probably stated best by Paul-Henri Spaak one of 
Europe's truly great statesmen;
What would become of the smaller countries if NATO 
were destroyed? They would have to take refuge in uni­
lateral disarmament and political neutrality. Who 
believes that a small country like Belgium, which an 
aeroplane can cross from North to South in two minutes 
and from East to West in three-and-a-half minutes, can 
maintain a completely independent army and air force and 
still have access to the weapons that would be effective 
in a possible war? Thrown back upon our own resources, 
we could not hope to create nuclear forces and as a 
result our military effort would become pointless. We 
can only reasonably ask of our peoples a sacrifice and 
expenditures of these dimensions if we integrate our 
military effort into an overall system.3
^Paul-Henri Spaak, "The Alliance Must Go On," NATO 
Letter. Vol. XV, No. 3 (March, 196?), p. 6.
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and again by a former Prime Minister of Greece, Panayotis 
Piplnelis, when he said;
In the matter of Atlantic, or indeed of any other 
kind of defense, the problem of the smaller countries is 
essentially not one of dimension or quantity; it is 
incontestably qualitative. The acquisition of one or 
the other weapons system . . . might be denied the 
smaller if only for economic reasons, A country whose 
diminutive area renders it at first sight insignificant 
can, because of its geographicl position, be of prime 
importance to the Alliance’s strategy.
. . . furthermore participation with the right of veto 
in all levels of an integrated alliance offers the 
smaller countries a share in influencing common decisions 
that they could not hope for otherwise. It seems to me 
difficult to deny that, far from being diminished by 
this form of integration, the small countries are in 
fact elevated by it, in a limited way perhaps but in 
one which in certain cases of disagreement might become
decisive.4
^"Integration, Detente And The Smaller Countries," 
ibid., Vol. XV, No. 3 (November, 19^6), pp. 8, 11.
CHAPTER II 
ORIGINS OF NATO
Baoksround To The Treaty 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
established on April 4, 194-9» when representatives from 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxem­
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States met in Washington and signed 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece and Turkey joined the 
Alliance in 1952, while West Germany, the last member to 
join, was included in 1955*̂
NATO began essentially as a military alliance. The 
decision of the member nations to unite for their collec­
tive defense was brought about by the demonstrated intention 
of the Soviet Union to expand its systems by force, threat 
of force, and subversion. The Soviet Union had held intact 
a combined military force of some 175 wartime divisions and 
20,000 planes and had sought to create a climate in which
U.S. Bureau of Public Affairs, NATO 1949-1959; The 
First Ten Years. Department of State Publication No. 6?S3 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 4.
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Western Europe could be taken over piecemeal by any method
2short of war.
Thus, NATO was created in response to a long series 
of moves by Russia in which she used aggression and conquest, 
principally through subversion either in the direct pressure 
of or in the shadow of the Red Army. In 19^7» Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania had been taken over by internal 
Communist parties even though these parties were in the 
minority.
As early as 19^5» the USSR was active in giving aid 
to Communist rebels in Greece. It also brought pressure to 
bear on Iran in order to keep Soviet troops in North Iran, 
and at the same time, the USSR was pressuring Turkey for 
territory and bases in the Straits.
In February 1948, when Czechslovakia fell to a 
Communist form of government, the West was shocked into full 
awareness that the period of peace and security they had hoped 
would follow World War II was not going to be realized. The 
West had reduced its armed forces below the security level 
and had placed their faith in the new United Nations and 
United States monopoly of atomic power for the maintenance 
of peace and the settlement of international disputes. But 
Russia had rendered the UN powerless for maintaining peace 
and security by abusing its power of veto in the Security
^Ibid.. p. 7.
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Council, The Soviet had used the veto no less than thirty
times by 19^9.̂
The Western Nations had begun to realize that the
USSR was a growing menace and that, in order to thwart this
menace, they must unite. For example, in March 19^7, Britain
and France had met in the historic town of Dunkirk and signed
the first of the post war alliances. Although the Dunkirk
pact was directed against aggression of Germany, rather than
Russia, it had a clause that suggested defense against
Russian aggression through the usage of East German forces
since it provided defense against a threat arising from
"action by Germany designed to facilitate . . .  a policy" of 
4aggression. The real importance of the Dunkirk pact lay in 
the fact that it showed a trend toward European collabora­
tion, and that it was a forerunner of the Brussels Treaty.
Exactly one year later, March 1948, Britain and 
France met with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands at 
Brussels and signed a 50-year Treaty of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Collaboration, and Collective Self-Defense, The 
signatory members pledged that if any one should be "the 
object of an armed attack in Europe," the others would
^North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Hand­
book (11th ed., Utrecht, Netherlands; Bosch-Utrecht, 19^3)» 
p. 7 •
4United Nations, Secretariat, Treaty Series: Treaties 
and International Agreements Registered Or Filed and Recorded 
With The Secretariat Of The United Nations. Vol. IX, No. 132 
(1948), p. 190.
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provide "all military aid and other assistance in their 
power.
The Brussels Treaty was also aimed directly at pro­
tection against German aggression. The "preamble" binds the 
signatory nations "to take such steps as may be held to be 
necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy 
of aggression."^ But by this time, the United States, which 
had shouldered the responsibility of aid to Greece and 
Turkey to resist Communism under the "Truman Doctrine," was 
interested in defense against Russian aggression. Britain 
had also become more interested in Russian aggression and 
the "real pre-occupation of the . . . British government was
"  7the eventuality of a Soviet attack on Western Europe."
Although the United States was not a signatory of 
the Brussels Treaty, President Truman welcomed its signing 
and stated that it was the intention of the United States to 
match the determination of the free countries of Europe to 
protect themselves "by an equal determination on our part to
Û
help them."
^United Nations, Secretariat, ibid., Vol. XIX, No.
30k (1949), p. 57.
^Ibid., p. 53.
7Royal Institute of International Affairs, Britain in 
western Europe (London; Oxford University Press, 195^)» P. 8.
8"Toward Securing The Peace And Preventing War," U.S. 
Department Of State Bulletin. Vol. XVIII, No. 456 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 419.
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In June 1948, the USSR, by means of a blockade, 
attempted to force the West out of Berlin. Since the status 
of Berlin was uncertain and rights of passage to and from the 
city were nowhere guaranteed In Allied agreement, the USSR 
hoped by this movement to shove the Allies out of that city 
and thus consolidate their hold on East Germany. (An Allied 
Airlift was to eventually break the blockade In 1949.)
The Brussels Treaty had set up a joint military 
organization for common military defense under the direction 
of British Field Marshal Montgomery, but In view of the 
massive strength of the Soviet Union the five signatory 
nations clearly did not have at their disposal the means to 
create a sufficient defense. "Only the strength of America, 
founded on an Immense Industrial potential and possession of 
the atomic arm, could redress the overwhelming Imbalance of 
power.However the Brussels Treaty was another step toward 
a collective defense system for the Western World.
In 1948, the Canadian Prime Minister Louis St.
Laurent proposed a single all-embracing Atlantic Defense 
System to Incorporate the Brussels Alliance. An Atlantic 
Alliance met with Immediate approval In Britain, and there 
was a general mood for acceptance of such an alliance In 
America.
It Is not surprising that the atmosphere In regard to 
an Atlantic Alliance was becoming favorable In America
9The NATO Handbook, op. clt., p. 7<
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although such an alliance in peacetime would be a complete 
change in America’s traditional foreign policy based on fear 
of "entangling alliances" which dated back to George Washing­
ton’s Farewell Address. The change in thinking started when 
the United States assumed responsibility for aid to Greece 
and Turkey after Britain declared herself unable to carry 
out her responsibilities in that area. The Marshall Plan, 
instituted in 19^7, for the economic recovery of Europe was 
another step toward this changing atmosphere. Gradually 
Americans began to realize that piecemeal takeovers of 
territory and extension of power by the USSR was a great 
threat to American security; to meet this threat the United 
States would have to participate in European and world 
affairs. This realization culminated in the so-called 
Vandenberg Resolution.
The Resolution, proposed by Senator Vandenberg, 
affirmed the right of the Government to exercise individual 
or collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. It authorized the Government to associate itself 
with regional defense arrangements when they were based on 
"continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and when 
they contribute to the security of the United St ate s. T he  
Resolution was adopted in the U.S. Senate by a decisive
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A 
Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents. 19%-49, 
01st Cong., 1st Sess (Washington; U.S. 'Government Printing 
Office, 1950), p. 197.
31
majority (64-4) on June 11, 1948, and thus paved the way for 
a comprehensive Atlantic Defense System.
Meanwhile, other steps toward the new union were 
being taken. The United States began to participate as 
observers in the meetings of the Defense Committee of the 
Brussels Pact. This participation grew from observer to 
advisor stage. In October 1948, the Consultative Committee 
of the Brussels Treaty announced "complete agreement in 
principle for a North Atlantic Defense Pact," and on December 
10, the actual drafting of the treaty began in Washington, 
D.C.^^
During the initial drafting period discussions took 
place between the five Brussels Pact countries and the United 
States. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portu­
gal were invited to take part in the negotiations. These 
countries accepted and, after two months of negotiations, 
the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the twelve original 
nations on April 4, 1949.
The North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty 
were much alike in purpose and goals:
— the peaceful settlement of disputes and abstinence 
from force or the threat of force. (Article 1)
— economic collaboration among the signatory 
countries. (Article 2)
11North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO: Facts 
About The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris: NATO 
Information Service, 196 )̂, p. 11.
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— the strengthening of the means for resisting 
aggression. (Article 3)
— consultation in the event of any signatory being 
threatened. (Article h)
— mutual assistance in case of aggression.
(Article 5)^^
But there were major differences in the two treaties. 
The Brussels Treaty was specifically aimed at German aggres­
sion, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, though covering 
attack against any aggressor, was primarily aimed at the 
Communist World. Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty guaranteed 
military support in case of an attack on one of the signatory 
nations, while the North Atlantic Treaty was vague on the 
military commitment. Article 6 states that should an attack 
on any signatory country occur, each country will take "such 
action as it deems necessary5 including the use of armed
13force," which did not bind any country to the use of force. 
One other major difference was the length of effectiveness 
of the treaties, whereas the Brussels Treaty was to continue 
for a period of fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty could 
be reviewed after ten years upon request by. any member, and 
after twenty years a member could secede upon a years notice.
Growth Of The Organization 
Although NATO was not to be the all-embracing 
Atlantic defense system that Prime Minister St. Laurent of
1 2 See Appendix for full text of the Treaty. 
^^Ibid.
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Canada had proposed, it was not to become an exclusive organ­
ization. Article 10 assures that it can be extended if it 
is required but it also limits extension to those European 
countries that would strengthen the Alliance. Article 10 
stipulates that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, 
invite any other European State in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and contribute to the security of
1Athe North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty." The 
NATO founders were of the opinion that to invite non-Euro­
peans could complicate the Alliance's task of self defense.
The founders were also of the opinion that not every European 
country would be welcome; only those that were prepared to 
promote the NATO principles both at home and abroad, that is, 
to work for the preservation of peace and the extension of 
freedom. Had the founders not incorporated these limitations 
into the treaty it would have been possible for the Soviet 
Union or any one of the satellites to join NATO and thereby 
disrupt the cohesion and spirit which are basic to the strength 
of an;ĵ alliance. With the Soviets as members, NATO could be 
paralyzed, as was the U.N. Security Council, by a veto.
Russian Foreign Minister Molotov probably had such a move in 
mind in March, 195^i when he suggested that the Soviet Union 
might be prepared to join NATO.
^̂ Ibid.
^^For the text of the Soviet note in regard to its 
membership in NATO see the U.S. Department of State Bulletin 
Vol. XXX, No. 772 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
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The unanimity clause in Article 10 is also a limita­
tion on membership. Spain which is considered of importance 
to the defense strategy of Western Europe has not been invited 
to join. Such suggestions were blocked by strong opposition 
from the Scandinavian countries. They were strongly opposed 
to the Spanish government headed by General Franco.Never­
theless Spain is an indirect part of the defense system and 
has been since 1953j when a bilateral agreement was concluded 
between Spain and the United States whereby the United States 
leased bases for the Strategic Air Command (SAG) bombers and 
naval bases for United States ships assigned to the Mediter­
ranean fleet.
Greece And Turkey Accede To NATO 
The organization, however has grown since 1949. In 
February, 1952, Greece and Turkey gained membership in the 
organization as a result of the heightened tension of the 
Korean War. Both countries desired entry to get a formal 
guarantee against invasion from the North. Turkey feared 
being left out of the defense perimeter, and being made 
subject to another incident such as Korea. Greece had fought 
internal conspirators for several years, and thought that a
1954), p. 662; For the text of United States' reply to the 
Soviet note see ibid., Vol. XXX, 777 (Washington: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1954), pp. 756-759.
^^Ben T. Moore, NATO And The Future Of Europe (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 195^), p. 68.
35
guarantee from NATO could prevent a recurrence of such 
17turmoil. Turkey, however, was not qualified to join, that 
is, geographically, since she was in Asia Minor. Politically 
and strategically though Turkey was on the European frontier. 
Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey were receiving unilateral 
support, in their struggle against Communist subversion, from 
the United States under the "Truman Doctrine," and therefore, 
the United States pressed hard for their entry. After over­
coming some objections from the Allies, especially the Scan­
dinavians who "were deeply worried by what they regarded as a 
watering-down of the Atlantic and democratic character of 
NATO and an extension of their obligations to an area remote 
from them," they finally acceded to the treaty by the "Greece- 
Turkey Protocol.
West Germany Accedes To NATO 
West Germany, the last member to join the Alliance, 
was able to accede only after a bitter struggle, of crisis 
magnitude, within the Alliance. The struggle was not over the 
extension of obligation or commitment of the treaty to defend 
West Germany, but over the delicate subject of German rearma­
ment. The security of West Germany was already guaranteed, 
at least indirectly, by Article 6 of the treaty. Article 6,
^Royal Institute Of International Affairs, Atlantic 
Alliances: NATO’s Role In The Free World (London: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1952), pp. 13-l4.
18Moore, o£. c^t., p. 28.
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which defines the North Atlantic Treaty Area, stipulates that 
"an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack . . .  on the occupation forces of any 
party in Europe. . . Therefore, an attack on West
Germany would have been an attack on Britain, Prance and the 
United States since all had occupation forces in West Germany. 
In fact, this clause of the treaty still commits NATO to the 
defense of Berlin so long as Britain, Prance, and the United 
States retain occupational forces in that city.
West German participation in the defense of the West 
was first considered and declared a necessity at the fifth 
session of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York on 
September 15, 1950. The Council, meeting for the first time 
since the outbreak of the Korean war, concentrated its efforts 
on a single problem; how to defend West Europe against a 
similar attack. The Council realized that the Alliance was 
far from ready to repel such an attack, but it was also in 
unanimous agreement that to repel a Korean type attack it 
must adopt a strategy to defend as far East as possible. But 
this in turn meant that the Allies would have to furnish far 
greater resources and manpower than were available at that 
time in Europe.
19See Appendix for full text of the treaty.
20NATO: Facts About The North Atlantic Treaty Organ­
ization, op. cit., p. 22. NATO countries could boast approxi­
mately fourteen armed divisions on the continent as opposed 
to some 210 Soviet armed divisions.
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The United States took the lead in this crisis and
proposed that NATO should seek to build "an integrated force
under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter
21aggression and insure the defense of Western Europe."
Under this plan the United States would furnish an outstand­
ing officer (General Eisenhower) and an increased number of 
American troops under his command in Europe, This proposal 
also called for an increase in aid for the enlargement of 
European forces. And, since the "forward strategy" called 
for defending Europe as far as possible, including the 
defense of West Germany, the integrated NATO forces must also
include "the participation of German units and the use of
22German productive resources for its supplies."
The proposal of an integrated force with German 
participation had a resounding impact in two different 
quarters. First, in the United States, it set off a bitter 
debate in Congress on sending troops to Europe, Second, in 
Europe, it set off a bitter debate on the rearmament of 
Germany. The first, that is the Congressional debate, is of 
no moment for this inquiry so suffice it to say that the 
United States in the end "faced the problem which it had 
avoided when it ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, and sent
21Moore, o£. cit., p. 44.
^^Lord H. L. lamay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949- 
1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 195^)> p. 32.
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troops to E u r o p e , O n  the other hand, the impact on Europe
of the rearming of Germany is important since it is directly
related to the major political and strategic problems; it is
directly related to the desires for a share in the control of
nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the fears of some of
the Allies over the possibility of Germany becoming a nuclear
2Llpower or even sharing in a nuclear weapons system.
When France saw that the United States was determined 
to bring Germany into the defense of Europe, she reacted 
immediately with a plan of her own. It had been no more than 
five years since Germany's defeat in World War II, and oppo­
sition to the idea of German rearmament remained strong in 
Europe, particularly in France. French Premier Bene Pleven 
proposed a plan for a unified European force which would 
incorporate German troops. The Pleven Plan (later to be 
called the European Defense Community, EDO) was not only for 
the purpose of bringing Germany in as a participant in her 
own and European defense, but more as a means of keeping a 
check on a strong and revitalized Germany.
In any case the Pleven Plan was a unique and bold move 
toward a European union. It provided for an army composed
Moore, o£. cit., p. #.
2kBruce M. Busset, International Regions And The 
International System; A Study Of Political Ecology (Chicago : 
Band McNally and Company, 1967)» p. 204= According to Russet, 
some observers feel that the French desire for an independent 
nuclear force is due as much to fear of Germany as of the 
Soviets. However, he sees little evidence of this.
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of mixed divisions and integrated staffs and support units. 
The army would be under the orders of a Supreme Command 
appointed by a Parliament of member countries. The army was 
to be financed by a common European defense budget, equiped 
with standardized arms, uniformly clothed and uniformly 
trained. This was "a bold step toward European military 
union.
Britain announced its inability to join a defense
community one month after the Pleven proposal. Britain had
always rejected any proposal which in any respect would
limit her national sovereignty. Furthermore, as a Ghatam
House Report stressed in 1953i "Britain is a world power with
vital interests outside Europe which preclude a complete
merger with European neighbors and restrict what it can do
2Ôfor Western Europe." (Although Britain temporarily set 
aside this policy in later joining the Western European 
Union, it was basically this same attitude that kept her out 
of the Common Market.)
The United States had been pressing the Europeans 
to form a unified Europe since instituting the Marshall Plan, 
but American reaction to the French plan was far from enthu­
siastic, The United States viewed the Pleven Plan as no more 
than a means of delaying the building of European defenses.
^^Hoore, 0£. cit., p. 46.
^^Atlantic Alliance, op. oit., p. 2.
40
The federalist elements in the plan were certain to lead to 
prolonged controversy, complicated negotiations, and post­
ponement of the rearmament of Germany. Therefore, the United 
States argued for the direct integration of German troops 
into NATO rather than by way of a European army. As a 
compromise it was agreed, at the NATO Council meeting in 
Brussels on December 18, 1950, "in principle" to a German 
contribution to defense. Meanwhile the Council invited
Britain, France, and the United States to explore, in cooper-
27ation with Germany, a means for effecting this decision.
As it turned out the United States viewed the Pleven 
Plan correctly. Due to delay in negotiation the idea of a 
European Defense Community (EDC) was not agreed to by France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries until May, 1952.
A year later the six governments had forged and signed a 
treaty to create the EDC and it was waiting for ratification. 
The EDC Treaty was basically the Pleven Plan— except France 
had negotiated several alterations, such as, the right to 
retain national forces for overseas interests and the right 
to withdraw forces, if necessary, for overseas interests. It 
was still another year, the Spring of 1954, before four 
countries had ratified the treaty. Neither France nor Italy 
had yet ratified it although it was expected that Italy would 
ratify the treaty soon after France.
27tThe NATO Handbook, op. cit., pp. 58-59»
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In June, 1954, a new French government under Pierre 
Mendis-France took office. The new French government immedi­
ately asked for concessions in the treaty which would reduce 
the degree of army integration and supranational control.
The other five nations balked at this point, and France was 
left to decide the fate of its own proposal.
On August 30, 1954, the French Assembly rejected the 
EDO Treaty by a vote of 319-264. The reasons for the French 
rejection are many and varied, but it is generally agreed 
that the major reasons were the reduction of tension brought 
on by the Korean Truce, the failure of Britain to Join as a 
counter-weight to a strong Germany, and the distrust of 
supranational institutions as a check on Germany. Ben T.
Moore aptly summed up the reasons for the rejection when he 
said, "The decision turned on national pride, particularly
sensitive because of the recent withdrawal from Indo-China,
28and the pervasive fear of Germany."
The failure of the EDC left Europe in a state of 
confusion. A decided anti-French bias immediately developed 
in the United States, Britain, and Germany, and NATO was at 
a breaking point. NATO had adopted a strategy at the 1952 
NATO Council meeting in Lisbon which called for incorporation 
of German troops into a central NATO army. The rejection 
automatically invalidated this strategy and left NATO with two
^®Moore, o£. cit., p. 53.
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alternatives; (1) they could go ahead and rearm Germany with­
out the consent of the French; (2) they could set up air 
bases and rely on retaliatory strength to deter aggression, 
and give up the idea of maintaining ground troops for that 
purpose. Either choice would possibly have destroyed NATO.
Britain, however, under the Eden government, suggested 
a third alternative; the establishment of a new organization. 
The British invited representatives from Canada, the United 
States, Germany, Italy and the five Brussels Treaty countries 
to London for discussions. The discussions resulted in 
several decisions which were agreed to later in Paris. The 
"Paris Agreements" were signed by all representatives on 
October 23» 1954» and ratified by Prance in December, 1954.^^
The agreements embodied the following decisions;
— Germany and Italy became members of a revised 
Brussels Treaty with a revised title of Western European 
Union (WEU).
— The end of the occupation of Germany, but the West 
German government agreed to the maintainence of the allied 
troops a].ready stationed there.
— Agreement on forces to be maintained by each member, 
and a system of control over armaments and force level.
— Britain would undertake to maintain substantial troops 
on the continent for an indefinite period.
^9yhe NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 6l.
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— Germany became a direct member of NATO (May 5» 1935)»
— Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUE) would have
control of all forces ezcept member countries stationed with-
30in the areas of his command.
The modified Brussels Treaty had finally removed the 
barb against German aggression. But it was replaced by a 
restriction on rearmament that has become almost as painful 
to Germany as the declaration against German aggression.
Under the WEU Protocol III, West Germany undertook not to 
manufacture any atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weaspons. 
Germany can manufacture missiles, warships, and strategic 
bombers with approval of two-thirds of the WEU Council. Pro­
tocol IV sets up an agency for control of armaments whose
job is to make sure provisions of Protocol III are carried 
31out. Thus, Germany is the only NATO member that is barred 
from developing nuclear weapons.
The price that the United States had to pay in order 
to achieve the participation of Germany in the defense of 
Europe was a promise to keep U.S. forces in Europe as long 
as was necessary.
Basically there were similarities in the new WEU and 
the abortive EDC. The main function of WEU would be to
30United Nations, Secretariat, Treaty Series: Treaties 
And International Agreements Registered Or Filed And Recorded 




administer control over the military strength of its conti­
nental members; and to exercise a more rigid control over 
Germany tnan the other members as was planned under the EDC 
Treaty, The integration of German units within the NATO 
army was but a watered-down version of the arrangements pre­
cluded by a European army. On the other hand, the WEU dis­
carded the common defense budget, common production, and the 
common uniform ideas as were contemplated by EDC. This was 
a setback to those who were advocating a European union.
(The EDC had been a bold attempt toward a federal Europe, 
but it ended in utter failure.)
The question might be asked: Why was France willing
to accept the rearmament of Germany in less than four months 
after rejecting her own proposal? There has been considerable 
speculation on the answers to this question, but it is prob­
ably safe to state that there were five major reasons for 
France's change: First, Britain had broken from her centuries-
long tradition, and had committed forces to the WEU, thereby 
easing Prance's fear of a revitalized German army.
Second, France realized that to reject the WEU might 
possibly lead to the dismantling of NATO. France realized as 
much as any other member that NATO was her basic security.
Third, the United States' promise that it would keep 
forces in Europe allayed much of Prance's fear of Germany 
becoming the predominant power of the new union. This was 
coupled with the fact that the United States would off-set
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German predominance in the broader Alliance.
Fourth, the economic integration of France and Germany 
by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was beginning 
to show positive results. Many Frenchmen believed that the 
ECSC did give France some measure of control over a resurgent 
Germany.
Finally, the WEU was not as obnoxious to the French
nationalist faction as had been the defunct EDC. Under WEU,
France would retain her army as a national force, and France
would not disappear as a nation. The disappearance of France
as a great power and even as a nation had been the major
nationalists* argument over the EDC Treaty in the French 
32Assembly.^
The Present Structure Of NATO
Article 9 of the treaty provided for a Council to be
"so organized as to be able to meet promptly at anytime,"
and the Council was given discretion to create subsidiary
33agencies with emphasis on defense.The first major action 
of the Council was, therefore, the establishment of a defense 
committee, and by the end of 1949, NATO had a loose "stra­
tegic concept" planned for the defense of the treaty area.^^
^^Moore, o£. cit.. pp. 50-51»
33See Appendix for full text of the treaty.
34NATO; Facts About the Worth Atlantic Treaty Organ­
ization, op. cit.. p. 20.
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Since 1949, the organizational structure has grown con­
siderably and today the structure includes the North Atlantic 
Council and its committees, the International Secretariat, 
and the Military Structure.
The Civil Structure 
The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority 
of NATO, with a permanent headquarters in Brussels,
B e l g i u m , I t  is composed of representatives of the fifteen 
sovereign and equal member states. Since the member states 
are sovereign and equal in status, the Council’s decisions 
are taken unanimously.
The Council generally meets at the ministerial level 
twice a year. At the Ministerial Meetings, the agenda 
determines who will represent the members. It can be one or 
several of the nation's ministers, such as Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, or even Heads of Government. The Council 
met at the level of Heads of Government in December 1957* 
However, in order to ensure the continuous functioning of 
the Council, Permanent Representatives, who hold Ambassadorial
35North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Hand­
book (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, I96&), 
p. 11. In June of 1966, after French President De Gaulle 
announced that France intended to withdraw from the military 
organization of NATO, the Council decided on Brussels as the 
new permanent political headquarters. The Brussels head­
quarters for the Council, the Military Committee, and the 
International Secretariat was inaugurated on October I6, 196?. 
All of NATO's organizations have been transferred from French 
territory.
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rank, meet between Ministerial Sessions. The permanent 
Representatives meet once or more a week, and can also be 
called together on short notice any time. The president of 
the Council is a Foreign Minister of a member state. This 
office rotates annually among the member states, according 
to alphabetical order in English.
The Committees are charged with assisting the Council 
in carrying out its role. There are numerous Committees; 
some of a permanent nature; others temporary. Each committee 
membership is composed of representatives from each member 
state. Each committee is charged with responsibility in 
areas according to subject matter. For example, the Political 
Committee, established in 1957» is responsible for preparing 
the political agenda for the Council. Mainly the Committees 
study questions and make recommendations on important matters 
submitted to them by the Council,
Some of the most important Committees would include 
(after the political committee); The Defense Planning 
Committee which was established in 196j. This Committee deals 
with all matters connected with integration of the common 
defense; it is the coordinating body for planning the defense 
of the "fourteen" members. The Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee, open to all NATO countries, and a Nuclear Planning 
Group of seven members, were established in December of 1966. 
Other important Committees are; the Science Committee; the 
Infrastructure Committee; the Committee for Pipelines; the
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Committee for Information and Cultural Relations; and the 
Civil and Military Budget Committees.
The International Secretariat is composed of a staff 
selected from all member nations and headed by a Secretary 
General. The Secretary General is Chairman of the Council, 
and exercises that capacity whatever the level at which the 
Council meets: that is, Permanent Representatives or Heads
of Government. He is responsible for the direction of the 
International Staff and Secretariat. In his absence he is 
replaced by a deputy Secretary General. The Deputy Secretary 
General also assists him in the exercise of his role.
The Secretariat is divided into numerous Divisions 
according to the Principle activities of NATO. Some of the 
several divisions of the Secretariat are: the Division of
Political affairs; the Division of Defense Planning and 
Policy; the Division of Defense Support; the Division of 
Scientific Affairs; and others.
The Military Structure 
The Military Committee is composed of a Chief-of- 
Staff from each member country except Iceland and Prance.
NATO’s Civil Structure was taken from The NATO Hand­
book (1968), 0£. cit., pp. 9-14; See chart on p. 54 for 
general view of NATO's civil structure.
^^Iceland may be represented in the Committee by a 
civilian since it has no military forces. France's with­
drawal from NATO commands also Involved withdrawal from mili­
tary affairs concerning NATO. Thus Prance does not associate 
herself with military decisions..
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This Gomiüittee is the Supreme Military Authority of NATO and 
is responsible to the Council for the defense of the whole 
treaty area. It is also charged with the direction of NATO's 
military agencies and commands. Until October 196?» the 
Military Committee met in Washington, D.C., since that date 
it is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium.
The Military Committee meets regularly, and whenever 
necessary on short notice. In order to enable the Committee 
to continue in permanent session, however, each Chief-of-Staff 
selects a Permanent Military Representative. The Permanent 
Military Representatives exercise effective powers of decision 
on questions which come within the area of the Military Com­
mittee. Nevertheless, some questions by nature and scope 
require Chief-of-Staff approval. The major responsibility of 
the Military Committee calls for making recommendations for 
defense of the treaty area and supplying direction on mili­
tary matters to subordinate commands.
The International Military Staff is a new group which 
was established by the Council, meeting in Ministerial Session, 
on June 8, I966. This new integrated Staff replaced the Stand­
ing Group which was abolished at the same meeting. Each member 
nation, except France, is represented in this new group, where­
as the Washington Standing Group was composed of representa­
tives only from France, Great Britain, and the United States.
The International Military Staff acts as the executive 
agent of the Military Committee, and in that capacity ensures
50
that policies and decisions are implemented as directed. In 
addition, the Staff prepares plans, initiates studies, and 
makes recommendations on matters of military nature.
The North Atlantic Treaty Area is divided, so as to 
account for geographical as well as political factors, into 
three Commands and a Regional Planning Group, These Commands 
exercise authority in varying forms conditioned by peacetime 
or wartime. For example, the armed forces of member nations 
remain under national control and command in peacetime. How­
ever, some of them may be earmarked or actually assigned to 
NATO Commands.
The NATO Commanders are charged with the development 
of defense planning for their respective areas, for deter­
mining number of forces needed, and for the deployment of 
forces under their authority.
The European Command covers the allied countries in 
Nurope, from North Cape to the Mediterranean and from the 
Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, Both the United 
Kingdom and Portugal are excluded from the European Command’s 
responsibility : Portugal is covered by the Atlantic Command,
while the United Kingdom is not covered by any of the major 
commands.
This area is under the authority of the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACBUR), first headed by General 
Eisenhower and later by Generals Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad 
and at the present by General Lemnitzer— all United States
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Generals. SACEUR's headquarters, commonly known as SHAPE 
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), are located 
near Mons in Belgium (Inaugurated March 31, 196?). To imple­
ment the defense of this area SACEUR has four subordinate 
divisions: the Northern European Command; the Central
European Command; the Southern European Command; and the 
United Kingdom Air Defense Region.
The Atlantic Ocean Commands extend from the tropic of 
Cancer to the North Pole and from the shores of North Amer­
ica to the shores of Europe and Africa. This area includes 
Portugal and islands such as Iceland and the Azores, but 
excludes Britain and the Channel,
The area is under the responsibility of the Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACHANT), whose headquarters are 
located at Norfolk, Virginia, Just as SACEUR has been 
headed only by Americans so has SACHANT.
SACHANT does not have a permanent force of assigned 
navies of ships, but it is in charge of those forces that 
are assigned at different times for training purposes.
To ensure effective defense of this broad area, the 
Atlantic Ocean Command is further divided into the Western 
Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, the Striking Fleet, the Sub­
marine, and the Iberian Atlantic Commands.
The Channel Command (CHANCOM), is composed of 
Naval Chiefs-of-Staff from Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Britain, which form the Channel Committee. This Command,
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headed by a British Admiral, is responsible for defense of 
the Channel and the southern North Sea.
The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group 
(CUSEPG), composed of representatives from Canada and the 
United States, meets alternately in Washington and Ottowa.
This group is responsible for developing and recommending to 
the Military Committee defense plans for the Canada-United
OQ
States region.'̂
This expansive and intricate organization gives the 
impression that the North Atlantic Alliance is more than an 
ordinary mutual defense pact. In the historical sense it is 
more than a classical alliance. For example, before NATO 
there had not been an alliance with a central political body 
to coordinate the goals and strategy of its members. Nor 
had there been a central integrated military command or a 
planned strategic defense in case of an attack. However, 
the organization should be viewed in the light of some 
important facts; First, NATO is not a political union. It 
is a typical intergovernmental compact among fifteen sovereign 
nations which must reach all decisions by unanimous vote, in 
order to remove any semblance of inequality. Even decisions 
reached in the military area require the unanimous agreement 
of each member's representative on the military committee 
before they are sent to the council for approval.
NATO's military structure was taken from The NATO 
Handbook (I968), jzp. .qjj., pp. 15-22; See chart on p. 5^ for 
general view of NATO's military structure.
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Secondly, with the exception of certain defense 
units— those on alert— SACEUR commands no national forces. 
National forces are commanded by their own authorities. In 
fact, NATO's integrated military command's primary mission is 
to unify the Alliance's defense strategy in peace time and to 
use the Allies' forces to the best advantage in wartime.
And finally, the only integration that can be found 
is in the Staffs of the Alliance's commands. This fact dis­
pels the notion that NATO has an integrated centralized army. 
Nor can any national forces, in case of war and even in the 
treaty area, be placed under NATO command without its govern­
ment's decision to do so. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
NATO, in the final analysis, depends on the loyalty of its 
member governments.
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CHAPTER III 
NATO'S STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Although NATO does not qualify as a political 
community, by almost any set of standards it has been a 
successful coalition. It provided Western European Nations 
with the sense of security and confidence needed to let them 
carry out the task at hand: rebuilding their war-shattered
countries and economies. NATO stimulated a desire for 
cooperation and interdependence that was to lead to several 
integrated economic structures of which the European Economic 
Community (EEC), or more commonly known Common Market, is 
probably most important. It erected a barrier to the West­
ward expansion of the Soviet Union by making a reality of 
the "Containment" policy. Although there is no empirical 
evidence from which conclusive proof may be drawn, and despite 
the Kremlin's eagerness to discount the effectiveness of NATO 
regarding peaceful settlement, it is generally agreed that 
NATO established the groundwork for the present movement 
toward detente between the East and the West. Therefore, the 
claim can be made that NATO was instrumental in keeping the 
West united during the toughest years of the Cold War and, at 
the same time, off-set the power of the Soviet bloc until the
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Kremlin saw the need to moderate its policies.^
While NATO has been the most powerful of Western 
mutual defense alliances, it has not been without problems 
and disputes which, on occasions, have seriously threatened 
to dissolve the coalition. The organization's major problems 
tend to fall into two broad categories; one political and 
the other military. The political disputes have arisen from 
the diversity of national policies and goals pursued by the 
major countries of the Alliance. The military strains have 
derived primarily over strategy and, above all, over the 
dilemmas created by the evolution of nuclear arms. In fact, 
it is possible to see NATO's current and greatest military 
problem as not being a military problem at all. Bather it is 
a purely political one. For example, the problem of nuclear 
weapons is only indirectly concerned with defense of the 
Alliance. On the whole, NATO has perhaps too much nuclear 
capacity— at least it has enough. The problem stems from 
the fact that at least 95 percent of the nuclear striking 
force is concentrated in the hands of Just one of the members- 
the United States. Regardless of how it is defined, the 
American force is Just as much a national force as the
For a summary statement of NATO's accomplishments 
see a study by the U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National 
Security and International Operations for the Committee on 
Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues. 
89th Cong., 2nd Sess (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1966), pp. 2-3.
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British Bomber Command and the French force de frappe » The 
overriding need is not to keep the responsibility of the 
launching of nuclear weapons in the hands of competent 
political leaders, but devising a means to give all members 
a political voice in the decisions concerning the use of 
nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara pointed up the problem of nuclear weapons as polit­
ical when he said:
As I suggest . . . there is need for and an interest 
in greater participation not only in what you might call 
the decision-making process itself but in the plans against 
which that decision would apply.
I think we must provide a formal mechanism within 
the Alliance to insure the active and effective and con­
tinuous participation by our allies in those two stages, 
the planning and the decision making.
I think it is a necessary action regardless of 
whether we have a collective force or not. The so-called 
multilateral force or allied nuclear force or any number 
of a number of 'hardware* proposals could be considered 
but only as supplementary to, not a substitute for, the 
organizational structure and procedures necessary to 
assure greater participation in planning and consulta­
tion.%
Or the problem was stated more clearly in a study made by 
the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and Interna­
tional Operations when it declared that:
PU.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and 
International Operations, Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance. 
89th Cong., 2nd Sess (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1966), pp. 206, 207; See also Hans J. Morgenthau, 
"Alliances In Theory And Practice," Alliance Policy in The 
Gold War, (ed.), Arnold Wolfers, op. cit., pp. 198-19^
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. . . since the United States has 95 percent or more 
of total Western nuclear capabilities, it necessarily 
and unavoidably has the decisive power, positive and 
negative, with respect to the use of these nuclear 
weapons. And that power is and will be located in 
Washington; no president can delegate it to anyone else.
However it may be accomplished, therefore, Canada 
and the European allies need greater access to the 
policy counsels of the United States— and vice versa—  
not just regarding the more remote contingencies of 
nuclear war, but also the ambiguous challenges that a 
flexible communist strategy makes probable. What the 
allies, including West Germany, need is confidence that 
they are, in fact, involved in major issues of strategic 
and political planning in such ways as to influence the 
actions of the United States government in a crisis.
And again vice versa.^
NATO’s strategy has developed from the Allies’ view 
of the complex situation existing within itself coupled with 
the ever present Soviet threat. The refusal of the United 
States to relax its monopoly grip on determining alliance 
strategy plus its ownership of nuclear weapons interacts 
with the desire of the European governments— particularly 
Britain, France and West Germany— to share in the monopoly 
or to develop their own independent nuclear forces. (There 
is no proof that West Germany desires to develop its own 
nuclear forces but the Germans do desire a voice in the use 
of the Alliance’s nuclear weapons.) The continuing debate 
over the nuclear arms dilemma is reflected in NATO’s strat­
egy, and from this strategy it is possible to identify three 
distinguishable policy stages developed around the issue of 
nuclear weapons control.
3The Atlantic Alliance; Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 12.
59
Stage One; "The Shield And The Sword"
Prom the inception of NATO into a period extending 
through the Korean War, the United States had an unchal­
lengeable world-wide nuclear preponderance. The United 
States nuclear monopoly had ended soon after the signing of 
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, when Russia exploded her
first atomic device, and Britain became the third nuclear 
4power in 1952. However a nation does not go from its first 
atomic explosion to a capable nuclear power in one short 
step, therefore, the United States' nuclear monopoly had 
ended only symbolically.
In any event, Europe was in no condition to demand 
that the United States share its nuclear weapons and thereby 
its control of stragegy, as a price for alliance. Further­
more, having lost most of its strength from the devastation 
of the second World War, Europe was too dependent on the 
United States for its (Europe's) recovery and defense to 
contest America's dominance over the Alliance. For this 
reason, Washington's first policy commitment concerning 
nuclear weapons, up to 1954, remained simply to control and 
improve the American nuclear monopoly, and after 1949 the
^"Atomic Explosion Occurs In The USSR," U.S. Depart­
ment of State Bulletin. Vol. XXI, No. 535 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 487; For the British 
test see Parliamentary Debates (Commons) (5th series) Vol.
505, 1952, cols. 1268-1269.
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alleged American superiority.'^ It was around this commitment 
that the Alliance built its first strategy.
NATO's first strategic thoughts were simple. The 
political commitment stated in article 5 of the treaty— "an 
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all"—  
combined with the fact that only the United States possessed 
atomic weapons would be enough to deter a Soviet attack 
against the West. This was thought to be clear enough, as 
well as strong enough, to remove any danger of miscalculation 
by any would-be aggressor who might conceive the idea that 
the European allies could be taken over one by one. In both 
congressional hearings and in public statements, American 
officials described the treaty as being designed to prevent 
the Soviet Union from making Hitler's mistake of assuming 
that he could carry out piecemeal aggression without inter­
ference from Washington as well as to give Europe strength 
and confidence.^
After some second thoughts, doubt was raised about 
the logic of this conclusion. Would it be wise to use nuclear 
weapons on allied territory should the Soviet forces overrun 
the token resistance offered by the small conventional forces
H. L. Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEG and Congress: A 
Study In Executive-Legislative Relations," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. VI, No. 2 (I962), p. lié.
6U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 
The North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st Sess (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
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of Western Europe? This doubt was changed to action with the 
onset of the Korean War in 1950. Fearing that the Communist 
attack on South Korea was a prelude to a similar attack in 
Europe, NATO set up a unified command in Europe, under the 
direction of General Eisenhower, with a plan of strategy: 
the "Shield and the Sword.
NATO's first strategic plan was based on the assump­
tion that Soviet aggiession in Europe would be the start of 
a third World War and a third world war would be, more or 
less, a continuation of World War II in regard to type of 
battle plans, weapons, and number of troops. However, there 
was a slight modification— limited numbers of U.S. atomic 
bombs. The strategic concept called for a strong conventional 
force: a large number of troops to protect the main avenues
leading into the West; a lesser number to cover the gaps in 
between; and a large number to remain in the reserve capacity. 
It was expected that the NATO conventional forces could 
execute, at least, a holding action until the United States 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) could deliver a telling, if not a 
fatal, blow to the Russian homeland with atomic weapons. To 
initiate the forces for the new strategy, the NATO Council 
meeting at Lisbon in 1952, set a goal of ninety-six divisions 
(forty-six active and fifty reserve) over the next four years
Q
for a strong "shield" for NATO.
^NATO: Facts About The North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
zation. op. cit., p. 26. 
®Ibid.
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However the United States, though willing to break 
with Its tradition In regard to "entangling alliances," and 
willing to commit Its nuclear power to the protection of Its 
allies, wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In 
1946, Congress had passed the Atomic Energy Act (McMahon 
Act) which basically forbade the diffusion of atomic Informa­
tion or control of American made nuclear weapons to any 
foreign country. The McMahon Act also provides for a Congres­
sional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a watchdog over 
atomic energy legislation, and to maintain civilian control 
over atomic weapons.^ There was, and still Is, an overriding 
fear In Washington that the spread of nuclear weapons would 
Increase the possibility of an accidental war through reck­
lessness or carelessness. Furthermore Washington viewed the 
diffusion of nuclear weapons as a detriment to arms control 
agreements. With the addition of each new state to the 
"nuclear club," it would become exceedingly more difficult to 
achieve, enforce, or even motivate confidence in the effec­
tiveness of arms control agreements.^®
^U.S. Statutes At Large. 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. Vol. 
LX, Part 1 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1947), pp. 756, 766, 772.
^%atlonal Planning Association, The Nth Country 
Problem and Arms Control. Planning Pamphlet No. 108 (Wash- 
Ington: National Planning Association, i960), p. x; See also 
"Documentation: Mr. Dean Rusk and The Atlantic Alliance," 
NATO Letter. Vol. XII, No. 6 (June, 1964), p. 19, who said 
"We do not see security for anybody In a world of prolifer­
ating national weapons systems."
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Coupled with fear of proliferation was the national­
istic tendencies of the United states. It was only natural 
that the United States, as would any nation, should wish to 
maintain control over the weapons that gave it a basic choice 
of peace or war. Therefore, the United States regarded the 
knowledge of atomic weapons as national secrets not to be 
distributed to any national government. It preferred to 
maintain this monopoly even to the exclusion of its allies.
Meanwhile, Britain was bringing pressure to effect a 
United States policy change concerning nuclear weapons. The 
British desired to return to the close relations exercised 
during the Second World War. This was understandable since 
the bomb project had begun in England, and had been trans­
ferred to America, for security reasons, through an agreement 
between President Hoosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at 
Quebec in 1943. According to the late Prime Minister,
The original arrangements made in the war were . . .  on 
the basis of strict reciprocity. Those results were 
superceded by other arrangements after the war. We have 
conducted this operation ourselves and I do not doubt 
that it will lead to a much closer American interchange 
of information than has hitherto taken place— than has 
taken place in the last two years. . .
By 1949, the British had persuaded President Truman 
that complete nuclear sharing would be highly desirable. The 
administration told a conference at Blair House that Britain 
should share fully in the "know how on weapons making" for at
1 1Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Col. 1270.
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least three reasons: (1) Anglo-American relations required
such action; (2) the British were ahead of America in some 
scientific fields and could aid the United States; and (3) 
Britain would develop the bomb in a matter of time regard­
less of whether they were aided or not.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, then chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was at the confer­
ence, disagreed with the administration's position for two 
major reasons: (1) he felt that the concept of the Alliance
called for a division of labor without costly duplications, 
and (2) the McMahon Act restricted any such partnership in 
atomic information. The Senator's views were shared by 
others at the conference. Not wanting to Jeopardize bipar­
tisan support for European recovery. President Truman quietly 
dropped the matter.13 This left Britain completely respon­
sible for the first bomb that she exploded in 1952.
Stage Two: The "New Look" Strategy
No sooner had the decision on strategy been taken in 
Lisbon than several changes took place that affected the con­
cept of the "Shield and the Sword." When President Eisenhower 
took office in 1953» changes were taking place in the inter­
national sphere and in the nuclear weapons field: First, the
1̂ Arthur S. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.). The Private 




world was entering a period of "nuclear-plenty," i.e., the
United States, and the Soviet Union, was developing a wide
range of "tactical" atomic weapons and adding them to the
already growing stockpile. Second, Britain was well on the
way toward a nuclear strike force. Third, both the United
States and Russia had, in 1952, developed and successfully
tested hydrogen devices signifying new horror in the nuclear
age. And finally, the European NATO members were not meeting
their requirements for the forty-six active divisions of
conventional forces.
Discouraged over the shortage of conventional forces
in Europe yet encouraged by the emergence of the new tactical
nuclear weapons and motivated by an avid desire to cut the
budget, President Eisenhower took a "new look" at the defense
posture of Western security and the American defense budget.
He had pointed out in the 1952 Presidential campaign that too
much was being spent on defense, and had declared, "The most
important victory the Soviets could win would be an economic
14.collapse of our country." Later at a news conference on 
February 17, 1953, the President gave an indication of the 
direction the defense budget would take when he defended his 
reliance on Business for his cabinet members; "Now we have a 
Defense Department that spends two-thirds of all the money 
we appropriate. . . .  If we are going to make a big savings
l4"Eisenhower Scores Statement On Bias Made By Presi­
dent," New York Times. October 21, 1952, p. 25.
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In that place, we have got to get some business like practice 
there. I deliberately went out to find the men that I 
thought made the biggest record for efficiency in business, 
to get into that department."^5 .̂nd again in a radio address 
to the nation. May 19, 1953» Eisenhower showed his desire to 
cut defense spending when he declared;
It has been coldly calculated by the Soviet leaders 
. . .  by their military threat they have hoped to force 
upon America and the free world an unbearable security 
burden leading to economic disaster. . . . Communist 
guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic 
target no less than a military target.l6
and he later added that "there must be . . .  a speeding, a
sharpening, a concentration that will extract the last cent
of value from every dollar s p e n t , A n d  finally he declared
that "what we are trying to do today is find a program of
security that costs the least. . . This concept was
later referred to as more "bang for the buck."
By the end of 1953, the "new look" defense policy had 
been adopted by the administration. The new policy placed 
emphasis on procurement of nuclear weapons and entailed 
changing the basis of the security of the West: that is, from
dependence upon conventional forces to dependence upon nuclear
President, Public Papers Of The Presidents. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1953), p. 55.
^^ibid., p. 307.
Iflbid.. p. 309. 
p. 317.
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weapons. In fact, by instilling the greater firepower of
atomic weapons within the Alliance forces, it was thought
that conventional forces could actually be reduced, a thought
19that pleased some of the European members.
The increasing reliance upon nuclear weapons raised 
several questions of which two were very important: First,
how was NATO to deal with a local attack by massive Soviet 
troops? And second, how was NATO to deal with limited 
aggressive movements by limited Soviet troops? Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles answered these questions with the 
concept of a nuclear strategy. According to Secretary Dulles’ 
new concept:
Local defense will always be important. But there is 
no local defense which alone will contain the mighty 
landpower of the Communist world. Local defense must be 
reinforced by further deterrent of massive retaliatory 
power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot 
always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. . . . 
The way to deter aggression is for the free community to
19Pierre Gallois, The Balance Of Terror: Strategy 
For The Nuclear Age, trans. Richard Howard (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 106; At the April 1953 meeting of the 
NATO Council, Secretary Dulles had suggested a concept known 
as the "long haul" whereby the NATO allies and the United 
States would develop their defensive strength over a period 
of time and thus not weaken their economic strength. The U.S. 
Strategic Air Force would, of course, reinforce NATO during 
this period. The "long haul" concept was accepted generally 
by the NATO allies in December 1953» See "North Atlantic 
Council Holds Twelfth Session," U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol. XXX, No. 758 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 195^)> pp. 8-9.
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be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and 
with means of its own choosing.20
The Secretary later spelled out what he meant by the "further
deterrent of massive retaliatory power." This was that the
posession of nuclear weapons gave the capacity to punish
aggression. Not in the sense of ultimate destruction of the
aggressor but in the sense that the aggressor would lose more
than he could possibly win. In other words, it must be
assumed that the Soviet Union expected to gain more than the
price of attaining it. Therefore, she must be convinced that
no matter what the value of the objective might be, atomic
21weapons would make the cost greater than the value. This 
would deter any aggressor from any kind of attack.
The new concept meant that whatever the form of 
attack against the NATO area, there would be reprisal, and 
that reprisal would be a nuclear one. The nuclear strategy, 
known as "massive retaliation," was accepted by the NATO 
Council in its December 195^ meeting. With the Council's 
acceptance, NATO was now dependent upon nuclear weapons not 
only for deterrence against aggression but also in planning 
for defense.
20John Poster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign 
Policy," ibid.. Vol. XXX, No. ?6l (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 195^)> P* 108.
21 John Poster Dulles, "Policy For Security and 
Peace," Foreign Affairs. Vol. XXII, No. 3 (195^)» See also 
Dulles, "Challenge And Response In United States Policy," 
ibid.. Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (1957), PP. 25-43.
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Actually neither Elsenhower nor Dulles should have 
to shoulder all the blame for the acceptance of the new 
strategy. There were other factors that contributed to read­
iness of its acceptance: First, the fabulous cost of main­
taining conventional forces coupled with the price of nuclear 
weapons. Second, both Americans and Europeans could not be 
reconciled to any more limited (Korean type) wars. Third, 
aggression in Europe had not followed on the heals of Korea 
and there were many who believed that this was due to the 
nuclear deterrent. And finally, the destructive power of 
the new weapons made them seem a good substitute for conven­
tional forces— that is, firepower for troop forces.
In any event, acceptance of the new strategy by NATO
resulted in some unforeseen ramifications, especially in
regard to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the United
States Congress. The Joint Committee faced the problems of
preparing the allies for strategic nuclear concepts; making
it possible to store tactical weapons and warheads outside
of the United States territory and "dispersing their control
22down through the ranks of the American military . . . "  The 
U.S. Congress faced the essential problem of altering the 
McMahon Act.
In order to influence Congress to amend the Atomic 
Energy Act, and to reduce some of the fears that had been
22Niebuig, 0£. cit., p. 121,
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raised over too much reliance on nuclear weapons, the State 
Department began a drive to make tactical weapons sound con­
ventional. For example, Secretary Dulles argued that the
change from gunpowder to nuclear weapons was no more revolu-
23tionary than the change from the cross-bow to the musket.
President Elsenhower added to this argument when he sent his
"atoms-for-peace" message to Congress in February, 195^» in
which he pointed out that "a wide variety of atomic weapons—
considered in 1946 to be mere possibilities of a distant
future— have today achieved conventional status in our armed 
24forces." (Italics mine) In his message the President asked:
. . . that authority be provided to exchange with 
nations participating in defense arrangements with the 
United States such tactical information as is essential 
to the development of defense plans and to the training 
of personnel for atomic warfare. Amendments to the 
definition of 'restricted data'. . . will also contribute 
to needed administrative flexibility in the exchange of 
information with such nations concerning the use of 
atomic weapons.25
The President did not get the "administrative flex­
ibility in the exchange of information" that he desired, for 
Congress discarded his message and enacted its own views on 
the exchange of atomic information. The new legislation
^^North Atlantic Council Meets At Paris," U.S. Depart­
ment of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXII, No, 810 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 13.
2kU.S. President, Public Papers of The Presidents. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1954), pp. 261-262.
^^Ibid.. p. 263.
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allowed the transmittal of such Information as was necessary 
for planning defense strategy, for training troops in the 
use of nuclear weapons, and for evaluating the potential 
enemy's capabilities.^^
Pour Historic events occured between 195^ and 1957, 
which profoundly influenced public attitudes— especially in 
Europe— concerning the risks of nuclear war and the validity 
of the United States commitment to use nuclear weapons in the 
interest of the NATO allies. The first event occured in March 
of 1954, when a United States thermonuclear test in the 
Marshall Islands contaminated an area of approximately 7,000 
square miles with radio active fallout. This event received 
wide publicity due to radiation sickness suffered by the 
islanders, and particularly, to the contamination of the 
crews of the Fukuryu Maru (Lady Dragon) and some 23 other 
Japanese fishing boats in the near waters.(Actually the 
fishing boats were outside the danger zone set for the test.) 
This event shocked the world into the realization of the 
peril of radio activity in a nuclear war; it also brought the 
Europeans face-to-face with the dangers inherent in a NATO 
defense based on nuclear weapons.
^^U.S., Statutes At Large. 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess, Vol. 
68, Part 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1954), p. 942.
"Fukuryu Maru Accident," U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol. XXX, No. 773 (Washington: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1954), pp. 598-599,* See also the New York Times, 
March 19, 1954, p. 4; March 20, 1954, p. 4; March 25, 19547 
pp. 1, 18; March 30, 1954, pp. 1, 8; March 31, 1954, pp. 1, 5*
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The second event occured on May Day, 1955> when 
Russia unveiled thirteen long-range Jet bombers in a flight 
over Moscow. This display convinced the United States that 
the Soviet Union was building a nuclear bomber force with 
range and capacity to strike the North American continent. 
Moreover it exposed to the world, and particularly to the 
NATO allies, American vulnerability and the decline in value 
of the American nuclear deterrent. With the exposure of 
America's vulnerability, doubts became evident in Europe—  
doubts that the United States would use its nuclear power in 
the event of an attack on one of the allies that did not 
directly involve an attack on America itself.
The "Suez Crisis" in 195^, constituted the third 
historic event. During this crisis, the three leading members 
of the Alliance were at odds on what action should be taken 
in regard to Egypt's nationalizing the Suez Canal. Britain 
and France, without consulting any of the NATO members, 
decided that armed force was the best solution to protect 
their vital interests threatened by Nassar's seizure of the 
Canal. Washington disagreed with this measure and President 
Eisenhower let it be known to the American people, and 
Europe, in a radio and television address on October 31, 1956, 
when he declared;
On Monday, their ^srael^ armed forces penetrated 
deeply into Egypt. . . . And on Tuesday, the British and 
French Governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to 
Israel and Egypt— now followed by armed attack against 
Egypt.
The United States was not consulted in any way about
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any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of 
them in advance.
As it is the manifest right of any of these nations 
to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our 
right to dissent. We believe these actions to have been 
taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force 
as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of 
international disputes.
The action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations to which 
we have all subscribed.28
Determined that this was the proper stand to take, the United
States found itself joined with the Soviet Union, in the
United Nations Security Council, on a movement to censure
its two senior partners for their punitive invasion of the
Canal Zone,
NATO solidarity had been seriously damaged by this 
crisis— a crisis arising outside the treaty area. The brutal 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Russia at the 
same time as the Suez Crisis is generally given credit for 
saving NATO from breaking up. Yet one may add another factor 
that was probably just as important in holding the Alliance 
together; The realization by Britain and France that they 
were not independent world powers; that their security was 
based on the Alliance; that there was no place to go if they 
left the Alliance. In any case, this crisis did have some 
enlightening effects upon the allies: (1) The Europeans
^G"Developments In Eastern Europe and The Middle 
East," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXV, No. 
907 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956),
pp. 744-745.
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learned that the United States would openly oppose certain
acts of member nations although those nations considered such
acts vital to their own interests; (2) that NATO's defense
was based completely on the nuclear deterrent, and therefore,
completely on the United States; (3) that the Soviet Union
was still a threat to the security of the West, and (4) that
the lack of consultation on matters that concern the Alliance
could have disasterous consequences.^^
It was purely a coincidence that the NATO Council
meeting which was held in Paris in December, 1956, was
scheduled to hear a report by the Committee of Three (The
Three Wise Men) on cooperation among the Allies in non-
military matters. This report emphasized the need for
political consultation within the Alliance. It warned that
"there is a pressing requirement for all members to make
consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of
national policy. Without this the very existence of the
30North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy." Included in 
the report were the following recommendations;
^In order to clarify (2), Britain, at this time, 
was considered a nuclear power, but this seems to have had no 
effect on Khruskchev's nuclear threats. This should have con­
vinced those who advocated the theory that a small nuclear 
force gives a nation more power, security, and flexibility in 
international relations that there is no basis for their 
argument.
30Report of the Committee of Three, Non-Military
Cooperation In NATO (N.P.: North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Information Service, n.d.), p. 6.
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(a) Members shoul.d inform the Council of any development 
which significantly affects the Alliance. . . ;
(b) both individual member governments and the Secretary- 
General should have the right to raise for discussion in 
the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest 
and not of purely domestic character;
(c) a member government should not, without adequate 
advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major 
political pronouncements on matters which significantly 
affects the Alliance or any of its members, unless 
circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and 
demonstrably impossible;
(d) in developing their national policies, members should 
take into consideration the interest and views of other 
governments, particularly those most directly concerned, 
as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no communi­
ty of view or consensus has been reached by the Council;
(e) where a consensus has been reached, it should be 
reflected in the formation of national policy, When for 
national reasons the consensus is not followed, the 
government concerned should offer an explanation to the 
Council. . . .31
The Council accepted in principle the recommendations 
of the Three Nise Men at the December meeting. However, 
there were some reservations. For example. Secretary Dulles 
reminded the Alliance members that the United States had 
obligations with countries outside NATO and could not, there­
fore, bind itself rigidly with a promise to consult the 
Alliance partners in formulation of policy outside the treaty 
area. In essence Mr. Dulles was notifying the Allies that the
United States considered that NATO's concern was limited to 
32the treaty area.
p. 7.
32"Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18," 
U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXVI, No. 915 (Wash­
ington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957)» pp. 4-5.
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The fourth and most significant event occured in
1957, when Russia launched its first earth satellite (Sputnik).
The Sputnik meant more than a Russian scientific research
gain; it meant the arrival of the age of the intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). But most important to the NATO
allies, it removed all doubt about America’s vulnerability
to nuclear attack. Fears and doubts raised earlier were now
being brought into the open, and several questions were being
asked: Can the United States be trusted to use its nuclear
weapons now that American cities are targets for Russian
IGBM's? What can Europe do for defense If the nuclear
deterrent fails to deter? This last question gained impetus
because the Europeans, following the lead of America, had
also economized in their defense budget to the extent that
the forty-six active divisions agreed to at Lisbon had
33deteriorated to approximately fifteen divisions. To make 
matters worse, the Europeans began to understand the possible 
result if the United States did use its nuclear weapons in 
the Allies' behalf. Estimated personnel casualties from a 
nuclear confrontation in Europe were placed in the hundreds 
of millions. For example. Lieutenant General Gavin told a 
Senate Subcommittee that:
33James E. King, "NATO: Genesis, Progress, Problems," 
National Security In The Nuclear Age, (ed.), Gordon B. Turner 
and Richard D. Challener (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
i960), p. 163; See also Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," 
Alliance Policy in The Gold War, (ed.), Arnold Wolfers, 0£.
cit., pp. 151-153.
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Current planning estimates run on the order of 
several hundred million deaths that would be either way 
depending upon which way the wind blew. If the wind 
blew to the southeast they would be mostly U.S.S.H,, 
although they would extend Into the Japanese and per­
haps down Into the Phlllplne area. If the wind blew 
the other way they would extend well back up Into 
Western Europe.3^
In order to answer these questions and reassure the
Allies that the United States would meet Its commitments,
President Elsenhower attended the December, 1957» NATO
Council meeting In Paris. >Ir. Elsenhower offered the NATO
members Increased economic aid, nuclear weapons, and declared,
"This Is our resolve: Speaking for my own country, I assure
you In the most solemn terms that the United States would
come at once and with all appropriate force, to the assistance
35of any NATO nation subjected to armed attack." At the same 
meeting Secretary Dulles spelled out what the President's 
offer of nuclear weapons meant. The offer meant, specifically, 
that Washington was prepared to make IRBM's available for 
use as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
(American control) Warheads for these missiles would become 
a part of the atomic stockpile system of the Alliance.
(American ownership) Deployment of such weapons would be by
 ̂See the testimony of Lieutenant General Gavin, U.S. 
Senate, Subcommittee on Airforce of the Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 195&), pp. 860-861.
Statement By President Elsenhower," U.S. Depart­
ment of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 967 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 7-
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g /
agreement of the country concerned and the United States.
Britain, Italy, and Turkey agreed to the offer of 
IRBM's under the "double veto" system— that is, each country 
and the United States were required to authorize the Joining 
of the warhead to the missile. On the other hand, Denmark, 
Norway, and France refused the offer. Prance, who had de­
manded ballistic missiles to modernize her contribution to 
the Alliance, blamed the "double veto" system for her refusal. 
Later in 1959> France went further and forbade any allied 
nuclear weapons on her national territory unless the United 
States consulted France in regard to the use of nuclear 
weapons anywhere in the world. According to French President 
de Gaulle, "France feels that if atomic weapons are to be
stockpiled on her territory, these weapons should be in her
37own hands." The Alliance members also agreed at the 
December, 1957, meeting to raise the conventional forces to 
thirty active divisions.
This new method of nuclear "sharing" meant another 
attack on the McMahon Act. The attack was not long in coming. 
In his annual message to Congress, January, 1958, President
Statement By Secretary Dulles December 16," ibid..
p. 9.
37"Third Press Conference Held By General de Gaulle," 
on September 5, I960, Major Addresses. Statements. And Press 
Conferences Of General Charles de Gaulle. May 19. 1958 - 
January 31. 1964 (hereafter referred to as Mjor Addresses) 
(New York: French Embassy Press and Information Division, 
1964), p. 96; See also Gallois, 0£, cit., pp. I70-I76.
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Elsenhower urged Congress to enact such legislation as was
necessary for sharing scientific and technical information—
at least with friendly countries. The President declared
that it was “wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to
consume talent and money in solving problems that their
friends have already solved— all because of artificial
barriers to sharing.” And he added, "The task will be hard
38enough without handcuffs of our own making." Mr. Eisen­
hower did not mean sharing in the sense that the United 
States would assist other nations to become nuclear powers 
or produce nuclear weapons. In any event, Congress did 
change the Atomic Energy Act. The amendments to the Act in 
1958, did remove some barriers to sharing information and 
some materials. For example, the President could authorize 
the Defense Department to sell, lease, or loan the following 
provided certain conditions were met:
(1) nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons provided that 
such nation has made substantial progress in the develop­
ment of atomic weapons, and other nonnuclear parts of 
atomic weapons systems involved in Restricted Data pro­
vided that such transfer will not contribute significantly 
to that nation's atomic weapons design, development, or 
fabrication capability; for the purpose of improving that 
nation's state of training and operational readiness;
(2) utilization facilities for military application;
and
(3) source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials
^President Eisenhower, "State Of The Union," U.S.
Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 970 (Washing­
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 120.
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for research on, development of, production of or use in 
utilization facilities for military applications; and
(4) source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials 
for research on, development of, or use in atomic 
weapons: Provided, however. That the transfer of such
materials . . .  is necessary to improve its atomic 
weapons design, development, or fabrication capability: 
and provided further. That such nation has made sub- 
stantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.
Needless to say that only allies who were established nuclear 
powers (Britain) benefited from the change,
France, meanwhile, was striving to develop her own 
nuclear strike force, France had decided to develop nuclear 
weapons in 1956, under the Mollet government, and had used 
the same justifications for so doing as had Britain— national 
pride, fear of the decreasing values of the American deterrent, 
and for increased influence within NATO vis-a-vis the United 
States. It was only a coincidence that General de Gaulle, 
who personifies France's nationalism, came to power at about 
the same time the McJ)Iahon Act was being changed to benefit 
Britain, and to exclude France. Since that time, the possi­
bility of dissuading de Gaulle from proceeding with the
40development of nuclear weapons has been virtually nil.
39U.S., Statutes At Large. Vol. LXXII, Part 1, 85th 
Cong., 2nd Sess (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1958), p. 276.
40President de Gaulle has emphasized on several occa­
sions that the condition for France to cease the development 
of her own nuclear force was and is complete nuclear disarma­
ment by the other nuclear powers. For representative statements 
to this effect see General de Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. 
cit.. pp. 27-28, 61, 96, 121, 124, 142, 159-160, 180-182,
219, 225.
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After a huge economic outlay and much technical trouble,
Prance exploded her first nuclear device over the Sahara on 
February 13, I960,
With the French explosion, Washington realized it 
was not going to stop the diffusion of nuclear weapons with 
the system of "sharing" that had been established in 1957»
The explosion also created two new fears in Washington; that 
other NATO members might be quick to follow France’s example—  
particularly West Germany, and that West Germany might be 
tempted to join France in the creation of a "third nuclear 
force" as mediator between the two super powers. These fears 
supplied the impetus in Washington for the search for a 
system of sharing nuclear weapons that would stop the spread 
of atomic weapons and at the same time isolate Prance.
At the NATO Council Meeting in December, I960, Secre­
tary of state Herter proposed a new concept of sharing: The
United States was prepared to give NATO five Polaris sub­
marines by 1963, provided the members could agree on a multi­
lateral means of control. Included in the proposal was the 
agreement to sell NATO one hundred medium-range ballistic 
Missiles (MRBM) for deployment at sea. However the NATO 
Council was not eager to accept the Secretary’s proposal for 
two reasons: First, the European members were not certain
that this was a new concept— to give them a voice in directing
nuclear policy. Second, a new administration was taking
office in Washington the following month. The Council acted
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with caution, and in its final oomunique stated that it "took 
note of the United States* suggestion with great interest and 
instructed the permanent representatives to study the sugges- 
tion and relate matters in detail."
Stage Three; The "Flexible Response"
As did Eisenhower before him, and as can be expected 
with a change in the administration. President Kennedy made a 
complete reexamination of the United States foreign policy.
He found NATO's lack of conventional forces and the strategy 
based on "massive retaliation" not to his liking. After 
examining American policy, the President decided that the 
best defense for America and the West was a strategy of 
"flexible response," that is, a defense flexible enough to 
respond to any level of aggression, from border incursions to 
all-out nuclear war. To have a strategy, of flexible re­
sponse, the first requisite was a build up of conventional 
forces in Western Europe. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy called on 
the allies to build up their conventional forces at least to 
the agreed level of thirty active divisions. At the same 
time the administration was downgrading the value of tactical 
nuclear weapons, and was installing technical devices to 
assure political control over the nuclear weapons in Europe.
If the Europeans did not wish to become embroiled in an atomic
^^NATO Letter. Vol. IX, No. 1 (January, I96I), p. 13.
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confrontation without their consent, neither did Washington.
In an address to the NATO Military Committee, April 11, 196I, 
the President declared that "we propose to see . . . that our 
military forces operate at all times under continuous, respon­
sible command and control from the highest authorities all the 
way downward— and we mean to see that this control Is exercised
before, during, and after an Initiation of hostilities against
A?our forces, and at any level of eseulatIon."
However, since the Atlantic Alliance's main purpose 
Is the mutual defense of the NATO members, and the United 
States' nuclear forces Is Its backbone, and Europe's security 
Is heavily dependent on the American deterrent forces. It Is 
only natural that the European members not only have an 
Interest but also a high stake In the continuity of American 
foreign and military policy. Even if the allies doubt Its 
correctness, they believe It to be an American guarantee of 
reliability. It was, therefore, no surprise that the caution 
over nuclear weapons and the demand for upgrading the con­
ventional forces, raised two Important questions from Europe; 
Questions on the reliability of the weapons and the relia­
bility of the American guarantee.Washington quickly
A?"President Kennedy Reaffirms U.S. Support of NATO," 
U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XLIV, No. 1140 (Wash­
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, I96I), p. 64?.
^Henry P. Kissinger, "Strains On The Alliance," 
Foreign Affairs. Vol. XLl, No. 2 (I962), p. 2?4; See also Hans 
J. Morgenthau, "Alliances In Theory and Practice," Alliance 
Policy In The Gold War, (ed,), Wolfers, o£. clt., pp. 199-200.
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rejected both questions, but did not quell the doubts,
fears, or desires for a voice in nuclear weapons decision 
44making.
On May 1?, 1961, while addressing the Canadian Par­
liament in Ottawa, President Kennedy made a new proposal for 
sharing atomic weapons. It was hoped that the new proposal 
would satisfy the desires of the European Allies. The 
President said that "the United States will commit to the 
NATO command five— and subsequently still more— Polaris 
atomic— missile submarines . . . subject to any agreed NATO 
guidelines on their control and use responsive to the needs 
of all members. . .." And he stated further that "beyond 
this we look to the possibility of eventually establishing 
a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in 
ownership and control, if it should be found feasible to 
our allies . .
At the NATO Council Meeting in Athens in May, 1962, 
Secretary of Defense McNamara committed five polaris
For example, since the U.S. became vulnerable to 
nuclear attack, it has had to make reassuring statements to 
Europe about the reliability of the commitment. Representa­
tive statements can be found in George Ball, "Germany And 
The Atlantic Partnership," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. 
Vol. LI, No. 1327 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1964), p. 774; George C. McGhee, "The United States 
And Germany," ibid.. Vol. LIV, No. 1400 (I966), p. 659; 
President Johnson, "Our View On NATO," ibid., p. 556; Dean 
Rusk, "The Role Of The United States In World Affairs," ibid.. 
Vol. LVI, No. 1456 (1967), p. 771.
"The Common Aims Of Canada And The U.S.," U.S.
Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XLIV, No. 1145 (Washing­
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, I96I), p. 84l.
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submarines to the Alliance under the command of the Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT, American Officer).The 
NATO Council accepted the commitment without strong opposi­
tion, However, Prance's Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de 
Murville called the American policy "intellectually dis­
honest." That is, the United States was pretending that it 
was proposing a new policy when it was actually offering 
nothing new in regard to guidelines on when and how nuclear 
weapons would be used. On the other hand, the Secretary's
commitment seemed to satisfy the German desire to have
A?lEBM's under the "double veto" system.
In 1962, President Kennedy cancelled the Skybolt 
missile program. The Skybolt (an air to surface missile) 
had been promised to Britain. Its use would moai.fy and 
extend the life of Britain's Bomber Command. Therefore, 
Britain had a great stake in the program which when can­
celled left her nuclear delivery system in doubt. This 
resulted in a Kennedy-Macmillan meeting at Nassau in Decem­
ber, 1962, where it was agreed that Britain would develop 
her nuclear deterrent around the Polaris which she would buy 
from the United States. According to the Nassau agreement
Drew Middleton, "U.S. To Give NATO Five Submarines 
Carrying Polaris," New York Times. May 6, 1962, p. 1; 
Actually the submarines were shifted from the command of the 




Britain would develop her own submarines and nuclear war­
heads. The British deterrent with a similar force from the 
United States would form the basis of a NATO nuclear force. 
This same offer was later made to the other Alliance members 
with the provision that they would also furnish the sub­
marines and warheads. They too would contribute their
LQPolaris forces as national components to the NATO forces. 
This agreement laid the groundwork for the much debated 
multilateral nuclear force (MLF) that the United States 
proposed to the NATO Council Meeting at Ottawa in 1963.̂ ^
The MFL concept called for a fleet of twenty-five 
multi-owned mixed manned Polaris surface ships under command 
of participating members. Both Britain and France would 
surrender their nuclear forces to NATO but could withdraw 
them if their national interest required it. According to 
Mr. Buchan, Prime Minister Macmillan in the House of Commons 
"laid such stress on the continuing national command of 
British nuclear weapons as to rob their assignment to NATO
kg See the full text of the Nassau Agreement in 
"President Talks At Nassau With Prime Mnister Macmillan,"
U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 43- 
45; Also see Robert Strousz-Hupe, James E. Dougherty, and 
William H. Kintner, Building The Atlantic World (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963), P. 238; Alastair Buchan. The Multilateral 
Force: An Historical Perspective. London; Institute for Stra­
tegic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number 13, October, 1964.
49For an excellent historical sketch of the multi­
lateral force see Buchan, ibid.
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of much of Its significance, at least in European eyes."^®
As for the actual control of the nuclear warheads, the point 
has never reached the negotiation stage,
European reaction to the United States proposal was 
less than enthusiastic to say the least. The smaller 
members (Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Canada) were partic­
ularly worried about the added cost of such a force con­
sidering the huge outlays to meet their conventional forces 
requirements. President de Gaulle made France's position on 
the JÜLF clear in 19&3, when he stated that "Prance has taken 
note of the Anglo-American Nassau Agreement; as it was con­
ceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot 
subscribe to it. . . .To turn over our weapons to a multi­
lateral force . . . would be to act contrary to that prin­
ciple of our defense and our policy.
Britain being a part to the Nassau Agreement, at 
first supported the NATO nuclear force proposal. Mr. Peter 
Thornycroft, in the House of Commons, March 4, 1963, declared 
that the British would do its best, "with the United States 
and Europe to bring a NATO nuclear force into being. ..." 
and "support, too, the efforts which the Americans are
52engaged upon to bring about a mixed-manned force as well."
^°iMd., p. 7.
^^General Charles de Gaulle, "Seventh Press Confer­
ence on January 14, I963," Major Addresses, op. cit.. p. 219.
^^cited in Buchan, 0£, cit.. p. 8.
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However, by October 1963» the British government had cooled
considerably. She was willing at this time to join in the
discussions on MLF with the U.S., Germany, Italy, Greece, and
Turkey, the only members that were interested at the time,
but not to commit herself. By July, 1964, Britain was not
interested in the U.S. proposal and had submitted her own
plan for a mixed-manned, joint financed and controlled force
consisting of aircraft and missiles in Europe.When the
Labor Party came to power there was no question about what
the government’s stand would be on the MLF. Mr. Harold
Wilson, Labor candidate for the post of Prime Minister, had
declared at a press conference in Washington in March, 1964,
that he was stongly opposed to the MLF concept and that if
he were elected would "renegotiate the Nassau Agreement."
Mr. Wilson later added that his government "would accept the
multilateral force if it were the only way to stop Germany
‘54from becoming a nuclear power.
On the other hand. West Germany was particularly 
attracted by the MLF concept. Germany desired some "nuclear 
status," and she was barred from developing her own nuclear 
weapons by the modified Brussels Treaty which admitted her to 
NATO. Nuclear weapons had become, and still are, such
^^Ibid.. pp. 10-11.
^^"Mr. Wilson Says He Would Seek Defense Review,"
The Times. March 4, 1964, p. 9.
^^See footnote 30, page 43.
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overexaggerated status symbols that Germany could only see 
herself relegated to a second or third rate power behind 
Britain and France. Therefore the MLF for Germany would 
raise her prestige In policy discussion In the Alliance to 
that of Britain and France.Another factor that gave 
Impetus to Bonn's desire for the MLF was the strategy of 
"flexible response." It Is not hard to understand Germany's 
consternation over a new policy, about which she was not 
consulted, considering she Is the most exposed country to the 
Soviet threat. This coupled with talk of limited withdrawal 
of American troops, the carrying out of operation "Big Lift" 
by the United States, and the continual propaganda from de 
Gaulle and France that the United States would pull out of 
Europe, made the Bonn government extremely nervous. The MLF 
would be a means of tying the United States permanently to 
the defense of Europe plus giving Bonn a stronger voice In 
Washington.The desire for sharing nuclear weapons became 
so Intense at one time, during Chancellor Erhard's adminis­
tration, that Germany would have joined the MLF with the
 ̂General Laurls Norstad, U.S.A.F. (Ret), former SAC- 
EUR of NATO, aptly points out the overexaggeration of nuclear 
weapons when he said, "We should appreciate at the outset that, 
because these weapons have become a symbol of power and, thus, 
of sovereignty, they have assumed an Importance In policy dis­
cussions far beyond that to which they are entitled on a pure­
ly military basis." U.S. Senate, Hearings. The Atlantic Al­
liance. op. clt.. p. 69.
^"^Buchan, 0£. clt.. p. 9.
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United States alone.Germany has used only one argument 
for the adoption of the MLF whereas Britain and Prance used 
several to support the development of their nuclear forces. 
Bonn'8 argument for acceptance revolves around the theory 
that a NATO nuclear force would increase the deterrent force 
of the organization. For example, Chancellor Adenauer in a 
statement on Germany's foreign policy before the Bundestag 
on February 6, 19^3» declared that his administration regarded 
the "Nassau Agreement as a big step forward along the road 
to creating an effective multilateral nuclear deterrent for 
NATO. We have decided to cooperate in the realization of the 
plans to the best of our a b i l i t y . A n d  again Chancellor 
Adenauer agreed with President Kennedy in their talks in 
Bonn in June, I963, that the MLF would be a good "instrument 
for the defense of NATO."^^
The new German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, sounded 
this same desire and argument in his first policy statement 
to the German Parliament after his election October I6, I963. 
The Chancellor declared that the "Federal Government . . . 
energetically supports all encucivors suited to intensify
^^Harry E. Ellis, "Fog Swirls In On NATO A-Fleet,"
The Christian Science Monitor. October 12, 1?64, p. 12.
KQ ̂"Chancellor Adenauer's Foreign Policy Declaration," 
JJEWB. Vol. VII, No. 2 (Washington; The German Embassy, 19&3), 
p. 3 •
^^"Communique On Bonn Talks," ibid., Vol. VII, No. 3
(1963), p. 5.
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political cooperation between the parties of NATO and to 
strengthen the integration of NATO's means of defense, A 
multilateral nuclear force would render a substantial contri­
bution towards attaining this o b j e c t i v e . A s  late as 1966, 
after de Gaulle had withdrawn France from the organization, 
Chancellor Erhard felt that a NATO nuclear force was necessary 
and declared Germany's readiness to participate:
We are convinced that a joint nuclear solution within 
NATO would increase the deterrent power of the Alliance, 
and thus serve the cause of peace. We therefore continue 
to be ready to cooperate on a joint atomic force. The 
discussions of the defense ministers in the nuclear com­
mittee of NATO concern another aspect of the cooperation 
of the nuclear powers, but they are no substitute for a 
nuclear solution of joint nature within NATO,o2
Prom all indications, the JILF has become a dead 
letter. President Johnson did vigorously press for its 
acceptance in 1964, but since that time has let it fade. How­
ever, there is a possibility that it could revive if there 
was some demand from the Allies. Both Secretary of Defense 
McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk have made this point 
clear. According to McNamara, if the "European Allies should
decide upon a collective force of some kind, the U.S. would be
63ready to participate." Secretary Rusk, when asked in a
"Highlights of Chancellor Erhard's Declaration To 
Parliament," The Bulletin. Vol. XI, No. 40 (Bonn: German Fed­
eral Government, Press and Information Office, I963), p. 5*
62"Chancellor Erhard Takes Stock At Press Conference," 
NEWS, Vol. X, No. 5 (Washington: The German Embassy, 1966), 
p. 3.
^^U.S. Senate, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. 
cit.. p. 192.
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Senate hearing if the MLF proposal was considered dead, re­
plied that "no proposal which has been made over a period of 
time . , . has been declared dead. All of the alternatives 
remain open."
By early 1966, President de Gaulle who had not ac­
cepted the new strategy of flexible response, removed France 
from participation in NATO and caused the organization* s 
facilities to be removed from French soil. Not only had 
France refused to integrate her nuclear forces into a NATO 
force but refused any kind of integration or token integration 
of conventional forces. Although surprised by the French 
move, the other fourteen members did make the transition 
complete in 196?. And at the December meeting of the NATO 
Council the "flexible response" strategy was adopted, however, 
it remains to be seen the actual ramifications of the French 




THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Why, one might ask, should nuclear weapons, the very 
basis of NATO's security, the very basis of NATO's strategy, 
be its greatest divisive factor? As has been pointed out 
NATO's security during most of its history has been based on 
the concept of massive nuclear retaliation. And even though 
the NATO Council adopted the flexible response strategy, some 
of the Europeans still feel that nuclear weapons will be 
brought into play at the outset of an act of aggression. Thus 
they have not really given up the massive retaliation concept.
One important factor that leads to the divisiveness 
of nuclear weapons is their tremendous destructive qualities.
It is the unparalleled destructiveness of nuclear weapons 
that gives the Allies' dispute over strategy and control of 
such weapons its unprecedented urgency. The speed with which 
these warheads can be delivered adds complications to effec­
tive command and control of such weapons. Since disputes occur 
within each government in regard to strategy and technology, 
it should not be surprising that the debate extends on into 
the Alliance as well.
Another factor which adds to the debate is the lack
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of a precedent for a nuclear war strategy. The world as yet 
has not witnessed a nuclear confrontation. The only occasion 
on which atomic weapons have been put to use in war time was 
when the bombs were dropped on Japan, to which she could not 
retaliate in kind. This has led to speculation on whether 
President Truman would have used the atom bomb if Japan could 
have retaliated. There is no ready answer to this speculation 
because there is no one who can say for sure how a nation or 
a nation's troops would react under a nuclear attack where 
there is a possibility of retaliation. Never before has so 
much depended on hypothesis and speculation based on unique 
weapons and unprecedented situations. This factor has been 
well pointed up by Britain's Permanent Representative to the 
NATO Council in I966:
It is very difficult for NATO nowadays . . .  to decide 
what forces and what weapons our countries must maintain 
as science advances and the international situation 
evolves. This is not because of any disagreement about 
the need to deter aggression. And it is not wholly due 
to economic and financial burdens which defense places 
on our countries, although that has a lot to do with it.
The main cause is the extreme novelty and unfamiliarity 
of a situation in which weapons are for deterrence . . . 
and in which the more effective and terrible they become 
the less possible it is to use them. . . .  In many respects 
our armed forces are still being prepared and trained to 
fight wars which never can and never will be fought.1
In addition to this the weapons systems themselves 
have not been thoroughly tested. Both the United States and
Sir Evlyn Shuckburg, "Is Force Necessary? NATO's 
Contribution to Peace," NATO Letter. Vol. XIV, No. 7 & 8 
(July & August, 1966), pp. 2-3.
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the Soviet Union have enormous stockpiles of nuclear warheads 
of which a small number have been tested. More factors of 
uncertainty are added with the delivery system for the war­
head. In fact, the "hard sites" that are supposed to protect 
the American missiles have not been tested, but are based 
entirely on theoretical studies.
Coupled with this fact is the added complications 
caused by the fact that nuclear weapons are primarily for the 
purpose of deterring war. This problem is well stated by 
NATO's Military Committee Chairman in 1966:
We are asked as soldiers, to prepare for a war which 
must be avoided at all costs, to arm and train ourselves 
in order not to fight the enemy but to deter him from 
fighting us. Our only victory consists in never having 
to resort to war; our weapons and training must be fault­
less but must never see service. If the worst comes, and 
we go into action it will be a war we cannot hope to 
win, for there can be no victory in mutual destruction.
Our aim is to show the enemy that he cannot win either 
and our intentions are not to destroy him but to contain
him.2
The basis of deterrence is credibility, that is, "to be 
deterred the potential aggressor must credit the opponent with 
the means and the resolve to employ military forces in order
3to make aggression unprofitable."'^
At the very heart of the dispute within the Alliance 
is the problem concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. This
^Cited in ibid., p. 4.
3William R. Kintner and Stafan T. Passony, "NATO's 
Nuclear Crisis," Orbis. Vol. VI, No. 2 (1962), p. 222.
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problem is affecting NATO in several areas, but there are 
four areas that are of major importance to the Alliance. The 
first of these is the possible dangers of accidental nuclear 
wars created through diffusion of nuclear weapons. The sec­
ond is the possible effect that a nuclear West Germany would 
have on NATO and world stability. Third, is the effects that 
diffusion of nuclear weapons can have on a unified NATO 
nuclear strategy. And finally, what effects proliferation of 
nuclear weapons will have on disarmament. Each of these 
areas must be examined in order to get a comprehensive view 
of the basic problem of nuclear proliferation.
Accidental Nuclear War 
Since the explosion on Hiroshima and President Truman's 
warning about diffusion of nuclear weapons, there is no longer 
a secret about the bomb. Five nations now belong to what is 
known as the "nuclear club" and prospects are great for new 
members. A National Planning Special Projects Committee, in 
i960, came to the conclusion that sixteen countries could
Aachieve atomic bomb production within the next ten years.
Six of the potential powers are NATO members: Canada, Belgium,
National Planning Association, The Nth Coyitry 
Problem And Arms Control. Planning Pamphlet No. 108 (Washing- 
ton: National Planning Association, I96O), p. 37; At this 
writing, three of the nuclear nations (Britain, the USSR, and 
the U.S.) plus some 91 non-nuclear nations have reached an 
agreement on a non proliferation treaty. Though it is a step 
in the right direction, the treaty is not a foolproof guaran­
tee against nuclear diffusion because two nuclear nations
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Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The only 
remaining problem for the potential nuclear powers consists 
in (1) finding enough skilled scientists and engineers, and 
(2) providing the necessary economic and industrial base, as 
well as necessary strategic materials.^
The committee also concluded that the diffusion of 
nuclear weapons, continued unchecked, would obviously in­
crease the possibility of a nuclear war, and listed some of 
the incalculable factors that the spread of atomic weapons 
adds to international politics: (a) Economic or other pres­
sures may cause some countries to sell nuclear weapons, (b) 
Fanatics or dictators who head some governments may act rash­
ly. (o) There will be an increase in unauthorized, or acci­
dental, use of atomic weapons, (d) One small nuclear power, 
through irresponsible "mischief making" can act as a catalyst 
for a nuclear conflict between large powers.^
An examination of the last factor points up the danger 
of the spread of nuclear weapons. That is, the possibility of 
a nuclear conflict from the "mischief-making" of a small
(France and Red China) desired to remain outside the treaty, 
there are no guaranteed safeguards through inspections, and it 
is quite possible that the treaty could not survive ratifica­
tion.
Îbid.
^Ibid., p. 38; Secretary Dean Rusk reaffirmed these 
factors before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 
23, 1966. See "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," U.S. 
Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LVI, No. 1394 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 406-4l0.
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nuclear power. It is agreed by many that a small nuclear 
country allied with a large nuclear power may force the latter 
into a nuclear conflict, not of its own choosing, by launch­
ing an attack on another large nuclear power. Since in the 
nuclear missile age it is most difficult to know the direc­
tion from which a missile is launched; and since nuclear 
strategies are planned for almost instantanious response, it 
is agreed by many that the attacked country, in all probabil­
ity, will retaliate with a major strike at its number one 
enemy. The argument can be made that a small nuclear power 
would not be able to come forth and collect the benefit for 
which it launched the attack; that an attack is most likely 
to be launched after or during an argument and, therefore, 
the opponents would automatically be identified. Neverthe­
less the point is that even the possibility that a nuclear 
conflict can be forced upon the super powers is sure to add 
an element of instability to world peace each time the 
"nuclear club" expands. It is this possibility that Wash­
ington fears most about proliferation.^ This alone causes 
many headaches in Washington, and greatly increases the 
potential power of a French or British nuclear force. 
(Actually, few Americans fear irresponsibility by the British; 
it is the French force de frappe and, particularly, the pos­
sibility of a potential German force that creates the most
^Eusk, "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 
ibid., p. 407.
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worries in Washington,)^ The "hot line" from Washington to 
Moscow is a product of this fear.
Viewed in the light of some of the justifications 
for independent forces, Washington is not wrong in fearing 
the possibility of a catalytic nuclear war. Both Britain 
and France have Justified their independent nuclear forces 
with arguments that nuclear weapons would give them greater 
influence over the United States' action. For example, the 
late Prime Minister Churchill, replying to an argument in the 
house of Commons, on March 1, 1955» that Britain need not 
build a hydrogen bomb, but should rather criticize unwise 
American nuclear policies, stated, "Personally I cannot feel 
that we should have much influence over their policy or 
actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent . . . 
upon their protection."^ On the other hand, this influence 
was spelled out more bluntly by French General Pierre 
Gallois: "In Prance the notion that the small nuclear arse­
nal would lead to the use of the large one of the United 
States is one of the Justifications for a modest nuclear 
arsenal for security.
The striving for independent nuclear forces by
O
Strausz-Hupe, Dougherty, and Kintner, 0£. cit., p.
110.
P̂arliamentary Debates (Commons) (5th series) Vol.
537 (1955)7^001. 1905.
l^Gallois, 0£. cit., p. 39.
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Britain and Prance for a bargaining weapon to gain special 
position within NATO could in the long run be the most divi­
sive factor of the Alliance, According to Albert Wohlstetter, 
"not all members of an alliance can be 'more equal' than the 
o t h e r s . T h e  allies that are slighted are bound to resent 
their inferior position and follow the course to a nuclear 
force or neutrality or both. Two cases in point are France 
and West Germany. For example, France has, from the first, 
resented Britain's close ties with the U.S. and has made it 
Icnown on several occasions, French Foreign Minister Maurice 
Couve de Murville stated this resentment as justification 
for the force de frappe on January 24, 1963:
On the European level . . . nothing has been done 
with regard to nuclear matters. Germany is finding 
itself in a special position resulting from the commit­
ments it made in 1954. As for Britain, it is linked to 
the U.S. through special relations that it has maintained 
for a long time, and which have Just been reenforced 
following the recent Nassap Accords. That is to say, to 
this day, the only path open to us is to continue what 
has been started. . . .12
French Ambassador Herve Alphand expressed this same resent­
ment to unequal treatment in an address to the Economic Club 
of Detroit on February 24, 1964, stating that he could not see 
why Washington was so concerned about an independent French
^^Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing; NATO and the 
N-Plus-I Country," Foreign Affairs. Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (I96I), 
p. 358.
l^Maurice Couve de Murville, The French Foreign 
Minister Defines France's Policy (New York; The French Embas­
sy, Press and Information Service, 1963)» P* 10.
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nuclear force which would in the majority of cases be joined 
with the U.S. force. He said, "Our position on this subject 
does not differ from that of Great Britain."^^
Germany's awareness of inequality in the Alliance is 
stated by State Secretary von Hase: "A special status for
the Federal Republic of Germany is unacceptable, since free 
Germans are called upon to shoulder equal risks and respon­
sibilities with their partners."
There are two other possible dangers that are not 
given much thought: (1) It is possible that a short sighted
calculation on the part of a small nuclear power which would 
stand to gain if the United States and Russia annihilated 
each other could lead to a nuclear war. In this case each 
nation would move up two rungs in power. One observer 
asserted that "this prospect presents as great a danger as 
any real or imagined Soviet belligerency."^^ (2) The pro­
liferation of weapons might increase to a point where
^ Address Delivered By H. £. 14. Herve Alphand To The 
Economic Club Of Detroit (New York: The French Embassy. In­
formation Service, 19&4), pp. 3-4; Also see Press Conference 
of General de Gaulle, October 23, 1958 (New York: The French 
Embassy, Information Service), p. 6; The General said,
"France will not accept a position of chronic and overwhelming 
inferiority."
^^arl Gunther von Hase, "Bonn Consulting With NATO 
Allies On Future Of Defense," The Bulletin. Vol. XIV, No. 11 
(Bonn: German Federal Government, Press And Information 
Office, 1966), p. 2.
^^Oliver D. Knouth, U.S. Foreign Policy In A Changing 
world, Planning Pamphlet No. 110 (Washington National Plan­
ning Association, I96O), p. 12.
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"suitcase bombs may be attractive to lands lacking delivery 
systems, thus producing the danger of anonymous attacks which 
could 'trigger-off a general war."^^
The reasoning which would motivate a small nuclear 
power to attack a large nuclear power with the intent of 
starting a nuclear holocost, is beyond the boldest reach of 
the imagination. The argument against such an act is quite 
strong. First, the small power would have to avoid all means 
of being detected; the risk of detection might outweigh any 
possible gain— it could be suicide. Second, there is always 
the possibility that the nation that starts a nuclear attack 
could become its own victim; that is, a victim of radio 
active fall-out. And finally, the "hope of inheriting the
world after the major powers have destroyed each other seems
„17 vague."
Every possibility, in the era when the destruction 
of man himself rests on irrationality, vague concepts, and 
the foolhardiness of men, becomes compounded. If past 
history shows anything it is the fact that .aan has not always 
been rational, has not always had clear concepts, and has not 
always been prudent.
^^Vernon Wash, "The Case For International Control Of 
Weapons," Current History, Vol. XLVII, No. 2?6 (August, 1964), 
p. 99.
7̂fienry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 19dO), p. 244.
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Germany And Nuclear Weapons
The Federal fiepubllc of West Germany is commonly
cited as the next likely nation to acquire its own nuclear 
18forces. No potential factor arouses greater emotions 
throughout Europe than this prospect. Memories of two major 
wars in the first half of the twentieth century argue against 
a nuclear Germany. Moreover, there are well grounded appre­
hensions about the reactions of the Soviet Union to such a 
situation. The unresolved European problems could at any 
time start a chain reaction of violence whether intended by 
Russia or not— problems of Berlin, German reunification, 
boundaries, and the general unrest in East Berlin as well as 
the Eastern European countries. Since these conditions 
already exist, they could only be compounded with the advent 
of a nuclear-armed Federal Republic. In view of this it is 
easy to understand why many agree that diffusion of nuclear 
weapons to West Germany is one of the most explosive factors
1 8For German official renunciation of the desire for 
the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons see "Chancel­
lor Adenauer's Foreign Policy Declaration," o£. cit.; Foreign 
Minister Gerhard Schroeder, "Schroeder On German Foreign 
Policy," NEWS (Washington; The German Embassy, 1962), p. 3; 
"Frank Answers: Schroeder's Views On Ending Atomic Peril,"
The Bulletin. Vol. XIV, No. 37 (Bonn: German Federal Govern­
ment, Press and Information Office, I966), p. 4; "Chancellor 
Erhard Takes Stock at Press Conference," loo. cit.; "German 
Note of March 25," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 
LIV, No. 1400 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1966), p. 656; Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, "The Divided 
Nation— A Pawn In International Politics," NEWS. Vol. XII,
No. 3 (Washington: The German Embassy, 1968)7 PP. 10-11,
104
in the Alliance, and at the same time one of the most explo­
sive factors in the international sphere.
An examination of some of the ramifications of a 
nuclear armed Germany points up why the United States pressed 
for the MLP program to head off a German national nuclear 
force, and at the same time head off collaboration between 
France and Germany on the French Force. It is true that 
under the Brussels Treaty Germany is barred from manufacturing 
atomic weapons, but there is nothing to prevent West Germany 
from collaborating with any of the Alliance members in the 
production of weapons systems. Of course implicit in de 
Gaulle's desire to involve West Germany in nuclear collab­
oration is the need to share the costs; not to share the 
19control.
The situation, where de Gaulle can tempt German
Nationalism, is much feared in Britain and the United States.
One possible American reaction to a collaboration of Germany
and Prance, is withdrawal from Europe. Withdrawal of the
United States, according to most writers, strategists, and
officials, is the worst blow that NATO could suffer and
would be the greatest Russian "political and military success 
20since 1945." Even if the United States did not withdraw
^^"Europe; To NATO's Brink," Time, November 13, 1964,
p. 5̂ .
20P. W. Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control Or 
Consultation," Orbis, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1964), p. 21.
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from Europe, a Franco-German effort would replace America's 
control over the European end of the Alliance and thereby 
have the same effect as an American withdrawal. In any case, 
a West Germany with nuclear arms as viewed by the Soviet 
Union, could only lead to a sharp deterioration of inter­
national stability.
According to Anthony Hartley, the fear of what might 
happen if West Germany got control of nuclear weapons and 
Moscow should take fright was a motive force that gave rise 
to the "Ban-the-Bomb" faction in the British Labor Party.
And this same motive force could cause Britain to join any 
nuclear arrangement between the United States and West Ger­
many. Britain could not afford the isolation that staying
21out of such a project as the MLF would bring her.
Britain's fear is multiplied by the thought that there is a 
possibility of erosion of the American veto over nuclear 
weapons.
Another factor of instability that would be Inserted 
Into the Alliance should West Germany develop her own force, 
or for that matter, should come to share in the already 
existing atomic power with any of the NATO members, is the 
fact that she would become the decisive nuclear power among 
the continental Allies. Bonn already possesses the strongest
21Anthony Hartley, "The British Bomb," Survival. 
Vol. VI, No. 4 (1964), p. 175; See also "Mr. Wilson Says He 
Would Seek Defense Review," The Times, loc. cit.
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conventional forces in Western Europe. Germany has, as of
1965» "fulfilled its pledge to NATO by making available the
22last of 12 divisions of armed forces. ..." On the other 
hand, Britain has fewer than two and one half divisions and 
Belgium has two divisions, assigned to the Central European 
NATO Command. France does not have any troops assigned to 
NATO, but does have approximately two divisions in Germany. 
And each of these nations, France, Britain, and Belgium, was 
planning further unilateral reductions of troop levels for
1968.23
In light of the present potential strength of the
Federal Republic, there are several possible views that
Moscow might take of any further addition to German strength,
Since the inception of NATO and German rearmament, the
Soviets have charged that both NATO and rearmamemt would
lead to a rebirth of German militarism. "A revival of
German militarism would endanger Germany’s neighbors" is one
2kof the main themes Moscow uses against NATO. A good 
example of the propaganda campaign against the West German 
government by Moscow can be seen in a speech by Leonid
22 "Free Part of Germany's Tenth Year Of Sovereignty," 
The Bulletin. Vol. XIII, No. 15 (Bonn: German Federal Govern­
ment, Press and Information Service, 1965)» p. 3*
^^Kiesinger, "The Divided Nation," NEWS, op. cit.,
p. 2.
24Alvin J. Cottrell and James L. Dougherty, The 
Politics Of The Atlantic Alliance (New York; Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964), p. 56.
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Brezhnev, April 24, I967, at a Conference of Communists and 
Workers Parties of Europe, held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslo­
vakia;
Pacts show that the military threat which today stems 
from German imperialism is an indisputable reality. In 
the past 10 years the German Federal Republic has created 
one of the largest armies in West Europe . . . and a 
sufficient quantity of command cadres to enable numerous 
armed forces to be mobilized in a short period. . . .
The West German imperialists . . .  do not have the 
power to achieve their revanchist aims. The Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries have a sufficient military 
might to strike a crushing blow at an aggressor who would 
dare start a war. But the revanchists could plunge the 
European countries, and eventually the whole world, into 
. . . another war, and this danger must be recognized.
The military presence of the United States in Europe 
encourages West German militarism and increases the 
threat to peace in Europe.25
No one but the Soviets themselves know what course 
they would take in a situation of a nuclear armed West 
Germany, but considering their strong opposition to NATO and 
to the MLP proposal, and remembering their fear of a rearmed 
Germany, it is possible to anticipate some of the views that 
Russia might take toward West Germany, Prom these anticipated 
views it is possible to predict some of the possible reactions 
of the Soviet Union to such a move: First, Russia could take
the view that West Germany was seeking the same weapons as 
the Soviet Union and was claiming parity. Second, the Soviet 
Union could get the impression that Bonn was actually becoming
^U.S. Senate, Subcommittee On National Security and 
International Operations of the Committee on Government Oper­
ations, The Soviet View of NATO: Speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev. 
April 24, 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess (Washington: U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 19o7), p. 7.
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revanchist (not Just propaganda) and, therefore, an offen­
sive nation, since a German nuclear force would have only 
"first-strike" capability. That is, these weapons would be 
vulnerable to destruction by a nuclear blow and thus be of
26little or no use for retaliation or defense. Third, Moscow 
might view the situation as one in which West Germany was 
preparing for the reunification of all Germany by force, 
since securing self-determination for the entire German nation
27remains a vital objective of German policy. Acquisition of 
atomic weapons would tend to support the Soviet propaganda 
of the rebirth of German imperialism even though German 
officials have denied this on numerous occasions beginning 
with the Land Declaration of 195^> in which West Germany 
declared "never to have recourse to force to achieve the 
reunification of Germany or the modification of the present 
boundaries" of West Germany. The Federal Republic also 
pledged to settle by peaceful methods all disputes "which
28might arise between the Federal Republic and other states."
26Kissinger, Necessity For Choice, op. cit., p. I7.
^^West German officials always include reunification 
in their policy statements. Chancellor Kiesinger's statement 
is representative— "The right of self-determination which is 
invoked by the peoples of the earth . . . cannot in the long 
run be denied to the German people either." "Responsibility 
For The Future of The German Nation," jJEW3i Vol. XII, No. 3 
(Washington: The German Embassy, 1968), p. 1.
28Karl-Gunther von Rase, "Bonn Consulting With NATO 
Allies On Future Of Defense," 0£. cit., p. 2; See particularly 
the German Declaration of March 25, I966, on the use of
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In considering these views that Moscow might take, 
there is a possibility of Russia implementing a preemptive 
nuclear attack on West Germany through fear.
This same possibility holds also in regard to the 
stationing of American missiles on German soil under the 
"double key" or "double veto" system. For to equip the Ger­
man Federal Republic with nuclear weapons capable of destroy­
ing Moscow, or for that matter, any Russian city, could have 
the same effect on the Kremlin as the Russian missiles in 
Cuba had on Washington. It is unlikely that Moscow would 
be more inclined to accept a Germany armed with American 
missiles than was Washington a Cuba armed with Russian 
missiles. It might be added that this could be the basic 
reason that the United States has not favored a NATO nuclear 
force of land-based MiRBM’s as suggested by SAC EUR. Another 
side to this unstable factor is the possibility that Russia 
could view American missiles on German soil as the erosion 
of American Deterrent capability. This could set off a 
Soviet attack through miscalculation.
There is also speculation that if the United States 
were to help West Germany, or any of the Alliance members, 
to develop a nuclear strike force, the Soviet Union would be
force. Full text is found in U.S. Department of State Bulle­
tin. Vol. LIV, No. 1400 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1966), pp. 65^-657.
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forced to give nuclear aid to East Germany and her other sat­
ellites. However, it is generally agreed that Russia has 
several reasons for not giving nuclear weapons to her satel­
lites. One observer dismisses this possibility in the follow­
ing manner; "This is nonsensical for two reasons. First of 
all, there is scarcely a nexus between the two eventualities. 
Second, it is doubtful, in any event, that the Russians will 
donate the hard earned fruits of their military technology 
to a potential dangerous neighbor."^ This view gains con­
siderable support when seen in the framework of the Hungar­
ian, Polish, and East German uprising plus the latest Russo- 
Czechoslovak confrontation over Czech reforms. It is highly 
unlikely that Russia would go so far as to arm her satellites 
with weapons that could not only involve the Soviet Union in 
a nuclear war but could also be used effectively against her. 
On the other hand, John G. Stoessinger, while agreeing that 
it would be a hard decision for Moscow to make, argues that 
Moscow has been pressured by its Warsaw partners as much as 
Washington has by its NATO Allies for a share in nuclear 
strategy. Therefore, he implies that it is a strong possi­
bility that Russia could give atomic weapons to East Germany 
should West Germany come to share them.^®
^̂ F. 0. Miksche, "The Case For Nuclear Sharing,"
Orbis, Vol. V, No. 3 (I960), p. 303,
^®0n the Dilemma facing the Soviet Union should West 
Germany get a share in nuclear weapons, see John G. Stoessin­
ger, The Might of Nations: World Politics In Our Times (Rev.
ed., New York; Random House,"1965), p. 159»
Ill
In any case, each of these factors or any combination 
of them, is possible and could very well happen. The worst 
situation is unlikely to occur, but where the fate of NATO 
and the world hang in the balance, "even very small proba­
bilities need to be taken seriously.
As for Bonn's goal of the reunification of Germany
and any motion of her pursuing a policy for nuclear weapons,
the two aims are incompatible. Alastair Buchan has pointed
out that a Federal Republic Administration that participates
in a European nuclear arrangement "must abandon all hope of 
32reunification." Helmut Schmidt, member of the Bundstag 
Defense Committee, in arguing against nuclear weapons for 
the Federal Republic, summed up the incompatibility of reuni­
fication and nuclear arms when he said:
Since German reunification is only attainable by 
negotiation, the German people cannot interest itself in 
the establishment and cultivation of a state of enmity 
between themselves and the Soviet Union. . . . Negotia­
tions of an agreed settlement of the German problem is 
quite inconceivable other than on the basis of partner­
ship between East and West.33
This seems to be the adopted position of the present West
German administration. Chancellor Kiesinger placed emphasis
on establishing a detente with Eastern European countries and
omitted any mention of a desire for nuclear weapons sharing in
3lMalcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intran­
sigence," Foreign Affairs. Vol. XLI, No. 2 (1963), p. 293.
^^Alastair Buchan, NATO In The I960's (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, I96O), p. 70.
33Helmut Schmidt, Defence Or Retaliation, trans. 
Edward Thomas (Edinburg: Oliver and Boyd, 1962)j p. I69.
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his State of The Nation message in March, I968. Bonn has, 
since the advent of the Kiesinger administration, tended toward 
establishing better relations with its neighbors.
Klaus Knorr argues that the sharing control of nuclear 
weapons with West Germany would have further ramifications 
than an attack on Germany, He says that "the USSR would prob­
ably interpret the transfer of control . . .  as a move so 
hostile that the host country would thereby assume the imme­
diate risk of a preemptive Soviet strike.
Effects On Nuclear Disarmament
Several strategic analysts within the Western nations 
believe that the diffusion of atomic weapons to other coun­
tries would magnify the problems of arms control and reduce 
further whatever possibilities there might be of reaching some 
kind of international arms agreement. The Soviet Union, for 
example, continued to hold out on the Nonproliferation Nuclear 
Treaty "so long as the United States continued to hold open 
the possibility of such nuclear sharing . . .  as the multi­
lateral force or Allied nuclear force. These schemes would
3^Por the complete text of Chancellor Kiesinger*s 
State of The Nation Message see NEWS, Vol. XII, No. 3 
(Washington: The German Embassy, 19oo).
^^Klaus Knorr, "The Future of Western Deterrent 
Power; A View Prom The United States Of America," Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists. Vol. XVI, No. 7 (I960), p. 273.
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constitute proliferation. ..." Arms agreements will be
complicated by the fact that each case of diffusion creates
additional pressure and incentive for still other countries
to strive to acquire their own nuclear force, "or to destroy
the nuclear facilities of the acquiring state before the pro-
37gram reaches completion."-̂ '
It has already been pointed out how nuclear weapons 
as a status symbol for more influence within NATO can only 
create inequality and further incentive to member countries. 
It is not likely that any new atomic power could develop 
"second-strike" capabilities for several years after it ex­
ploded its first atomic device. France, who exploded her 
first device in i960, did not have her force de frappe fully 
developed until 1966, and does not expect to have her sub-
q  q
marine missile fleet fully developed until 1972. There­
fore until the nuclear launching submarines are completed the 
French force will remain no more than a "first-strike" force 
due to high vulnerability.
To overcome vulnerability there will be a tendency
 ̂"Excerpt From Annual Report; The International 
Negotiations," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, 
No. 1394 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, I966), 
p. 413.
^^Dean Rusk, "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 
op. cit., p. 406.
O Q
President Charles de Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference 
(New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 
1964), pp. 8-9.
Ilk
toward automatic or "qulck-trigger" systems for launching re­
taliatory strikes. Automatic systems could raise the risks 
of nuclear war by accident of third party or by war exercises, 
mismanaged tests, and strategic miscalculation; Automatic 
reaction systems are inflexible and could esculate into a 
full scale war out of border incidents or threats. In view 
of these factors it would be almost an impossibility to
achieve, much less enforce, arms agreements that would sta-
39bilize world conditions. It is argued that nuclear arms
control will be almost an impossibility where there is a
history of suspicion and hostility. As a matter of fact.
Secretary of State Rusk argues that "nuclear proliferation
could add a new and dangerous dimension to historical ethnic
40and territorial disputes existing between nations."
Another observer suggests that a "perfect or foolproof inspec­
tion and control system" cannot be "devised for most types 
of disarmament agreements between states that are hostile to 
and suspicious of each other." With this in view, the 
possibility of what will happen when the United Arab Republic 
and Israel acquire atomic weapons lends urgency to the matter.
^^The Nth Country Problem And Arms Control, op. cit.,
p. xi.
Rusk, "Won Proliferation of Wuclear Weapons," loc.
cit.
James E. Dougherty, "Nuclear Weapons Control," 
Current History. Vol. LXVIII, No. 275 (July, 1964), p. 35*
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Washington agrees with the analysts who argue that to 
gain any measure of arms control the spread of nuclear weap­
ons must be halted. RAND analyst Malcolm W. Hoag writes that 
the broad objective of the United States has been, and remains, 
to halt the diffusion of national nuclear forces. Therefore, 
"the United States has persisted in one message to would be 
aspirants: ‘If you go toward independent nuclear capabili­
ties, you go it alone. The road promises to be long and 
costly; and for what?'" Washington was hoping that France's 
problem would be a prime example as a lesson to other poten­
tial atomic powers.
An argument that has been used extensively by both 
Britain and France is the positive effect that their own 
nuclear force has on world stability and disarmament. Each 
tends to view his own national force as beneficial. Both 
the late Prime Minister Winston Churchill and former Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan justified Britain's nuclear weap­
ons on the basis that they gave the British an exercise of 
influence on arms-control agreements between the United States 
and Russia. French President de Gaulle speaks not only of 
the increased effect that France as a nuclear power will have 
on nuclear disarmament but also of the peaceful effects of 
equilibrium, security, wisdom, and circumspection she will 
bring to a dangerous world. For example, in 1958, de Gaulle
42Hoag, 0£. cit., p. 286.
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declared that "when we become an atomic power . . .  we will
have all the greater means at our disposal for making our
action felt in fields that are precious and useful to all
43mankind; those of world security and disarmament." In 
i960, when Prance exploded her first atomic device, General 
de Gaulle immediately proclaimed that the "French Republic is
now in an even better position to further its actions toward
the conclusion of agreements among the atomic powers with a 
view to achieving nuclear disarmament."^^ At his Tenth Press 
Conference on July 3» 1964, the General stated that France’s 
nuclear force "not only constitutes for her . . . the guar­
antee of her security, but also it introduces into a danger­
ous world a new and powerful element of wisdom and circum­
spection." Later in the same conference he added:
We will . . . continue our atomic effort over the
short, medium and long term, convinced to be thereby
helping the nation's scientific, technical and industrial 
development . . . and to be giving France the means for 
her security and her independence, consequently those 
for her action in behalf of equilibrium and peace in the
world.45
If these arguments were carried to their logical conclusion, 
it would mean that the unanimity for stability and nuclear 
disarmament through arms-control can be achieved only by
43De Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 28.
^^Cited in George A. Kelley, "The Political Back­
ground Of The French A-Bomb," Orbis, Vol. IV, Wo. 3 (I960), 
p. 284.
pp. 9-10.
^^De Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, op. cit.,
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distributing nuclear weapons to all countries.
Neither Britain nor France, of course, has ever 
carried this argument to its conclusion. They have adhered 
closely to what Albert Wohlstetter, RAND analyst, has called 
the "N-Plus-l Country Problem," that is, so far as world 
stability is concerned the Nth country tends to see the 
problem of proliferation as starting with the N-Plus-l.
The Nth Power problem originally started when both Russia and 
the United States thought of the trouble as the "third-power 
problem"; Britain thought of it as the "fourth-power problem"; 
France as the fifth; and Red China as the sixth. "Each new 
or prospective nuclear power thinks of the problem as stopping
47the next country after itself." Secretary Rusk pointed
out the Nth power problem when he declared that the United
States believed that "even one nuclear power was too many,
and immediately after World War II we sought to remove nu-
48clear energy from the military field," Red China faith­
fully followed this procedure when she exploded her first 
nuclear device. She immediately called for a world conference 
to out-law the bomb.
A study prepared at Stanford Research Institute, in 
California, suggests that the prevention of nuclear diffusion
^^Wohlstetter, 0£. cit., p. 257*
47IMi*, p. 258.
48Rusk, "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," op. 
cit.. p. 407.
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has not only been a failure in its intended purpose of creat­
ing world stability, but has rather increased instability by 
giving Russia an opportunity for various forms of blackmail. 
The study further asserts that since Russia's fears of a 
nuclear-armed Western Europe are sincere, Washington could 
use these fears to America's advantage by suggesting to 
Russia that Washington is seriously thinking about sharing 
control with the WATO Allies. "Over the long run it may give 
the United States bargaining leverage in any negotiation" 
over the areas of nuclear disarmament and European security.
The suggestion is refuted by an example of the com­
plexities of proliferation of weapons and nuclear disarma­
ment. For instance Washington proposed the tlLF as an arms- 
control measure to head off Bonn's nuclear ambitions and at 
the same time tempt Britain and Prance to consolidate their 
forces within the RATO framework. Russia, on the other hand, 
regarded the proposal as proliferation, and declared the 
project would preclude any arms agreement, including agree­
ment against nuclear proliferation. Though Washington main­
tained that the MFL arrangement did not constitute prolifera­
tion, it did let the matter become obscure. A nonprolifera­
tion treaty has been negotiated and is now in the ratification
AgRichard B. Foster, "Unilateral Arms Control 
Measures And Disarmament Negotiations," Orbis. Vol. VI, 
No. 2 (1.92), p. 279.
^°Ibid., p. 280.
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s t a g e . However, since neither Prance nor Germany has 
approved the treaty, West Germany could still be driven into 
collaboration with France. This would bring about the pro­
liferation that the iTLP was supposed to prevent.
Proliferation and nuclear disarmament are incompat­
ible. Diffusion of nuclear weapons within NATO can only add 
to the problem of agreements on control of nuclear weapons. 
It seems that, until nuclear disarmament has been achieved, 
world stability in the nuclear age can best be maintained by 
the nuclear stalemate between the two super powers.
Effects On NATO's Strategy 
An Alliance should be an exception to the problems 
of proliferation. An effective Alliance would not be 
plagued with the spread of nuclear weapons if it had a 
planned strategy in accord with objectives to be achieved.
In the case of the North Atlantic Alliance, there are fif­
teen sovereign nations with common interests but not 
identical ones; and fifteen different views on the objec­
tives to be achieved. It is true that so long as the Allies 
viewed Soviet foreign policy as a military threat to their 
security, they were agreed that the main purpose of NATO was 
to counter Communist force. But as armed aggression became 
less imminent and Western Europe grew more prosperous, the
— 51"Nuclear Treaty Endorsed In U.N. By 92-To-4 Vote," 
New York Times. June 11, 1968, pp. 1, 3.
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Alliance's leading members began to disagree on NATO's
objectives and how they should be achieved.
For most of the Alliance members one purpose of NATO
is to create a base of strength from which to negotiate
successfully with the USSR. A base of strength is considered
a prerequisite for successful negotiations in international
diplomacy. Marshal Stalin emphasized this necessity for
military force when he posed his famous question: "How many
62divisions has the Pope?"
The principle members of the Alliance are agreed that 
NATO falls far short of an effective strategy and that there 
is need for a change. Even though the "flexible response" 
was adopted in December, 196?, it did not solve the basic 
problem of strategy because the basic problem turns on the 
question of confidence within the Alliance and is brought 
about by the changing purposes of alliances. For example, 
pre-nuclear age alliances were formed for three basic pur­
poses: First, to amass physical force— the more members the
stronger the alliance. Second, to let it be known to all 
potential enemies what nations would support each other.
There is some claim that had Germany known that the United 
States would join the Allies both world wars would have been
52Cited in Gordon B. Turner, "Diplomatic Aspects of 
Unbalanced Military Forces," National Security In The Nuclear 
Age (ed.), Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener, 0£. oit., 
p. 116.
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prevented. Third, "to provide an Incentive for mutual assist­
ance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the 
national Interest."
There was Inconsistency among these purposes even 
before nuclear weapons were Introduced. The larger the 
membership of an alliance the greater was the collective 
security; but at the same time, the wider the range of Inter­
ests the harder It was to establish a common ground and get 
common action from the members. Larger membership not only 
made agreement on what constituted a threat next to Impossible 
It also raised the threshold on how direct and Intense a 
threat had to be to produce joint action. Those difficulties 
have multiplied with the atomic age. An alliance In the 
atomic age must have a strategy based on tight control and 
command of nuclear weapons because of the great risks Involved 
In nuclear warfare. These risks have brought the pledge of 
mutual assistance Into grave doubt. As a result of this doubt 
there are two opposing views on the effectiveness of the 
modern alliance such as NATO. (1) The Alliance can be effec­
tive If all Its nuclear weapons are centralized under competent 
authority and direction. (2) The Alliance has lost Its use­
fulness and each member must have Its own nuclear strike 
force.
The United States subscribes to the first view.
63Henry A. Kissinger, "Coalitions And Nuclear Diplo­
macy," Survival. Vol. VI, No. 5 (1964), p. 20?.
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Washington has consistently emphasized that European contri­
butions to the overall nuclear strength of NATO is negligible, 
and has adopted a policy that firmly opposes proliferation 
of independent nuclear strategies. On June l6, 1962, Secre­
tary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed clearly the United 
States' position in an address delivered at the University of 
Michigan, Mr. McNamara asserted that independent European 
nuclear strike forces would be too small to have any serious 
deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, and their use against 
Russia would be tantamount to commiting suicide. "Limited 
nuclear capabilities operating independently, are dangerous,
and prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a 
Kh,deterrent." Essential to American strategy, Mr. McNamara 
added, is the existence of a "controlled response" based on 
"unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, 
and central direction. There must not be competing and con­
flicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war.
Fundamental to Secretary McNamara's new strategy was 
the determination to control the employment of force in order 
to rule out, insofar as humanly possible, the chance of an 
expansion of a small conflict into a nuclear war through
<4Robert McNamara, "Defense Arrangements of The North 
Atlantic Community," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 




miscalculation, and to rule out a possible "counter-city" 
strike by Russia. The "controlled response" (flexible re­
sponse) strategy called for the United States to retaliate,
In case of a nuclear attack, against Soviet military forces. 
This strategy Is Impossible If Independent strike forces with 
only "first-strike" capabilities are dispersed throughout 
NATO countries.
Every United States proposal for nuclear sharing 
reflects this strategy. Each proposal has had a built In 
veto system that would perpetuate American hegemony over 
nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy within the Alliance. In 
other words, Secretary McNamara's flexible response called 
for a division of labor within the Alliance with the Euro­
peans supplying the conventional forces and the United States 
furnishing the nuclear deterrent. Since the only real 
deterrent force In the Alliance Is nuclear, this could and 
would leave the security of Europeans completely at the mercy 
of the American commitment. In fact, Europeans would be 
reduced to mere satellites. (A fact which many of them already 
realize and resent.) In view of this It Is not surprising 
that the Europeans have balked at raising conventional forces; 
that the Europeans are suspicious of Washington's efforts to 
get them to furnish the "men-at-arms for the American nuclear 
k n i g h t , T h e  United States has not changed from its stand
^^Benard Brodie, "What Price Conventional Capabili­
ties In Europe," The Reporter, May 23, 1963, P* 28.
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as Secretary McNamara pointed out in a statement before the 
Senate Armed Forces Committee;
The main subject of this debate over nuclear strategy 
has concerned the proper response to levels of aggression 
below an all out strategic nuclear attack on our home­
lands. For siz years, the discussion has centered on the 
extent to which we should plan on the use of nuclear 
weapons as the main response to non-nuclear aggression. 
The U.S. has been firmly of the view that the threat of 
an incredible action is not an effective deterrent.37
The opposing view of the controversy, that Alliances 
have lost their usefulness, is based on the assumption that 
the risks of total destruction will prevent the United States 
from fulfilling its commitment to defend Europe with the 
American deterrent. It is also based on the assumption that
a small national strike force will deter a large force. The
leading exponent of this view is French President de Gaulle. 
President de Gaulle has used these arguments on several
occasions in support of the French force de frappe. For
example, in his second press conference in 1939, as President 
of the French Republic, de Gaulle cast doubt upon the Ameri­
can commitment when he declared:
Who can say whether . . . the two powers that would 
have a monopoly on nuclear weapons might not make a deal 
with each other to divide the world between them. Who 
can say whether, should the occasion arise— while each 
side might follow a policy of not hurling its devices at 
the principle adversary . . . the two rivals might not
^^U.S. Senate, Armed Forces Committee, Statement of 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara On The Fiscal Years 
19^9-1973 Defense Program And 19^9 Defense Budget. 90 Cong., 




And who even can say whether the two rivals . . . 
will not come to the point of uniting? In truth, France, 
by equipping herself with nuclear armaments, is render­
ing a service to the equilibrium of the world.58
By 1963, President de Gaulle was more direct in his doubts of
the United States' commitment to use its nuclear weapons in
defense of NATO:
With regard to defense, until recently the Ameri­
cans . . , were in a position to assure the free world 
almost complete protection, but they lost this monopoly,
. . . Owing to the fact that the Russians now have the 
wherewithall to destroy the world . . .  it is only 
natural that America is seeing its own survival as the 
principle objective in a possible conflict and is not 
considering the time, degree, terms and conditions of 
its nuclear intervention for the defense of other 
regions . . . except in relation to this natural and 
primary necessity. This . . .  is one of the reasons 
that Prance is equipping itself with its own atomic 
weapons.59
In his Tenth Press Conference, in 1964, President de Gaulle 
again found the American commitment doubtful. He also took 
issue with those who had criticized national nuclear forces 
as insignificant. De Gaulle asserted that in six years 
(1970) France would have "a total instantaneous power of 
2,000 Hiroshima bombs. This is what certain, obviously un­
thinking, opponents call France's 'little bomb.' The 
French President added that an attack on France would bring
^^De Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 6I.
59President Charles de Gaulle, Eighth Press Confer­
ence (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information 
Service, 1963), pp. 8-9.
^^De Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, loc. cit.
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destruction to the attackers, and since a people can die but 
once, "the deterrent exists provided that one has the means 
to wound the possible aggressor.(Italics mine)
This argument was carried further in 1966, when 
French Premier Georges Pompidou, in a foreign policy state­
ment before the French National Assembly, declared:
Within NATO itself, we have seen the replacement,
. . . and without our agreement, of the initial strategy 
tbf>t was based on deterrence and . . . the immediate use 
of atomic reprisals, by a strategy called 'flexible' 
which actually consists in enabling the U.S. to limit 
the field of the initial operation by sparing the terri­
tory of the main potential aggressor.
Tactical nuclear weapons under American control could 
not ensure us from an attack from the East.^2
If this argument were carried to its logical con­
clusion, NATO in the end would comprise fifteen separate 
nuclear weapons programs and strategies. All these programs 
would not only overlap from duplication, but would be of 
dubious military value, and would mark the end of the 
Alliance. In all probability, this would lead to world 
chaos. Each country, to assure its security, would have to, 
not only build a nuclear strike force, but would have to 
devise a method of protection against careless neighbors.
This in turn could lead to surrender or non-involvement.
®^Ibid.
°^Premier Georges Pompidou, Statements On Foreign 
Policy April 13 and 20. 1966 (New York: French Embassy, 
Press and Information Service, 1966), p. 4.
GHAPTfîR V 
STfîATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR NATO
The will to use or not to use nuclear weapons is 
formed by human attitudes coupled with political considera­
tions. These in turn have been the subject of conflicting 
views that cover the entire spectrum from preventive strikes 
to unilateral disarmament of nuclear weapons. It is fortunate 
that, within the Alliance, those who hold either extreme view 
are not in responsible governmental positions. Yet it is 
unfortunate that those who are responsible officials cannot 
agree on what constitutes the best atomic strategy which in 
turn creates nonagreement on what constitutes nuclear pro­
liferation and the dangers of proliferation.
The problem of proliferation derives urgency from the 
fact that the world is approaching a point where it will no 
longer be possible to control the diffusion of independent 
atomic forces.^ Once a nation has successfully completed a 
nuclear weapons program it will have atomic stockpiles which 
can be stored indefinitely; which can survive responsible
^See above footnote 4, p. 96 and footnote 51» P» 119 




governments; and which can be exchanged, sold, or given away.
And Just as important, "Every additional country having
nuclear weapons, is an additional center of independent
decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. International
2relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous."
It is possible that the point of no return has already 
been reached. In the opinion of many there is no possible 
way to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in NATO, there­
fore, the next best thing is to accept the inevitable and 
plan a NATO nuclear strategy accordingly. French Air Force 
Colonel F. 0, Miksche, who is a noted military strategist, 
has written that the spread of independent atomic forces in 
NATO is inevitable unless the United States distributes some 
"300 Hiroshima bombs among the Western European countries,"
and thereby exercise some measure of control over diffusion
3by controlling the production of nuclear warheads. And if 
the United States procrastinates longer, it will control 
neither the use nor the production of the weapons. As 
Miksche succinctly put it, "The expansion of the nuclear club 
is inevitable. Those who stubbornly oppose this trend remind 
one of the doctor in Moliere's Le Malade Imaginaire, who 
hated everyone who preferred to cure himself in his own way
%usk, "Non Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons," loc.
oit.
3Miksche, oĵ . oit., p. 305*
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rather than die according to the advice of the medical 
faculty.”^
Professor Robert Strousz-Hupé, director of the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and 
others have agreed with Miksche that nuclear proliferation is 
inevitable and added that the United States should give life 
to the policy of nuclear sharing to which it has formally 
committed itself. The United States cannot stop proliferation 
and to try to do so by a policy that stifles its Allies, "is
almost as futile as Canute commanding the sea to stand
still.
In any event, an examination of the possibilities of 
proliferation shows that Miksche and Strousz-Hupe et al are 
probably right. First Russia and Britain then France and now 
Red China have developed nuclear weapons. West Germans have 
discovered a process which is a short cut to the development
of the weapons. It has been found by a research group that
any country, "in traveling the road to an operational power 
reactor, is simultaneously traveling well over half-way 
toward an operational plutonium bomb."^ By I960, some forty- 
two countries were operating atomic powered reactors and 
were active in atomic research.
^Ibid.
^Btrausz-Hup^, Dougherty, and Kintner, 0£. cit., p. 13I. 
6The Nth Country Problem And Arms Control, op. cit.,
p. 38.
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It should be noted here that the United States, for 
all its fear of nuclear diffusion has at times proceeded on 
the assumption that the spread of nuclear weapons is good.
There has never really been much objection in Washington to 
the British nuclear strike force. In addition, some of the 
United States military policies tend toward the notion that 
the spread of nuclear weapons is good. For example, the United 
States has placed nuclear weapons in foreign countries under 
the "double veto" system; has given or sold significant parts 
of total systems; and has agreed to assist the Dutch and 
French in construction of nuclear submarines— at least the 
non-nuclear parts of the main propulsion machinery. Washing­
ton has gone even farther in regard to Britain: "Actually
given not only submarine plans, but also designs and special
7materials for nuclear warheads." To justify this special 
treatment to Britain, the United States modified the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1958, in such a way that it can be interpreted, 
as was stated above by Hoag, or as an incentive to the "other 
Allies to demonstrate a nuclear capability of their own, and 
so become eligible for help."^
It should be also noted that nuclear sharing, such as 
the United States is now doing, is in itself a movement to­
ward an eventual independent nuclear force. The United States
7
Wohlstetter, o£. cit., p. 358. 
^Ibid.
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will try to retain control over the shared nuclear weapons, 
but it is expected that these efforts will be resisted.
Prance is a case in point. Furthermore, in the bilateral 
agreements with the Allied countries, involving nuclear 
weapons, Washington has found it expedient to vest in the 
recipient country a right to continue to receive both ancil­
lary equipment and restricted information on the use of 
nuclear systems. This right can only be terminated by 
bilateral agreement or by the dissolution of NATO. The 
United States-Turkey agreement is representative of all the 
atomic energy agreements with NATO Allies. Article I states 
that "each Party will communicate to and exchange with the 
other Party information and transfer of non nuclear parts 
of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data to the 
other Party . . ."̂  And Article XI makes note that the 
agreement "shall remain in force until terminated by agree­
ment of both Parties except either Party may terminate its 
cooperation , . . upon the expiration of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.
Since it is highly probable that proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is inevitable, the choices among alternative 
atomic policies confronting NATO members are likely to play an 
important role in proliferation of national strike forces.
^U»S. Department of State, United States Treaties And
Other International Agreements. Vol. X, pt. 2 (Washington;
U.S. Government Printing Office, i960), p. 1341.
lOlbid.. p. 1344.
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and the problem of avoiding small or large nuclear conflicts. 
For this reason it is necessary to examine some of the alter­
natives open to the individual Alliance members, within the 
framework of what is best for the national interest of each 
country.
Albert Wohlstetter, Assistant President of the RAND 
corporation, lists four alternatives from which NATO nations 
can choose; (a) the repudiation of all nuclear weapons, of 
the American guarantee, and of association with any nuclear 
powers; (b) the development of an independent nuclear strike 
force; (c) the creation of a jointly controlled nuclear force; 
(d) the reliance upon the nuclear commitment of the United 
States, that is American control of all NATO nuclear forces. 
There are other choices perhaps, but for the study Wohlstet­
ter' s should be sufficient to make the point clear.
Rejection Of Nuclear Weapons And U.S. Commitment
The unilateral repudiation of nuclear weapons, even 
an Ally's, for protection against Russian aggression has, 
over the past decade, gained some prominence in Britain and 
a small following in the United States. This movement was 
able to split the British Labor Party on policy concerning 
Britain's nuclear strike force, yet it was not confined to 
the Labor Party alone. The movement boasts such notables as 
Bertrand Russell, Philip Toynbee, Stephen King-Hall and
^^Wohlstetter, 0£. cit., p. 358.
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1 2others. In any case, this policy receives support only
from those who advocate returning to complete reliance upon
conventional weapons; those who advocate passive resistance
to Soviet aggression and occupation; and those who advocate
complete surrender without resistance. The unilateral dis-
armer8 see the possibility of war with Russia not as the
consequence of Communist aims and ambitions but as a result
of the arms race. This movement views the USSR as a satisfied
status quo power that, if given a chance, is ready for a
negotiated settlement of the East-West differences. On the
other hand, the group views the United States as "one half
of a power conflict which threatens to crush third coun- 
13tries." Moreover the nuclear disarmers are in the fore­
front of those who spread doubt that America will come to 
the defense of NATO; but is more likely to involve the 
Allies in a nuclear war in which the NATO members have no
iZfinterests.
^^For an excellent representation of British uni­
lateralism see Bertrand Russell, "The Debate On Nuclear 
Pacifism: Bertrand Russell on Unilateralism," The New Repub­
lic. Vol. CXLIV, No. 10 (1961), pp. 13-14.
^^Wohlstetter, o£. cit., p. 359.
^^Russell, loc. cit.; It is quite interesting to note 
that Prance has used these same arguments to justify her 
development of nuclear weapons. See above pp. 124-126; See 
also French Premier Pompidou who, after criticizing the idea 
of U.S. control of weapons, asserts that U.S. control could 
also "involve us in a war that would not be ours . . . and 
for reasons alien to the interests of France and the 
Alliance." Statements On Foreign Policy, op. oit.. p. 5.
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Fortunately, unilateralism is the opinion of a small 
minority throughout NATO countries. Rejection of nuclear 
weapons does not in any sense assure a country of security 
against a nuclear power. Rejection of nuclear weapons, total 
disarmament, or submission would not necessarily diminish the 
Russian motive for attack. A non nuclear defense is not a 
wise substitute for reliance on nuclear weapons since it 
could have little chance of stopping a nuclear attack. To 
unilaterally disarm or partially disarm nuclear weapons, 
would be an invitation for Soviet aggression since at no 
time have the Soviet leaders disavowed the inevitability of 
Communist expansion. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders 
have made it very clear that peace is no more than an order­
ing of world affairs for the triumph of Communism. Their 
policy of peaceful coexistence has a twofold purpose; (1) 
the avoidance of a general war and (2) the creation of a 
situation where all obstacles to Communist expansion are 
removed. Nuclear disarmament is regarded as a most vital 
weapon in the struggle for the Communist triumph. Former 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev pointed this out in speeches in 
November, 1957, and January, I96I. According to Mr. Khrush­
chev the 20th CPSU Congress had advanced the theory and 
practice of the Communist movement, which was first of all 
the "recognition of the necessity of a revolutionary trans­
formation of capitalist society into a socialist society as 
an axiom. . . . The path to socialism lies through
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proletarian revolution and the establishment of the dictator­
ship of the proletariat," Khrushchev went on to recite some 
of the conclusions reached at the 20th CPSU Congress:
Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the view that the 
forms of transition to socialism can be a peaceful or 
nonpeaceful nature, Revolution by peaceful means is in 
keeping with the interests of the working class and the 
masses. But if the ruling classes counter revolution 
with force and are unwilling to bow to the will of the 
people, the proletariat must break their resistance and 
start a resolute civil war,15
In establishing peaceful coexistence as the Soviets* 
foreign policy, Khrushchev had this to say:
Our party considers the policy of peaceful coexist­
ence, which has been handed down to us by Lenin, to be 
the general line of our foreign policy, , , , The con­
sistent implementation of the policy of peaceful coex­
istence strengthens the position of the World Socialist 
system, promotes the growth of its economic might, its 
internal prestige and influence among the peoples' 
masses and creates for it favorable foreign-political 
possibilities in peaceful competition with capitalism.
Peaceful coexistence helps develop the forces of 
progress, the forces struggling for socialism, and in 
capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of 
the Communist Parties. . . .  It facilitates the 
struggle the people wage against aggressive military 
blocs, against foreign military bases. It helps the 
national liberation movement to gain success,
In regard to world peace, the former Soviet Premier 
pointed out that peace was synonymous with Communism, Or
■̂ U,S, Senate, Subcommittee On Internal Security Of 
The Judiciary Committee, Hearings. Analysis Of The Khrushchev 
Speech of January 6. 1961. 87th Cong, 1st Sess (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 73.
^^Ibid.. p. 66.
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better still peace was subject to Communist world triumphs:
Consequently the slogan of the struggle for peace 
does not contradict the slogan of the struggle for Com­
munism. Those two slogans harmonize with each other 
because , . . Communism acts as a force capable of 
saving mankind from the horrors of modern destructive 
rocket nuclear war. . . . Therefore, the slogan of the 
struggle for peace appears as a satellite of the slogan 
of the struggle for Communism.1?
The new leaders in the Soviet Union have not rescinded
the policies stated by Khrushchev in the Moscow conferences.
As a matter of fact Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev has made
it quite clear that the "important conclusions" that were
drawn at the 1957 and i960 conferences had been confirmed to
18be the correct policies. In evaluating the correctness of 
the policies, Mr. Brezhnev declared, "We state with conviction 
that during the years since the Moscow conferences detach­
ments of the revolutionary movement have taken up new posi­
tions and continue their advance though not as rapidly as we 
would like."^^ The Chairman went on to assert, "There has 
been continuous confirmation of one of the fundamental
propositions of communist strategy: that the struggle for
20peace helps the struggle for communism.” Mr. Brezhnev’s 
evaluation concluded that;
^ Ibid.« p. 67; See also Charles B. Marshall, Two 
Communist Manifestos (Washington; Center of Foreign Policy 
Research, 196I).





One of the most important sociopolitical factors of the 
postwar period is that precisely in Europe . . . capital­
ism’s positions have been weakened to a great degree.
This is manifest in the collapse of capitalism and 
the victory of socialist revolutions in the eight states 
of East and Central Europe. This is also manifest in 
the fact that the bourgeoisie has been able to retain its 
domination over the remaining part of Europe to a con­
siderable degree only by relying on the military, polit­
ical, and economic help of the United States.21
However, according to Brezhnev, now that the European members
of NATO are gaining their independence from the United
States it is splitting the "united front of world capital,
which opens up new opportunities for the European and world
workers movement for the development of the struggle for 
..22peace.
In regard to the Soviet position on wars of liberation. 
Chairman Brezhnev made it clear that there would be a con­
tinuation of support from the Kremlin. Of much interest here 
is the insight Brezhnev gives into how the tensions and 
communist struggles in Europe aid the liberation movement 
throughout the world :
Even today the struggle for peace in Europe pins 
down the aggressive forces of the imperialists to a 
certain extent and prevents them from taking part in 
suppressing the liberation movement in other parts of 
the world. . . .
To tie down the forces of imperialism in Europe and 
thwart their aggressive plans is not to simply narrow 
the circle of action of imperialism's aggressive 




have effects everywhere. This would also be a real help 
to the liberation struggle of the peoples on all other 
continents.23
It should also be noted that should both East and
West agree to destroy all existing nuclear weapons, Russia
would have the advantage of massive conventional troops.
WATO has at no time reached the conventional force levels
agreed to whereas the Soviet Union has continued to maintain
her strong conventional troops in her satellite countries
2kplus sophisticated conventional weapons. With the destruc­
tion of all nuclear weapons, Russia would probably have a 
greater advantage over the West than she had when NATO was 
founded, that is provided the West did not build up its con­
ventional forces.
Independent Nuclear Forces 
Although national nuclear strike forces have been 
justified for various reasons, the major justification is 
the belief that no alliance or commitment of allies can ever
^3ibid., p. 5.
^^Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
gives the following statistics on Soviet conventional forces; 
Soviet Army: 26 tank and motorized divisions in East Germany,
Poland, and Hungary; 50,000 combat-ready airborne troops;
115 Red Army divisions in Russia; Soviet Airforce: 12,000
planes with well trained Airmen; Soviet Wavy: Four fleets—
second in power only to the U.S. Navy. Highlights On A 
Briefing On SHAPE And Allied Command Europe (SHAPE (mimeo­
graphed) 1968), pp. 2-3. See also "Defining The True Purpose 
Of NATO," NATO Letter. Vol. XVI, No. 4 (April, I968), pp. 12- 
13, for the disparity of conventional forces between the 
NATO and Warsaw Pacts.
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be strong enough to force any country to risk annihilation 
to aid an o t h e r . A s  has been pointed out, advocates for 
the spread of national nuclear forces— particularly Prance—  
argue their position as follows: (1) nuclear forces can
only deter an attack if the potential aggressor knows that 
the retaliation, causing more destruction than he is willing 
to bear, will actually be used to answer an aggression; (2) 
it is not credible that a nation will become involved in a 
nuclear war, if its own cities are exposed to devastation, 
solely to defend another country; (3) therefore, the only 
force that can deter an attack on France is a nuclear force 
in the hands of the French, Some French writers— not Presi­
dent de Gaulle— make two further points: (4) the other
European nations can be protected only by having their own 
strike forces, therefore, each European nation should have 
nuclear weapons in its own control; and (5) since the 
Western Europeans have intermeshed interests, France will 
only be secure when every major European country has its own 
nuclear strike force.
In brief, the advocates of independent national 
atomic forces argue that not only must each country have its
^^Gallois, The Balance Of Terror, op. cit., p. l40.
The Nth Country Problem And Arms Control, op. cit., 
pp. xii-xiii; See also Maurice Schumann, "Europe's Role In 
A New World— A French Viewpoint," NATO Letter, Vol. XV, No.
11 (November, I966), pp. 6-7.
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own nuclear weapons, but that any small nuclear force will be 
able to deter a major power such as Russia. Thus it is log­
ical that diffusion of nuclear forces offers the best means 
for NATO members to protect their national interests.
This argument supporting the diffusion of small
nuclear forces is based on the assumption that, in the atomic
age, there is no longer a correlation between the purposes of
war and the risks of war. An aggressor nation, though
stronger, risks losing in a few hours the advantage of all
its past efforts economic and political. Therefore, "when
two nations have nuclear weapons, even if they are unequally
27armed, the status quo is unavoidable." This argument is
also based on a theory held by some analysts immediately
after the Second Norld War. The view held at that time was
that nuclear arms would be the great equalizer of nations.
That is, according to some, nuclear weapons would be the
poor country's way to retaliate. Kenneth Younger succinctly
places the bases for this argument as coming from those who
struggle against universalism, those who tenaciously hold to
the concept of the sovereign nation state as the only possible
center of authority. According to Younger, the advent of
nuclear weapons arrived in time to support this group,
. . . .  by making it possible to suggest that moderate 
sized nations may now be able after all to look the 
great powers in the eye, if they make national nuclear
27Gallois, o£. cit.. p. 7'
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deterrent forces the basis of continuing national 
independence.
This doctrine, clearly stated by de Gaulle, appeals 
to deep-seated emotions in many countries including 
Britain and is consequently capable of stimulating 
dangerously nationalistic ambitions at a time when every 
economic and military consideration underlines the need 
for greater international cooperation.28
Nevertheless, the view that nuclear weapons would be 
the poor country's equalizer does not hold true today. Both 
the weapons and the delivery systems have become sophisti­
cated and more costly. Today nuclear weapons deterrent 
power must be viewed in terms of a well protected second- 
strike capability. Which also means that command, control,
and communication systems must be capable of withstanding a
29nuclear strike from a potential enemy.
Will small national nuclear strike forces be able to 
deter an attack against a country possessing them? First, 
it must be noted that national nuclear forces tend to pro­
duce an illusory feeling of security which in itself ampli­
fies the dangers associated with nuclear forces. Most 
analysts agree that each European NATO member is limited in 
the resources needed to build a force capable of destroying 
Russia, even by a pre-emptive attack. Thus, for all
^Kenneth Younger, Changing Perspectives In British 
Foreign Policy (London; Oxford University Press, For The 
Royal Institute Of International Affairs, 1964), p. 51» For 
the statement by de Gaulle that "government of nations alone 
can be capable of and responsible for making policy" see 
Tenth Press Conference, op. oit., p. 6.
^%oster, "Unilateral Arms Control Measure And 
Disarmament Negotiations," 0£. cit.. p. 266.
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practical purposes, the Soviet nuclear force is invulnerable 
to European NATO Allies, Since such an attack could not 
achieve victory, but rather guarantee the complete destruction 
of the NATO members concerned, it is only logical that no 
European Ally would retaliate to initiate its own annihila­
tion— even in the face of extreme provocation.
National nuclear forces could on the other hand, 
create a more dangerous situation in that each new NATO nu­
clear power would be a subject of Russian provocation. In 
addition, it would be subjected to nuclear blackmail. The 
"Suez Crisis" of 195^ should have been a lesson to the advo­
cates of small independent nuclear forces in that respect 
for two reasons: First, Britain, which was considered a
nuclear power at the time, had to exercise caution in face 
of Soviet nuclear threats. Therefore, her nuclear forces 
were utterly useless. Second, Britain’s nuclear weapons 
added nothing to her capability in dealing with a non-nuclear 
power such as Egypt, This refutes any notion by those, such 
as Colonel Miksche, who claim that "there is a clear nexus
between the safeguard of interests in overseas areas and the
30expansion of the , , , atomic club." It would be inter­
esting to see how Britain or Prance could have justified 
using nuclear weapons against Egypt, Or for that matter, 
how Prance could have benefited in Indo China or Algeria by
3 0 Miksche, 0£, cit,, p, 298,
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having a nuclear strike force.
There are several other factors that decrease the 
effectiveness of European national forces as deterrents.
Three of these factors must be taken into consideration before 
a nation strikes out for independent nuclear capability:
(1) The short distance between Russian missile bases and 
targets in Western Europe. The short distance makes it possi­
ble for the Kremlin to use maximum payloads and still achieve 
a high degree of accuracy. This will make it harder for the 
West Europeans to build effective hard shelters for a deter­
rent. (2) The limitation of land area in Western Europe. An 
effective deterrent must have land area for proper dispersal. 
Proper dispersal becomes a vital factor if the deterrent con­
sists of manual nuclear bombers which now comprise the 
French and British deterrents. (3) The dense population of 
Western Europe. The dense population of West Europe Is vul­
nerable— especially to city-strike strategy. Therefore, a 
few well placed Soviet bombs could all but literally devas­
tate European civilization. In light of these factors it is 
easy to see why Professor Kissinger asserts that for any one
of the NATO "Allies to attempt independent retaliation is 
31almost s u i c i d e . O r  as the French scholar, Raymond Aron, 
in writing against independent nuclear forces, aptly puts it
31Kissinger, The Nessssity For Choice, 0£. cit.,
p. 113.
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"the elimination of Great Britain and France would not
counter-balance the destruction of Lenningrad or Moscow by a
32few atomic bombs."
National nuclear strike forces are costly and of
dubious military value. Their political value has also been
over emphasized as was shown by the British deterrent during 
33the Suez crisis. From the standpoint of world stability 
national nuclear forces can only hinder individual NATO 
members since it increases their possibility of becoming 
involved in extreme provocations, nuclear blackmail, and an 
accidental nuclear war. Moreover, an increase in national 
nuclear forces within NATO could diminish the American 
guarantee. One observer asserts that several independent 
nuclear forces within NATO could be advantageous to the 
Western deterrent power since Russia would be confronted
34with a "more complicated and less predictable situation." 
However, an increase in national nuclear forces within NATO 
is more likely to lead to a decrease in the American commit­
ment. And if the Kremlin were reasonably sure that the United
^^Raymond Aron, "The Future of Western Deterrent 
Power: A View From France," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 
Vol. XVI, No. 7 (I960), p. 2VT-
^^On the other hand, one must accept the fact that 
France's atomic force, though insignificant in real military 
value against a possible adversary, nevertheless seems to 
give France some political influence over her station.
^^Klaus Knorr, "Perspective On Nuclear Policy," Alli­
ance Policy In The Cold War (ed.) Arnold Wolfers, op. cit., 
p. 157.
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States would not Intervene, an independent national force 
could be overwhelmed by a Russian attack.
A MTO Nuclear Force
Growing concern for the continued reliability of the 
American retaliatory force for deterring an attack on indi­
vidual NATO countries has prompted many analysts, strategists, 
and officials to propose several different types of joint 
NATO nuclear forces. These proposals have been suggested as 
a means of insuring that the United States would fulfill its 
guarantee; of halting diffusion of nuclear weapons; and of 
strengthening the Alliance. For example, Alastair Buchan 
proposed the creation of "the least vulnerable" NATO strate­
gic nuclear force. This force composed of an IRBM system 
would be developed along the entire periphery of the Alliance 
Area from "North Gape to Alexandretta," under the direct con- 
trol of SACEUE or some other suitable command.
Frederick N. Mulley, British Labor N.P., who has
been Vice President of the Western European Union (WEU) 
Assembly and Rapporteur of its Defense Committee, submitted 
a proposal at the WEU Assembly meeting in December, 1959» for 
a joint European Strategic Nuclear Force.^ Mr. Mulley’s 
plan did not call for joint production, nor the sharing of
^^Buchan, NATO In The 1960’s, op. cit., p. 71.
^^Frederick W. Mulley, The Politics of Western 
Defense (London; Thames and Hudson, 1962), pp. 26-27.
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atomic secrets, nor the sharing of actual bombs and warheads» 
To put it in Mulley's own words, it would "simply have trans­
ferred the control of those that existed from national to 
joint WEU control and direction."
Professors Strausz-Hupé', Dougherty, and Kintner agree 
that a joint European nuclear force under the WEU might be 
the best possible plan for a credible NATO deterrent. They 
suggest that the United States "offer to make the Western 
European Union an independent nuclear power, provided Britain
and France will subject their nuclear capability to joint
38control within the WEU framework."
French General Gallois also has proposed a joint
nuclear force which is not a joint NATO, or European force,
but rather joint nuclear forces between each NATO member
39and the United States. The General urged retention of the 
"double veto" system for control of nuclear weapons, and for 
protection of the vital interests of each member. But he 
proposed further that the system be supplemented by an agree­
ment that in certain specified circumstances the United States 
would turn over the nuclear weapons to the national control of 
the Ally. For example, the United States would make arrange­
ments with each of the NATO Allies or group of Allies with a
3?Ibid., p. 87.
38Strausz-flupé', Dougherty, and Kintner, 0£. cit.,
p. 222.
^^Gallois, o£. cit., pp. 173-174.
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definition of the several danger criteria on which to base 
the agreements. Using a hypothesis of a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and France as a model, Gallois ex­
plains his plan. Experts would decide that aggressive acts, 
such as, a nuclear bomb exploding on France, enemy divisions 
crossing the Rhine in force, or bombardment of the French 
coast by an alien fleet would constitute enough danger to 
lift the American veto. The nuclear weapons would then be­
come national and France would be responsible for their use. 
The double veto system would play its proper role because it 
would be understood that in grave danger the American check
would be removed and France In turn could use the weapons as
40"instruments of a strictly national policy of dissuasion," 
There are several other proposals such as the plan 
proposed by General Norstad while in command of NATO Forces. 
Another was proposed by General Andre Beaufre, former French 
representative to the Washington NATO Standing Group. It has 
not been for the lack of a plan that NATO does not have a 
joint nuclear force of some sort. The difficulty arises be­
cause all Joint systems that have been proposed suffer the 
same major problem as does the official United States MLF 
proposal: the problem of who and how many would have the
final say in the use of nuclear weapons. Or to use the over­




The United States has been committed to the idea of 
a NATO wide nuclear force since I96O, as the best means to 
strengthen the Alliance and halt diffusion of national nuclear 
forces. Rather than examine all the different joint systems 
that have been suggested this inquiry will concentrate on the 
NATO-wide force that the United States is committed to.
It should be noted first that a NATO strike force 
would in all probability not stop diffusion of independent 
nuclear forces. That is, if viewed in the light of some of 
the reasons for national forces. The purpose of a NATO 
strike force is to make NATO an organization responsible for 
the decision of launching a nuclear attack. Thus, theoret­
ically it would be the result of an Alliance decision rather 
than a national decision. A NATO force, therefore, obviously 
could not be used in defense of special national interests, 
for example, conflicts with lesser powers, and especially 
overseas interests. It is doubtful that NATO members would 
consent to any one country using it for such interests. A 
NATO strike force also opposes the concept of sovereignty, 
and it would be useless as a means of gaining influence or a 
special position within the Alliance. (However, West German 
officials see a NATO force as a means of gaining equal influ­
ence within the Alliance for Germany.) Besides, France had 
made it clear all along that a NATO force could not, in the 
words of General Billotte, "respond even partially to the 
exegencies imposed for the security of France . . .  it could
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4lin no manner be a substitute for the French project."
Since a joint NATO atomic force does not satisfy these motives 
for national nuclear forces, it is not likely that it can 
halt the diffusion of independent nuclear forces.
Another side of the NATO nuclear forces coin is its 
military value. It is generally conceded, except by some 
U.S. officials, that the military worth of a Joint nuclear 
force adds nothing to the defense of NATO. The MLF of surface 
vessels as proposed by the United States can only be seen as 
possibly having some political value. A matter which was 
pointed out by Patrick Gordon Walker, the new British For­
eign Minister, at the NATO Parliamentarian Conference in 
Paris, November, I963. Mr. Walker questioned the Americans 
on the feasibility of a NATO multilateral force and asked 
why the United States had not adopted such a weapon for its 
own use since it was supposed to be so "magnificent." He 
then derided the concept as useless, costly, and an inter- 
ference in the upgrading of NATO's conventional forces.
Another who voiced considerable doubt as to the worth of the 
MLF was French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. In a 
policy statement before the French National Assembly on 
November 3» 1964, the Foreign Minister said:
^Icited in Wohlstetter, op. cit.. p. 3?6; As has been 
shown France at no time even considered giving up her nuclear 
project for a NATO nuclear force.
4?Patrick G. Walker, "Voices In Opposition: The 
Labour Party," Survival. Vol. VI, No. 1 (1964), p. 24.
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Let us take . . . the matter of the so-called multi­
lateral force. No one has yet told us what its real 
goals are. Everyone agrees in thinking that its interest 
is far from being demonstrated from a military standpoint. 
Then what would be its utility from the political stand­
point? It is understood that Germany would perhaps, 
psychologically, derive some satisfaction from it. It is 
seen that the Soviets would, rightly or wrongly, be dis­
turbed by it. It is felt that it would result in a split 
within NATO, for which it would be difficult to blame 
Prance. 3̂
In view of the opinions of the two Foreign Ministers, the 
MLF would cause a reduction in conventional forces due to 
added expenditures as well as add a divisive factor to the 
organization.
The major difficulty in the effectiveness of a joint 
NATO strike force is the problem of control and command; that 
is, in the political sphere of NATO. The object of creating 
the joint forces by the European members would be to make it 
independent of Washington domination and dependent on 
Europe's ability to make decisions on its use. However, in 
place of the lone decision by Washington the Europeans would 
purchase a dependence upon fifteen governments and their 
decisions. (14 now that France has withdrawn from the organ­
ization.) The NATO-wide force presupposes that whereas a 
single country would not, a group of countries would, run the 
risk of exposing their cities to a nuclear counter-strike or 
pre-emptive nuclear strike. There is little difficulty in
43Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Policy State­
ment On November 3. 1964. (New York: French Embassy, Press 
and Information Service, 1964), p. 11.
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predicting that a unanimous decision, if it could be reached 
at all, would be made in time. On the contrary, it is highly 
probable that many countries would try to control the elements 
of the strike force stationed in their own country so as to 
avoid provoking a retaliatory strike on their territory.
This being the case, in an emergency the NATO joint force 
would probably be useless.
To understand the effectiveness of a NATO strike 
force, it must first be determined just what it is that the 
Europeans want. That is, do they want the power to veto the 
American use of nuclear weapons or the power to launch a 
nuclear attack? It has been pointed out that the European 
Allies fear both premature use or no use at all by Washing­
ton. If it is the power of veto that the Allies desire, the 
NATO joint force offers little in the way of European securi­
ty. And the United States could still exercise its veto if 
a strike were not in America's national interest. But even 
if the American veto were removed, it is quite likely that at 
least one other member would find reason to exercise a nega­
tive vote due to national interest. Actually the power to 
veto a nuclear strike by a Joint force in the final analysis 
would in no way affect the use of the American strategic
AllIt is highly improbable that the United States would 
forego its veto power over any kind of NATO joint force to 
which it was committed. According to Adrian S. Fisher, U.S. 
representative to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, "We would 
have to insist . . . that the United States be a necessary
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forces which are, and in all probability will remain, outside
of a joint NATO force.
If on the other hand, the Europeans want the power
to launch a nuclear attack how will the decision be made?
Would the decision to invoke the NATO deterrent be taken by
unanimous consent of all members, by special majority, by a
simple majority, or by a special majority composed of leading
powers? There have been several suggestions of which two can
be ruled out without further discussion; (1) a unanimous
decision by all members, and (2) delegating the decision to
the NATO SACEUE. In the former case, any small country would
thwart the use of the nuclear forces. As for the latter it
is unthinkable that the decision to launch a nuclear attack
Acshould be in the hands of the military.
The suggestion of drafting a prior set of guidelines 
for reaction to an attack on NATO also has its drawbacks. 
First, it would presuppose a renunciation of national sover­
eignty, which not only would not be accepted by the European 
Allies, since it would infringe on their nationalistic
party to a decision to use nuclear weapons. Because the vast 
arsenals of the United States are so heavily involved in that 
decision, we must be present for that decision and must our­
selves agree to the decision taken." "U.S. Presents Amend­
ments To Draft Treaty On Nonproliferation," U.S. Department 
of State Bulletin. Vol. LIV, No. lAOO (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 676.
^5no documentation is necessary to recall that dele­
gation of decision making, respecting nuclear weapons, to the 
military played an important role in the U.S. Presidential 
Campaign of 1964.
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tendencies, dut the United States Congress would also probably 
refuse such a move since it would usurp its power to declare 
war. As a matter of fact, one of President de Gaulle's major 
criticisms of NATO and a basic reason for his withdrawal from 
the organization was the token integration within the NATO 
military command structure. To de Gaulle this represented a 
loss of sovereignty for France. As for Congress' power to 
declare war, for all practical purposes that power has already 
been usurped with the stationing of troops and missiles on 
foreign soil.
Second, it would be inexpedient for NATO to list in 
advance how it would react to all eventualities. Should the 
list become known to the enemy, it might be regarded as an 
invitation for him to choose the smallest risk specified in 
it for an attack.
On the other hand, decision to launch the NATO strike 
force by a committee of five or three fares no better than by 
unanimity. What five or three countries would compose the 
committee? Would the decision, in the committee, be unani­
mous, three out of five, two out of three or what? The Ameri­
can position in this respect was made clear by President 
Eisenhower in a letter to President de Gaulle on October 20,
46For de Gaulle's criticism and claims of loss of 
sovereignty see his Major Addresses, op. cit., pp. 235-236; 
Also see de Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, op. cit., pp. 
8-10.
154
1958. General de Gaulle had written President Elsenhower 
suggesting that, since NATO did not meet France's need as a 
world power, a tripartite organization be established between 
Britain, France, and the United States for the purpose of 
strategic planning and employment of nuclear weapons. In 
his answer President Elsenhower said;
As for the means dealing with the problem which you 
propose, our present procedure for organizing the defense 
of the free world clearly requires the willing coopera­
tion of many other nations, both within and outside NATO. 
We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to 
our other Allies . . . the impression that basic deci­
sions affecting their own vital interests are being made 
without their participation.4?
Bernard Brodie asserts that even though the smaller NATO
powers "seem content to go along with the American views,
. . . and feel that what they can contribute is not going to
make much difference in the defense of NATO," they definitely
want a proper voice in a NATO decision to launch a nuclear
attack.
From the foregoing it seems that if the NATO allies 
could merely prevent the United States from using a small 
NATO force, which only supplemented the much larger nationally 
controlled American force, and could not force the United
^^For the text of President Eisenhower’s letter to 
General de Gaulle, and a statement by the State Department of 
the events surrounding General de Gaulle’s letter to Presi­
dent Eisenhower, see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee On National 
Security and International Operations, Hearings. The Atlantic 
Alliance, op. cit.. pp. 228-231.
4&Brodie, o£. c i t . ,  p. 27.
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States to authorize its use, a NATO Joint nuclear force 
would not have changed the situation from its original posi­
tion. In any case, practically every proposal put forth on a 
NATO strike force, and on the command and control of such a 
force, would seem to render the deterrent more cumbersome and 
less credible than the American nuclear guarantee.
American Control Of NATO's Nuclear Weapons
The growing Soviet capability to threaten the United 
States has magnified the doubts which began to appear during 
the Suez Crisis: Whether America can be relied upon to ful­
fill its commitment to challenges which the NATO Allies con­
sider vital to their national interests. On the other hand, 
Europeans equally fear the opposite hypothesis, that is, that 
Washington might use nuclear weapons prematurely, especially
since NATO's conventional troops are not, and have not been,
49up to agreed levels. Or, as some have put it, the Ameri­
cans might be "trigger happy."
As was pointed out above. President de Gaulle has in­
sisted that France have her own nuclear weapons because the 
United States might make some arrangement with Russia; that 
the United States and Russia might agree to divide the world; 
and that the United States and Russia might decide to confine 
violence to other parts of the world and thereby protect 
themselves from devastation. Though there have been doubts
^^Birrenbach, 0£. cit.. p. 13.
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and fears raised in other member countries, France has taken 
the lead in criticizing the American commitment to the 
Alliance,^^
It should be noted here that even though de Gaulle is 
the leading critic in spreading doubt of the American commit­
ment, he more than any one does not really doubt that the 
United States will honor its guarantee to NATO. Or as Pro­
fessor Schelling has put it, de Gaulle is "enjoying the luxury 
of knowing that his security is so much guaranteed by the 
rest of us that he can insult us as he does."^^ The late 
Secretary of State Herter voiced the same view on de Gaulle's 
belief in the American commitment when he said, "I can under­
stand why France has not withdrawn from the treaty. She still
has the umbrella of U.S. power hanging over her as long as
52she is a member of the Alliance." In any case. President 
de Gaulle's policies are based on the assumption that no 
matter how troublesome an ally is the United States cannot 
allow it to be defeated. Thus his policies are made possible 
by the protection of the American forces which he seems eager
German Chancellor Kiesinger in fact defended the 
credibility of the United States policy when he declared 
"The credibility of American policy in Europe . . . does not 
appear to have diminished. ... "  "Current Problems In Ger­
man Internal and Foreign Policy," NEWS, Vol. XI, No. 10 
(Washington: German Embassy, 196?), p. 2.
^^Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance, op. c ^ . , p. 120.
^^Ibid., p. 45.
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to see withdrawn from Europe. Henry Kissinger described de
Gaulle's belief in the American guarantee in the following
manner: "Par from doubting America's military commitment to
Europe, President de Gaulle is so certain of it that he does
not consider political independence a risk. He thus adds
63American power to his own in pursuit of his policies."
Nevertheless, the European allies do have some 
grounds for worry and their fears are real. The worries and 
fears were brought about by the fact that the Alliance's 
primary dependence was (and is) upon American nuclear weap­
ons, and to a lesser extent, the British nuclear deterrent—  
both of which are outside NATO's control, and for that matter, 
whose deployment and targeting in case of war were unknown 
to the Allies. Therefore, the Allies had no effective voice 
in control of the weapons on which their security primarily 
rests. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara accurately 
defined these worries and their bases in a news conference 
on April 3, 196?:
The foundation of the security of the alliance is 
nuclear power. Thus it is only natural that the non­
nuclear members . . . have always felt a need to be in­
formed about nuclear matters and to participate in 
nuclear planning. They have been uncertain of their 
role. They believed, and rightly so, that they should 
have a greater voice in assessing the nuclear threat to 
the Alliance, in determining the nuclear forces required
^^Kissinger, "Coalitions and Nuclear Diplomacy," 
op. cit., p. 209.
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to meet that threat, and in working out how and under
what conditions these nuclear forces would be employed.
To aleviate this situation, the NATO Council established the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee as permanent bodies at the December, 1966, meet­
ing. This Group met for the first time in April, 196?. It 
is yet too early to assess the success of this new body in 
removing the fears and worries of nuclear weapons.
Yet it is not only the nuclear control problem that 
has given rise to European worries and fears. It was 
pointed out earlier that the Suez crisis had effected some 
new realizations. There have been events other than the 
Suez crisis that have reenforced the Allies' doubts and 
fears: (1) Statements by high United States government
officials have caused some uneasiness among the Europeans.
For example, the statement by the late Secretary of State 
Christian A. Herter in April, 1959, In which he said that he 
could not "conceive of any President involving us in . . . 
nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in 
danger of all-out devastation ourselves, or that actual moves 
have been made toward devastating o u r s e l v e s . (2) The
 ̂"NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds Joint Ministerial 
Meeting," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LVI, No.
1453 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 196?),
p. 686.
■̂̂ Por the text of the communique issued following the 
Nuclear Planning Group's first meeting see ibid., pp. 687-688.
^^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hear­
ings, On The Nomination Of Christian A. Herter To Be
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landing of the United States troops In Lebanon, about which 
NATO was not consulted, even though it increased the risk of 
Soviet pressure on NATO countries and involved the redeploy­
ment of some of the Alliance's divisions, (3) The unilateral 
reaction of Washington to the Cuban missile threat also added 
weight to European fears and bolstered, in European eyes, de 
Gaulle's reason for a national nuclear strike force.
President Kennedy's reaction in the Cuban Crisis in 
1962, did, to some extent, dispel the fear of some Europeans 
that America would not run the risk of a nuclear war where 
American interests were at stake. For example. Chancellor 
Adenauer stated that "the crisis has proved that the American 
Administration is ready, in the face of a threat to the very 
existence of the United States and to freedom, to take even 
the gravest decisions." But it did not dispel the doubt 
of some Europeans that Washington would run the same risk in 
face of similar interests of the European Allies.^® On the 
other hand, many Europeans take an adverse view of the rami­
fications of the Cuban Crisis. First, President Kennedy's 
decision to take unilateral action, without advanced notice
Secretary Of State. 86th Cong., 1st Sess (Washington; U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1959)» p. 10.
^^"Chancellor Adenauer's Foreign Policy Declaration," 
NEWS. Vol. VII, No. 2 (Washington: The German Embassy, I963), 
p. 1.
^®Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control Or Con­
sultation," 0£. cit., p. 22.
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to NATO, reenforced the argument that the United States might 
involve the Alliance in a nuclear war over a situation of 
little or no interest to the Allies.
Argument can be made that the Cuban crisis was more 
than of little interest to the Allies since the basis of 
their security was at stake. The Cuban crisis was a threat 
from NATO's common enemy— not just a Cuban threat to the 
United States. However it cannot be argued that the NATO 
countries would not be involved, American troops, missiles, 
and airbases are dispersed throughout NATO countries. It is 
not likely that the United States could engage in a confronta­
tion with Russia and exclude some of its armed forces from 
the conflict. In addition it is not likely that the Soviet 
Union would exclude such forces and bases from its targets 
in the event of a hot war.
Second, some Europeans seem to see the Cuban crisis 
in the light of a settlement being made by the two super 
powers. The settlement was actually made without Cuba's 
participation, the country which was most concerned but which 
possessed only conventional weapons. This reenforced de 
Gaulle's argument for France's nuclear force as a means of 
protection against United States and Russian arrangements.
Finally, some Europeans see the importance of the 
small nuclear force as a result of the Cuban crisis. No 
Washington argument has been able to satisfy those critics 
who question why the United States could regard the French
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force de frappe as insignificant and useless while at the same
time regard some forty missiles in Cuba as a threat to the
'59vital interests of the United States. An argument, though 
weak, can be made that the missiles were a threat because they 
were Russian made and were highly sophisticated as to range 
and capability, and, particularly, because they were backed 
by the full might of the USSR. However, it is more likely 
that the missiles would have had the same effect if they had 
been completely Cuban-made, Cuban-owned, and Cuban-controlled.
(4) A final event that seems to enforce European 
worries over the American guarantee to the NATO Allies is the 
United States involvement in Vietnam. Some Europeans view 
the Vietnam involvement as a sign of the lessening in impor­
tance of American Foreign and defense policies in Europe. In 
addition there is fear that a less than total victory or less 
than a completely satisfying solution will have a detrimental 
effect upon American prestige and thus degrade the credibil­
ity of American policy in Europe. German Chancellor 
Kiesinger, a supporter of the American position in Vietnam, 
discounted this possibility at a press conference on Novem­
ber 3» 1967. Kiesinger stated that he could not "envisage a 
solution of the Vietnam conflict by the United States which 
would weaken the credibility of the American protection
p. 284.
^^Kissinger, "Strains On The Alliance," 0£. cit.,
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of Europe."^®
In addition to European misgivings about United 
States commitment to NATO, some see in America's Vietnam pol­
icy the possibility of their becoming entangled in a war that 
is not of their own concern— a war outside the NATO area.
Are the European fears real or mythical? One has 
only to reverse the situation placing America's security on 
the guarantee of France or any of the NATO members to see 
that the fear exists. Besides history is filled with broken 
commitments and alliances; some NATO members have, within 
this generation, abandoned allies themselves.
But, there is strong argument favoring American sup­
port of the NATO Allies in the event of an attack on them.
An examination of America's European interests can lead only 
to the conclusion that the United States' stake in the use of 
its nuclear deterrent is as great as that of Europe. A 
Europe under the control of Russia would isolate America to 
the extent that the United States could not survive as an 
island of freedom surrounded by a Communist world. Domina­
tion over Western Europe would also give Russia the rich and 
powerful industrial nations that she needs to become the 
world's leading power. George G. McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to 
Germany, makes a very strong argument concerning the importance
^^Chancellor Kiesinger, "Current Problems In German 
International And Foreign Policy," loc. cit.
3.63
of free Europe to America’s world leadership and freedom:
For to anyone examining the situation of the United 
States as a world power in the nuclear age, it must be 
clear that our fate is linked inseparably with that of 
free Europe. Our heavy investment of American men, 
materials, and technology in the Federal Republic— and 
Berlin— exist in order to defend not just Germany or 
Europe but the United States as well.
I cannot take seriously the notion spread by some 
that the United States does not feel genuinely committed 
to the defense of Germany and Europe.
Another reason that America would honor its commit­
ment is that an attack on Western Europe would be an attack 
on the American armed forces. Former Assistant Secretary of 
State George Ball pointed this out in 1964, when he said, "We 
have not stationed our troops in Europe to let them be over­
run by a hostile power. We have not built our massive stra­
tegic force . . . with any thought that the force would not
62be used if Europe were attacked." The American armed forces 
stationed in Europe are a substantial part of the United 
States defense system, even though Europeans view them as a 
"triggering" device for the ultimate use of the American 
deterrent. It is doubtful that Russia would if she could 
stage an attack on Western Europe without including American 
forces and bases. The risk would be too great to do so.
The most obvious reason why the United States would
George C. McGhee, "The United States And Germany,"
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1400 (Wash­
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 659»
^^George Ball, "Germany And The Atlantic Partner­
ship," ibid.. Vol. LI, No. 132? (1964), p. 7?4.
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honor its oommltment to NATO Is because It has identified its 
defense with that of Western Europe in the form of a treaty. 
Albert Wohlstetter in defending the idea that America's word 
can be trusted said that " it is not merely a figure of speech 
to say we will treat an attack on Europe as an attack on our­
selves."^^ The defense of the United States in respect to 
the treaty and the honoring of the commitment is probably 
argued best by Professor Thomas Schelling. Professor Schel­
ling declares that it is not the treaty per se that commits 
America to the defense of Europe but the attitude surrounding 
the reasons for the treaty. The Professor's defense is 
better stated in his own words;
The North Atlantic Treaty did not so much create a 
commitment as it expressed one. On matters of war, 
especially nuclear way, President de Gaulle is quite 
right; nations can often not be relied on to risk nuclear 
destruction for each other merely because they are part­
ners to a treaty. But in the United States most of us 
have never thought that we were bound up with the securi­
ty of Turkey, Italy, Germany, or Norway, merely because 
the Senate ratified a treaty in 1949. Rather, the 
Senate ratified the treaty because it recognized that our 
security was indeed bound up with the security of those 
countries. Ratification did not create the obligation, 
the commitment, or the Interest; it expressed it«°^
In any event, should the United States fail to honor its
commitment even on lesser matters than a nuclear conflict it
would mean for her a tremendous setback in political power.
Or to put it in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, "If it
^^Wohlstetter, 0£. cit.. p. 379«
95.
^^Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit.. pp. 94-
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should be discovered that the pledge of the United States Is 
meaningless, the structure of peace would crumble and we 
would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophy More­
over a massive attack on one or more of the NATO Allies could 
only be viewed In Washington as the first wave of an attack 
against America Itself.
Whether the NATO Allies believe that America will 
respond or not, It seems that the Kremlin does not find It 
hard to believe, I.e., If the American deterrent can be given 
credit for the stoppage of the piecemeal take over of Europe. 
This fact seems to have been forgotten by many of the strate­
gists and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic. According 
to Bernard Brodie the doubters could take a lesson from the 
late Winston Churchill who once wrote, In regard to planning 
an offensive; "However absorbed a commander may be In the 
elaboration of his own thoughts. It Is necessary sometime to 
take the enemy Into consideration."^^ Brodie then went on to 
say that the USSR Is so convinced that the Americans will 
honor this nuclear commitment; that It would take considerable 
persuasion on the part of the United States to rid the "Soviet 
leaders of their apparent conviction that In the event of a 
substantial attack by them the nuclear weapons available to
^Dean Rusk, "The Bole Of The United States In World 
Affairs," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LVI, No. 
1456 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 196?),
p. 771.
^^Clted In Brodie, 0£. cit., p. 28.
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NATO forces in Europe would quickly be used."^^
As for the individual NATO countries, reliance upon 
the American guarantee seems to offer each of them the best 
security against Russian aggression. It is hard to see how 
the commitment can be made stronger or more real than it was 
made when President Johnson said, "Like the Constitution 
. . . the North Atlantic Treaty is more than Just a legal 
document. It is the foundation of a living institution. The 
institution is NATO . . . created to give meaning and reality 
to the Alliance commitments."^® There is also a fringe bene­
fit that derives from acceptance of the American commitment: 
It offers more peace of mind to the individual NATO members 
in regard to the likelihood of accidental wars through 
nuclear proliferation.
^flbid.; Another writer makes this point when he shows 
that no overt aggressive moves have been made by Communist 
forces in areas where U.S. troops are assigned. See Morton 
H. Halperin, Limited War In The Nuclear Age (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 123.
^^President Johnson, "Our Views Of NATO," U.S. De­
partment of State Bulletin. Vol. LIV, No, 1398 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 555»
CHAPTER VI 
CHANGING NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE
As the North Atlantic Alliance moves toward its 
twentieth anniversary, it is moving toward a clearly uncer­
tain future. The eleven nations in 1949, plus the three 
others in the early 1950's, that desperately sought to rebuild 
their economies and military security in the face of a strong 
adversary on their borders, are completely different in 1968. 
These nations are again prosperous; they are also very much 
aware of their proud national traditions; and they are rais­
ing questions concerning the validity of the assumptions and 
commitments made in 1949. Many see the Soviet threat, NATO's 
raison-d'etre, receding and being replaced by a policy of 
coexistence which, if encouraged, can lead to a true entente. 
Some argue that, though a threat is possible, the Soviet 
Union of Brezhnev and Kosygin is not the Soviet Union of 
Stalin.
It has been shown that the true force behind NATO lies 
in the United States' nuclear power which places this force 
in the hands of Washington's policy-makers. This has raised 
the question regarding involvement of NATO members due to
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unwise maneuvers or policies of the United States. It has 
also raised the question of whether too much dependence on 
American nuclear weapons relegates Western Europe to a second 
rate military position from which it will not be able to ex­
tricate itself. A secondary military position is not only 
intolerable to most Europeans in terms of national pride, it 
is also seen as suicidal in terms of national defense.
These fundamental questions underlie the discontent 
and uneasiness on the part of certain NATO Allies. Although 
the most divisive elements in the NATO structure are France 
and West Germany, Britain and the United States also add to 
the divisiveness. Much of the division within NATO stems 
from the differences among the four leading members on the 
Alliance's purposes. For example, France has looked on NATO 
as if it were established particularly for the security of 
France, with as little participation by France as possible. 
France insisted from the beginning that the French Algerian 
Departments be included in the treaty, and later insisted 
that North Africa was NATO's southern flank; and argued that 
Washington should overtly take France's side on the Algerian 
problem.^
West Germany has looked at NATO as a base of strength 
to ensure negotiations on reunification; she has insisted
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "France Under de Gaulle," 
Headline Series. No. 139 (New York: Foreign Policy Associa- 
tion, i960), p. 38.
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that the NATO defense line be the Federal Republic’s eastern 
frontier, so that West Germany would not become a battle­
ground in a war with the Soviet Union. According to Helmut 
Schmidt, West Germany "cannot be interested in a Western
defense structure predicated on the eventual liberation of a
2
Germany devastated after a final battle."
Britain views NATO as a means of retaining great 
power status through a close, and, at times, special relation­
ship with the United States. Moreover, NATO is a means of 
security to Britain, but mostly in terms of a deterrent, not 
as a means of winning a war. This can be seen in Britain’s 
severe reduction of conventional forces since the 1957 
Defense White Paper, which placed Britain’s defense on her 
nuclear strike force. This meant that she was admitting that 
she could not survive devastation should a global war come.^ 
The United States has looked upon NATO as the basis 
of United States’ policy for all of Europe. With its Euro­
pean policy anchored in the Alliance, Washington has viewed 
NATO as the basis of America’s general overall policy of 
"containment." Washington has, therefore, dominated NATO 
policies and strategy in effecting the containment policy.
Whether the United States has intended, or as for 
that matter, has had any desire to dominate the Alliance,
2
Schmidt, Defense Or Retaliation, op. cit., p. l68. 
^Hartley, "The British Bomb," o£. cit., p. l6l.
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there is little doubt that it has been the dominating partner 
of the Organization. Arnold Wolfers sees this dominating 
relationship of America to its Allies as being analagous to a 
wheel. According to Wolfers, the United States represents 
the hub of the wheel while its friends and partners are
located at intervals around the rim. Each spoke in the wheel
represents the line of communication or tie between the Ally 
or friend and the United States. Though the Allies make up 
the outer rim, they are not necessarily tied together. Thus, 
a disturbance in any Allied nation such as Portugal or Den­
mark would be communicated automatically to the hub (the U.S.) 
but not necessarily to other nations along the rim. Yet a 
disturbance at the center would have repercussions on the 
entire wheel,^ An excellent example of Wolfer’s analogy in 
action was the Korean War. The Allies did send token forces 
as a supporting gesture, but did not agree wholeheartedly 
with the United States' policies. Neither did the Allies 
feel that the Korean conflict was as much a threat to Europe 
as did the United States. The United States involvement in
Vietnam is a similar example. Here again only a few of the
Allies seem to be opposed to the United States' policy. 
Particularly is this true of Prance who has been very critical
iiArnold Wolfers, "Stresses And Strains In 'Going It 
With Others,'" Alliance Policy In The Cold War, (ed.) Arnold 
Wolfers, 0£. cit., p. 7.
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of the United States.^ In addition to de Gaulle’s general 
opinions of the United States' policy, France's former 
ties in Southeast Asia have much bearing on French attitudes 
concerning this area.
In any case, the United States' domination of the 
Alliance is breaking down. It is no longer possible for 
Washington to get its NATO policies accepted without argument. 
Added to the break-down of American domination, is the ten­
dency to see the organization as an anachronism which is also 
coming apart because its reason to be is disappearing. Many 
see the organization as being destroyed by the efforts of one 
man: President Charles de Gaulle.
It is easy enough to blame the ills of NATO on de 
Gaulle for he has not been subtle or diplomatic in regard to 
his opinion of the Organization. As a matter of fact, many 
of de Gaulle's actions and utterances can, rightly, be seen 
as direct attempts to break up the Organization. However, if 
the Organization does fall apart it is doubtful that it will 
be a result of de Gaulle's actions but more as a result of 
the changing nature of the Alliance. In the first place, the 
Organization is stronger than one man; it is the implementa­
tion of the self identified interest of several nations for a 
base of security. And in the second place, though de Gaulle
•̂French Foreign Policy: Official Statements. Speeches.
And Communiques 1966 (New York: French Embassy. Press And 
Information Service, 196?), pp. 109-110.
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has strong appeal to nationalistic tendencies, it is hard to 
visualize any NATO member giving up the security of NATO to 
follow France, A brief look at the changing nature of the 
Alliance and the changing relationship within the Alliance 
will point this out,
France And The Alliance
On March 7, 19^6, French President de Gaulle notified 
President Lyndon Johnson of his intention to remove France 
from the Organization of the Alliance, The French President’s 
rationale for this move was based on his views of the changed 
world conditions. As stated by de Gaulle:
France considers the changes that have occured, or 
are in the process of occuring, since 1949 in Europe,
Asia and elsewhere, as well as the evolution of her own 
situation and of her own forces, no longer Justify, inso­
far as she is concerned, the provisions of a military 
nature taken after the conclusion of the Alliance, either 
in common in the form of multilateral agreements, or by 
special agreements between the French Government and the 
American Government.
That is why Prance proposes to reassume on her terri­
tory the full exercise of her sovereignty, which is at 
present impaired by the permanent presence of Allied ele­
ments or by the regular use made of her air space, to 
terminate her participation in the ’integrated’ commands 
and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO.®
On March 10 and 11, 1966, France’s withdrawal from the 
Organization was made official when each of the remaining 
fourteen member nations were handed a memorandum to that 
effect. The memorandum not only affirmed de Gaulle’s
^For the full text of President de Gaulle’s letters 
see ibid,, pp. 24-25.
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withdrawal of French troops from NATO's Integrated command 
but also expelled the command structure and alien troops from
7French soil. The withdrawal from the Organization did in no 
way mean renunciation of the North Atlantic Treaty since 
France regards the Organization implementing the treaty and
g
the treaty as two separate entities.
France's withdrawal from NATO and the removal of the 
Organization's commands and foreign troops from French soil 
did not create any extreme changes in the structure of NATO 
but rather brought to light conflicting attitudes within the 
Alliance. Other than the time factor, France's withdrawal 
should not have come as a great surprise to the other Allies. 
Any one who had kept up with de Gaulle's speeches and press 
conferences knew that he was against the integration of the 
French military even within NATO commands. He had made this 
clear even before he came to power in France in 1958.^ After 
coming to power de Gaulle made his displeasure with the Organ­
ization known in the letter to President Eisenhower in which 
he suggested the three-powered directorate of Britain, France 
and the United States.
By 1959, France had forbidden the United States to
?For the full text of the Memorandum see ibid., pp. 
25-27, 36.
^Ibid., p. 48.
%e Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 232.
l^The late Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of State 
Husk, and the former Secretary of Defense McNamara were in
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store atomic weapons on French soil and later had removed the 
French navy from participation in NATO. By I966, there was 
every indication that Prance was determined to leave the Organ­
ization; De Gaulle had stopped planning new physical facili­
ties for SHAPE and refused to let French forces take part in 
an important NATO exercise— "Fallex 66."
Former French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, in 
a speech before the French National Assembly, April 14, 1966, 
declared that no one inside or outside of France should have 
been surprised at de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw. To put 
it in the French Minister's words:
Since June 1, 1958, that is, for nearly eight years, 
everyone in the world has knora what, in this major affair, 
the French Government's position is. Everyone knows the 
steps it has taken over the years . . , concerning either 
our naval forces, our ground forces when they were brought 
back from Algeria, . . .  or our refusal to accept Ameri­
can atomic missiles on our soil. Everyone was well in­
formed that we had set ourselves as the final deadline for 
the changes that we found indespensable for France the 
expiration of the second ten-year period of the treaty of 
April 4, 1949. We have frequently set forth our views to 
our principle partners, and first of all to our American 
partners. And twice even, and the last time in October,
I pointed out to Washington that, barring unforeseen 
events . . . France would make known her position in the 
spring of I966, and more exactly, probably during March. 
Now, our first step was taken on March 10th.11
complete agreement that de Gaulle's suggestion had nothing to 
do with changing the military structure of NATO but rather with 
setting up the three powers to run the Organization and thereby 
ignoring the other Allies. Secretary Herter's testimony be­
fore Senate Committee, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. 
cit., p. 43; See also McNamara's testimony, ibid., p. 21H; 
"Secretary Rusk Answers Some Questions On NATO Issues and Viet­
nam," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. l401 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, I966), p. 696.
French Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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In regard to the changes that were "indispensable for Prance," 
United States officials have categorically denied that there 
has been any suggested plan for changing the Organization's 
structure. Secretary of State Rusk's statement on May 2, I966, 
is representative of these denials:
France has made no proposals to reform NATO. From 
time to time over the past three years, the French Govern­
ment has indicated that it intended to put forward pro­
posals, and her Allies in NATO have made it clear that 
they looked forward to those proposals and would give them 
most careful consideration. But instead of offering pro­
posals for reform of NATO, the French Government has 
chosen to announce its decision without consulting its 
Allies in any serious way.12
Although President de Gaulle did not insist that the 
NATO Council leave French territory, it too has left France. 
Thereby France is completely divorced from the Organization 
except for membership on the Council and a military mission 
at SHAPH'.̂ ^
No one but de Gaulle himself knows what his aim really 
is. It appears, however, that he wants to establish a Western 
Europe removed from United States influence leaving France 
free to negotiate bilateral defense agreements unhindered by 
the Organization's integrated commands. Or as John McCloy has 
stated it: "France contends, while adhering to a 'come
hostilities' form of alliance, that her sovereignty is being
12"Secretary Rusk Answers Some Questions On NATO 
Issue And Vietnam," 0£. cit., p. 695*
^̂ The NATO Handbook (I968), op. c i t . , p. 18.
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impaired and her flexibility limited by continued membership 
in NATO. . . Moreover, in such a situation, and since
Germany, without nuclear weapons, would be unable to counter 
French power, de Gaulle could dominate the continent. Since 
de Gaulle does not feel that the United States would allow 
France to be absorbed by the Soviet Union, he seems willing 
to surrender the many years of planning and preparation that 
went into the development of a common defense for the sake 
of French hegemony in Europe.
Although de Gaulle's design for Europe may sound fan­
ciful and unrealistic, it has been in the General's thoughts 
for quite some time. De Gaulle envisages French hegemony over 
a Europe that extends from the "Atlantic to the Urals" and he 
has spoken of this possibility on numerous occasions. For 
example, in a speech before the United States Congress on 
April 25, i960, the French President stated:
Through the Organization of a Western Europe ensemble, 
facing the bloc built by the Soviets, it will be possible 
to establish, from the Atlantic to the Urals, some equi­
librium between those two zones which are comparable, in 
both populations and in resources. Alone such a balance 
may . . . one day, enable the old continent to bring a 
reconciliation between its two parts, to find peace with­
in itself, to give a fresh start to its civilization and 
lastly . . .  to help in an atmosphere of serenity, the 
development of the unfavored masses of Asia and of the 
awakening populations of Africa.15
l^Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit.. p. 128.
1 Ĉongressional Record. Vol. CVI, Part 7, 86th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
i960), p. 8644.
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One of President de Gaulle's fellow Frenchmen, Jean 
Lecanuet, has aptly summarized the premises underlying France's 
new foreign policy which is worthy of quoting in full;
. . .  In 19^9» the Atlantic Alliance responded to a 
need because it corresponded to a threat; that threat has 
now disappeared and the danger of hegemony has been re­
versed, coming now not from the East but from the West; to 
this new danger we must reply with a new policy, one af­
firming our national independence and seeking to build a 
Europe productive of detente and understanding from the 
Atlantic to the Urals; this Europe will be more European 
if she is deprived of the presence of Great Britain; de­
tente will lead to understanding with the Soviet Union and 
bring about the conditions for the settlement of the Ger­
man problem; the disappearance of the Western bloc carries 
with it the certainty of the dislocation of the Eastern 
bloc. There, in abbreviated but I believe accurate form, 
are the formulas best able to explain France's present
policy.16
Mr. Lecanuet went on to argue that the French policy is based
upon false premises. For example, in the question of American
hegemony, if there had been signs of it being true, France 
would not have tolerated it— particularly France during the 
years of the Fifth Republic. Lecanuet then added his view of
the real danger of France's policy:
Under the pretext of combatting American hegemony this 
policy is leading to the withdrawal of American troops 
from Europe, although to my knowledge no official state­
ment has ever been made on this question. But if it is by 
chance the political intention to achieve this result, we
would then . . . exchange what we call American hegemony
for the danger . . .  of Soviet hegemony. What would then
become of what we are accustomed to hear referred to as
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? I would be in­
clined to call it Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic, 
in order to make known and understood by public opinion
^^Jean Lecanuet, "Relations Between Europe And Ameri­
ca," NATO Letter, Vol. XV, No. 12 (Decemoer, I967); p. 10.
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where would be the real weight of hegemony in Europe so 
cut off from Anglo-Saxon Allies.17
It is doubtful that France will be able to degrade the 
effectiveness of NATO strategy in Europe to the extent that 
Prance will be placed in the position to arbitrate with the 
Kremlin on such issues as Germany's future. This seems nei­
ther plausible nor acceptable to the other Allies, especially 
Germany. Such acceptance would mean a Federal Republic pli­
able JO French designs. Although the plausibility of such a 
situation can be more or less discounted, its nuisance value 
cannot.
West Germany And The Alliance 
West Germany stands today (1968) as probably the 
strongest power in Western Europe. And it is fully aware of 
its importance in Europe. Yet, by most standards. West Ger­
many is a second rate force. Its troops, integrated into the 
much larger framework of the NATO defense structure, are 
denied nuclear weapons since Germany itself is denied pro­
duction and ownership of nuclear weapons. Germany is still a 
divided country some twenty three years after the cessation of 
hostilities of the Second World War. The Soviet Union has not 
seen fit to restore to freedom the part of Germany it has oc­
cupied for this same length of time. If anything, the USSR is 
more solidly entrenched in East Germany than ever before.
l^ ibid ., pp. 11-12.
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Since joining WEU, and as a result NATO, West Germany 
has viewed the latter as the best means to influence the bal­
ance of forces in Europe and bring about a European peace 
settlement, and particularly the reunification of Germany.
It was the general belief in Germany that participation in 
NATO would not adversely affect a peaceful settlement and 
reunification. On the contrary, membership in NATO would fa­
cilitate the problem of security for the whole of Europe. 
Therefore, to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the 
Federal Republic's membership in the Alliance was to serve 
two purposes: as an incentive to keep the United States
committed to the defense of West Germany; and to establish a
situation of stability that could provide for the unification 
1 Rof all Germany.
Due to its position as the most exposed NATO Ally to 
the Soviet threat, the West German Government tends to over 
react to each crisis or act of crisis nature.. Even though 
most members of the Alliance seem to be in agreement that the 
Soviet bloc is not contemplating an overt aggressive act 
against a member of NATO, the Federal Republic does not view 
the situation in the same manner. The physical threat to 
Germany has not receded as far as many West Germans are con­
cerned. Probably one of the major reasons the Soviet threat
18Dr. Gotz Roth, "NATO And European Security: A
German Viewpoint," NATO Letter. Vol. XV, No. 1 (January, I967)
p. 3 .
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has not disappeared in the eyes of the West Germans is that
"it is difficult for the Federal Republic to close her eyes
to the continued presence in the other part of Germany of the
strongest concentration of military force within the Soviet
bloc— forces whose arms and equipment are constantly being
19improved in line with the latest technical development."
The late Chancellor Adenauer's first objective has 
been a success— ensurance of American participation in Ger­
many's defense. It is the second objective that has been 
less than successful. Though a more or less stable condition 
has been established, a peaceful settlement of Europe and 
German reunification has not; and, for that matter, cannot 
be seen even in the distant future. Nevertheless the Federal
Republic holds that it will never accept the idea of a per­
manent division of Germany, that is, two German states.
Former Chancellor Erhard pointed this out in a speech to the 
Christian Democratic Union on March 22, 1966;
If, on all sides, a measure of good sense of justice
governs without which a peaceful world cannot exist, the
questions which now still appear burning and insoluble 
can also be settled, because the German people are ready, 
now as before, to make the sacrifices for their unity. 
However, one thing must be excluded from their delibera­
tions by our discussion partners— the thought . . . that 
the Germans will ever become used to their division, and 
that they will in the long run, be ready to accept the 
existence of two German states.20
l^ib id . ,  p. 2.
2 0 "German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard Says Reunification 
A Goal Of Peace Policy," NEWS, Vol. X, No. 8 (Washington: 
German Embassy, I966), p. 2.
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West Germany recognizes and accepts the fact that her 
future lies with the Atlantic Agreements and she is anxious 
to strengthen her ties through NATO with the United States.
At the same time, however, the Federal Republic is fully cog­
nizant of the strategic importance she plays in Western de­
fense and therefore, desires the status of a full participant 
in the decision-making process of the organization. This is 
seen in a statement of basic principles concerning the Alli­
ance and German defense, by State Secretary Karl Guenther von 
Rase, March 15, 1966:
(1) NATO is indispensable to keep the peace in Europe.
(2) An integrated defense is necessary, for integra­
tion ensures the degree of effectiveness required to deter 
aggressors.
(3) The free nations of Europe should plan the common 
defense in close contact with the United States and 
Canada.
(4) North American presence in Europe is an essential 
part of Atlantic teamwork to avoid war.
(5) A special status for the Federal Republic of Ger­
many is inacceptable. . . .21
Although Bonn officials maintain that an integrated 
NATO is the best guarantee of German and Western European 
security, there are signs of doubt and distrust that NATO can 
achieve reunification in West Germany's foreign policy. When 
the utter lack of achievement is displayed, it is not hard to 
understand a reaction of doubt and distrust on the part of 
the Germans. It should also be noted that there is a tendency
2 1 "Bonn Consulting With NATO Allies On Future Of 
Defense," The Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 11 (Bonn: German Fed­
eral Government, Press and Information Office, I966), p. 2.
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among the Western nations to accept the division of Germany 
as a natural dividing line between East and West. At least 
the senior NATO members have never placed the German problem 
in a position of high priority in East-West negotiations.
In any case, since 1966, the Federal Republic has 
made some changes in its approach to the German and there­
fore European problem. On March 25, I966, the West German 
Government declared that the "Federal Government is deter­
mined in accord with its Allies to defend itself against any 
attack on its freedom. However, it is not equipped for a 
war of aggression. Nor would it be capable of waging such a
war since it has assigned all its combat units to NATO. .
22. ." This declaration was to alert the world and especial­
ly the Eastern European satellites that West Germany was not 
following a "revanchist^'policy. It was hoped that the decla­
ration would cause a let up in the constant Soviet propa­
ganda aimed at West Germany. It was also hoped that such a 
declaration could establish a peaceful framework for a re­
laxation of tension between West Germany and Eastern Europe.
As a further effort to establish a relaxation of 
tension, the Federal Republic, though not recognizing East 
Germany as an independent state, has made overtures toward 
the government in East Berlin to negotiate some of the
2 2 "German Note Of March 25»" U.S. Department of State
B ulletin , Vol. LIV, No. 1400 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, I966), p. 656.
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problems concerning all Germans. This effort is best stated 
in Chancellor Kiesinger's State of the Nation Message in 
March 1968:
I repeat once again the offer that I made in the 
Government Declaration of December 13, 1966 and April 12, 
1967, as well as in my two letters to Herr Stoph. The 
Federal Government adheres to the intention of easing 
the lot of the people in divided Germany. It is prepared 
to negotiate with the Government in East Berlin about all 
practical questions concerning the living together of 
Germans.23
In this message the German Chancellor first aptly shows the 
greatest obstacle to the German settlement through NATO, and 
then outlines his policy in this regard;
Since the Soviet Union has caught up with the United 
States in nuclear armaments, the powers and their blocs 
have been facing each other strongly armed. They are en­
deavoring to avoid any conflict which might develop into 
a nuclear war annihilating them both. The dreadful dan­
ger, while preserving a precarious peace, solidifies the 
status quo. The powers* political and ideological dif­
ferences continue to exist, but the fronts have frozen 
in the middle of our country.
Whoever wants to change this intolerable and danger­
ous state of affairs . . . can only do so by peaceful 
means. This is why the Federal Government has initiated 
its policy of detente vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. . . .
If we want to create a lasting peace, we must find solu­
tions which are recognized as right and Just also by 
future generations. We are therefore trying to develop 
better relations with our Eastern neighbors. We have 
therefore established diplomatic relations with Rumania 
and Yugoslovia and have exchanged trade missions with 
Prague.
We are prepared to enter into diplomatic relations 
with the Czechoslovak Republic and with all other East
23Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, "The Divided 
Nation— A Pawn In International Politics," NEWS, Vol. XII, 
No. 3 (Washington: German Embassy, I968), p. 5*
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European States and, together with them, to endeavor to 
build a better future for Europe,24
Whether Bonn's policy of detente will hasten negotia­
tions on a peace settlement in Europe is unknown, but it is
a known fact that a peaceful approach is a necessary condi-
25tion for a final peaceful settlement. It is impossible to 
know if and when the Soviet Union will be ready or willing to 
settle the question of German division. However, the Soviet 
Union and Warsaw Pact's intervention in the internal affairs 
of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, is suggestive. This is an 
indication that the Kremlin will go to extreme lengths to 
retain control over the satellites. And that East Germany 
will remain in the Soviet orbit for quite some time.
Fear is being voiced by some sections that the Fed­
eral Republic, disenchanted with the slow progress on reuni­
fication in the framework of NATO, will follow President de 
Gaulle out of the organization. One German writer asserts 
that the French President speaks to a strong German following 
when he says, "If you remain in NATO, that is, if you remain 
dependent upon the United States, you will remain divided I 
The German question can only be resolved in a framework of a 
European Europe;" This of course is a possibility, but it
2^Ibid., pp. 1-2.
^^See Schilling's testimony in Hearings. The Atlantic
Alliance, op. cit.. p. 100.
^^Roth, 0£. cit.. p. 7*
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is not highly likely. At least it appears that Bonn is not 
anxious to exchange American hegemony for French hegemony. 
This was implied by former Chancellor Erhard at a press con­
ference on February 25» 1966. When asked if the Federal 
Republic recognized de Gaulle as the spokesman of Europe, 
after the French President had stated that he would represent 
the European viewpoint in Moscow, Erhard said, "In Moscow, 
the French President will illumine the European standpoint
from the French view. It is clear that not all the European
27Nations will share this view to the final comma."
Another fear, voiced by NATO’s Secretary General, is 
that the tendency of Alliance members toward unilateral de­
tente with the Soviet Union is confusing and blurring the 
purposes and aims of NATO; that these unilateral efforts 
could "become a sanction for the status quo, and at that
moment the temptation for Germany to try a direct approach
2fito the Soviets may become too strong." Mr. Brosio warned
that :
. . . the present situation is not clear enough to 
rule out either the possibility of an agonizing
^"Chancellor Takes Stock At Press Conference," op. 
cit., p. 4; Although the Germans recognize American domination 
over NATO, they do not feel that the United States seeks 
hegemony over Europe. See Foreign Minister Gerhard Sohroeder, 
"Points of Main Emphasis In German Foreign Policy," The Bulle­
tin, Special Supplement (Bonn; German Federal Government,
Press and Information Service, July 9, 1963), P» 5*
p  Q
Secretary General Manlio Brosio, "î'ir. Brosio And The 
Problem Of Germany," NATO Letter. Vol. XV, No. 1 (January,
1967), p. 9.
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reappraisal by Germany in an unforeseeable future, or 
the reversal of the Soviet attitude towards Germany, from 
implacable hostility to the offer of a deal at the ex­
pense of the West.29
Here again it is unlikely that the Federal Republic would act
rashly, that is, exchange its freedom for Soviet hegemony.
However, it must be noted that the German division is a high­
ly explosive factor and any eventuality is possible.
Britain And The Alliance 
The annual statement on the British Estimates, as 
announced in the House of Commons on January I6, I968, sig­
naled the end of the myth that Great Britain was a world 
power. For all practical purposes Britain had ceased to be 
a world power by the end of the Second World War, although 
she did have many overseas commitments. The I968 White Paper 
on Defense also signaled the withdrawal of British forces 
from all areas except Europe. The British Government’s 
important decisions can be summarized as follows; (1) Europe 
and the treaty area will constitute Britain’s major efforts 
of defense; (2) an accelerated withdrawal of troops to be 
completed by 1971, from such areas as Maylaysia, Singapore, 
and the Persian Gulf; (3) the reduction of new naval con­
struction and the complete phase out of carrier forces upon 
completion of the troop withdrawal from the above mentioned 
areas; (4) Britain will maintain no forces for use outside of
29Ibid.
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Europe after the troop withdrawal.^® This was a concession 
that Britain's role as a great power and her overseas commit­
ments had come to an end. The White Paper stated further 
that Britain's future was with Europe and that she was de­
pending upon the Alliance for her freedom and security:
The foundation of Britain's security now . . . lies 
in the maintenance of peace in Europe. Our first prior­
ity, therefore, must still be to give the fullest possi­
ble support to the North Atlantic Alliance. Our contri­
bution will be formidable. The size and striking power 
of the Royal Navy is, after that of the United States 
Navy, greater than that possessed by any other member of 
the Alliance. Our army is well-trained and superbly 
equipped, and has more recent and varied fighting ex­
perience than any other European army. The Royal Air 
Force . . . will be second to none in Europe. We shall 
thus be able to contribute to the security of NATO on a 
scale corresponding with our efforts to forge closer 
political and economic links with Europe.31
Although it was implied in the White Paper that 
Britain was determined to become a part of the European com­
munity both politically and economically, this was later 
spelled out by William Rodgers, British Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of States, Foreign Office. In stating Britain's 
policy Mr. Rodgers said:
Britain has made her commitment to Europe, which I 
should like to emphasize is unequivocal, and to the 
Europe of the Rome Treaty. Not everyone yet understands 
the very profound change which has taken place in my 
country. We have come to recognize that from now on our 
major interests and the major field of operations for 
our policies must be in and with Europe. We have said 
quite plainly that we want to work out in Europe and with
"Documentâtion: Britain's I968 White Paper On 
Defense," NATO Letter, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (March, I968), p. 28.
3llbid.
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other Europeans our own common destiny. This then Is the 
point we have reached,32
To say that the British policy was a change would be 
an understatement. Particularly, considering that Mr, Harold 
Wilson, as late as March 1964, was making such statements as: 
"We have always been a world power," and "We should not be 
corralled In E u r o p e , A t  the same time the Party In power 
was Implying the same attitude in regard to Britain’s need to 
maintain Its own nuclear deterrent. For example, Prime Min­
ister Douglas-Hume warned should Britain give up Its nuclear 
arms, "France and China would take our place In the highest 
International councils," Mr, R, A, Butler, Foreign Secre­
tary, asserted that It would make It "Impossible to conduct 
the foreign policy of the country unless It were quite cer­
tain we had our nuclear deterrent,
Britain's policy change does not come as a surprise 
since her colonial holdings had started their decline short­
ly after World War II, The surprise Is generated by the
^^"Great Britain, France and The Common Market: Bri­
tain's Point Of View," NATO Letter. Vol. XVI, No, 4 (April,
1968), p, 6,
^^The Times, March 4, 1964, p, 9.
3̂ ''Torles Stress Prosperity, Nuclear Deterrent In 
Campaign," The Washington Post. September 18, 1964, p, 18,
33ibld,; It Is Interesting to note that the British 
Government has assigned Its first Polaris submarine to NATO, 
See "Documentation: Britain's I968 White Paper On Defense," 
0£, clt,, p, 29,
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determination displayed in her effort to become involved on 
the European Continent. Why is Britain so eager to tie her 
destiny to Europe at this date when leadership of Europe 
could have been hers with little effort on her part two dec­
ades ago? What prevented Great Britain from taking the oppor­
tunity to lead Western Europe twenty years ago when today she 
would settle for equal membership in the Common Market? As 
a matter of fact the British have tried twice— and have been 
refused twice by France— since I96I, to become a participa­
ting member of the Treaty of Rome (Common Market).
It is impossible to point to any single factor as a
cause for the British refusal to seize the opportunity to
lead Europe. However, it is possible to point to some fac­
tors that probably influenced the course Britain took.
First, a brief review of British Foreign Policy shows that 
it was always in her interest to deal with a fragmented Eu­
rope. The continental states were viewed as the greatest 
threat to Britain’s security. Therefore, the policy general­
ly followed by the British was to prevent the rise of a 
strong European state, or for that matter a coalition of 
European states strong enough to threaten her security. Thus 
promotion of a United Europe would have been in complete op­
position to the British tradition.Britain was not in the 
decade following World War II, ready to break with this tra­
dition.
3%ounger, o£. c i t . , p. 88.
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A second probable influence on her decision away 
from European leadership was the fact that she retained the 
view that Britain was still a world power. This was only nat­
ural since she still headed the Commonwealth; she had just 
made a gallant stand in the War when the European nations 
had given up leaving her to fight alone; and the War-time 
alliance with the United States had resulted in a "special 
relationship"— at least for the British. In regard to the 
latter, President de Gaulle sees it as something formal, 
though it has not really been defined. Actually, any British- 
American relationship would bear some "special" qualities 
considering they share a common language and culture which 
could only encourage informal ties. These ties would prob-
37ably exist regardless of the close alliance during the War.
In any case, British policy throughout most of the 
post War period seemed to lack any definite purpose. For at 
least a decade following World War II, she seemed more or 
less concerned with keeping as many channels open as possible. 
Though she was concerned with British security in the frame­
work of the Alliance, she was not concerned with building a 
strong Europe or limiting her flexibility in foreign affairs 
by binding herself to the Continent. (It was only when the 
European Defense Community failed and there was the possibil­
ity that NATO would follow suit that Britain broke with
^̂ fienry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Published for the Council on 
Foreign Relations, 19o5)» pp. 77-?8.
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tradition and stationed troops on the Continent.) However, 
in 1955» the late Sir Winston Churchill set the tone for a 
definite British policy which, though eroded badly, lasted 
until 1968. In a debate in the House of Commons Mr. Church­
ill stated that Britain must become a strong nuclear power in 
order to have influence thoughout the globe. Yet, she must 
at all times direct her policy toward a close relationship 
with the United States. The British policy is best stated 
in Churchill’s own words;
. . .  We must never allow, above all, . . . the grow­
ing sense of unity and brotherhood between the United 
Kingdom and the United States and throughout the English- 
speaking world to be injured or retarded. Its mainten­
ance, its stimulation and its fortifying is one of the 
first duties of every person who wishes to see peace and 
wishes to see survival of this country.
Our moral and military support of the United States 
and our possession of nuclear weapons of the highest 
quality and on an appreciable scale, together with their 
means of delivery, will greatly reinforce the deterrent 
power of the free world, and will strengthen our influ­
ence within the free world. That, at any rate, is the 
policy we have decided to pursue.38
Needless to say this policy did not bear fruit. Brit­
ain was unable to develop the nuclear capabilities that would 
give her a strong influence within the free world. In regard 
to the special relationship with the United States, it was 
shattered, or at least it was exposed as being not so special, 
when London found Washington in complete opposition to the
^^Parliamentary Debates (Commons) (5th series) Vol.
537, (1953), Cols. 1897, 1905.
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British policy in the 1956 Suez Crisis.Although the 
United States did help meet the British fuel shortage caused 
by the closing of the canal, and amend the Atomic Energy law 
which in the long run favored Britain over the other Allies, 
the relationship did remain strained.
Another blow to the British-American relationship 
occured when President Kennedy cancelled the Skybolt missile 
project in 1962, The cancellation not only put Britain's nu­
clear strike force in jeopardy it also put the relationship 
in jeopardy. That is, the manner in which it was cancelled; 
without prior consultation. The cancellation of Skybolt also 
pointed out that the two facets of the policy set by the 
late Prime Minister, were both dependent on the United States: 
the "unity and brotherhood" relationship and Britain's nuclear 
deterrent. The Nassau Agreement, which resulted from the 
Skybolt affair, was able to smooth some of the British-Ameri­
can relations. However, this agreement came in time to ad­
versely affect a new British policy toward Europe.
At the time of the Nassau Agreement, Britain was 
negotiating with members of the Common Market concerning her 
application for membership in the EEC. It is doubtful that 
Britain's membership would have been accepted by France had 
there been no British-American Agreement at Nassau, but at
3Q̂Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, opr cit.,
p. 79.
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any rate, it came at the most opportune time when President 
de Gaulle was preparing to exercise his veto over Britain's 
membership. Though de Gaulle did not use the Nassau Agree­
ment as a reason when he vetoed the British entry, it later 
came out in one of his press conferences when he stated the 
reasons for the Franco-German Treaty;
The French plan for European organization not being 
adopted by the Benelux countries; moreover, integration 
not being able to lead to anything other than an American 
protectorate; finally. Great Britain having shown through 
but the . . . Brussels negotiation that it was not in a 
position to accept the common economic rules and, by the 
Nassau Agreement, that its defense force, particularly 
in the nuclear domain, would not be European for lack of 
being autonomous in relation to the United States— it 
seemed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger­
many and to the Government of the French Republic that 
their bilateral cooperation could have some value.^0
There is not much doubt that de Gaulle had viewed 
the Nassau Agreement as another example of the British-Amer- 
ican special relationship. And the argument can be made that 
his reasoning concerning Britain's defense forces is not 
logical. For example, the British forces are as much Euro­
pean as the French forces including the force de frappe. How­
ever, the point is Britain missed an opportunity to use her 
nuclear force as a lever for influencing European attitudes 
when she failed to consult any of the European Allies before 
coming to an agreement with Washington.
^^De Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference. 0£. cit.. p. 6. 
^^Younger, o£. c^., p. #.
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How long Britain will remain out of the Common Mar­
ket is unknown. She recently applied again for membership, 
but was blocked a second time by a French veto. One inter­
esting aspect of this situation is the fact that all members 
of the Common Market have their defenses bound together in 
NATO, except France, On the other hand, three countries 
(Britain, Denmark and Norway) which have applied for member­
ship in the EEC also have their defenses bound in NATO, but
are being excluded by the one member that does not wish to
A?have its defense bound in NATO. Professor Ernest H. van 
der Beugel, Leyden University, former Deputy Foreign Minister, 
The Netherlands, pointed out Britain's greatest obstacles to 
membership in EEC when he said that he was "very pessimistic 
about the possibility that the French Government having al­
ready lost so much of its absurd illusion of hegemony of 
. . . Europe, will permit Britain to come in."^^
The United States And The Alliance 
Just as the other NATO members see different advan­
tages and disadvantages through membership in the organiza­
tion so does the United States. Just as the other members
42"Great Britain, France and The Common Market," loc.
Pit.
^^"Relations Between Europe and The United States," 
Reprinted from Knickerbocker International (April, 196?) in 
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security And Interna­
tional Operations, The Atlantic Alliance; Current Views. 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 20.
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hold different views regarding the role they intend to play 
in the common effort so does the United States, Washington 
has viewed the United States as a full member of the organi­
zation with all of its benefits and obligations, but she has 
not viewed her role as being just one of fifteen members. 
Washington has at different times viewed the United States as 
having several distinctive roles for achieving NATO's objec­
tives. William T. H. Pox and Annette Baker Fox distinguish 
seven roles that American policy-makers have envisaged for 
the U.S. from time to time.^^ For this study, however, a 
brief look at three of these roles and how they are changing 
should be sufficient; (1) Washington has viewed itself as 
the best guide for the Alliance's strategic planning; (2) as 
the best authority on NATO's overall policies; and (3) as 
best equipped to handle NATO's nuclear deterrent.
The view in Washington that the United States was
more capable of guiding the Alliance's strategic planning was 
a natural growth out of the economic and military situation
of the Allies when NATO was founded. First, the United States 
was the only member that could pay its full share of the 
financial burden of rearming. Since America was already 
underwriting the economic recovery of Europe, it would neces­
sarily have to assume the major financial burden for rearming
^^William T.R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, NATO And 
The Range Of American Choice (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 19^7), pp. 59-76.
45ibid.. pp. 63, 64, 69.
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the Alliance. It goes without saying that In general the one 
who pays the larger share has the stronger voice In most any 
endeavor. Thus, the United States was the dominant voice In 
the Alliance’s planning.
Second, aside from Britain, the United States had 
perhaps the best qualified and established military organiza­
tion capable of planning a strategy for the whole Alliance 
area. In addition, the technological gap between the United 
States and the Allies Increased, particularly after tactical 
nuclear weapons were Introduced Into the Alliance's defense, 
to the extent that Americans felt they were more capable of 
strategic planning; Bernard Brodle adds to this the tendency 
of Americans to think of themselves as almost exclusively 
gifted In knowledge of appropriate strategy planning because
JiAAmerica was out front In some technological phases. In any 
event, the Introduction of atomic weapons Into NATO placed the 
United States In the dominating position, especially In the 
nuclear area.
When the Kennedy administration announced the flex­
ible response strategy, the Allies balked. Not only was the 
new stragegy completely American Inspired without prior Allied 
consultation, but It advocated the build up of conventional 
forces which had lost much of their Importance under the "new 
look" strategy. In addition, the European Allies had regained
^^Brodie, 0£. çj^., p. 2?.
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enough economic security that they could not be persuaded 
financially to accept a strategy change in which they had 
little faith.
When the Allies resisted the strategy change, Wash­
ington began to realize it was losing its dominance of NATO's 
strategic planning; that the day of automatic acceptance by 
the Allies of American inspired policies was over. Washing­
ton also began to realize the more it pressed for acceptance 
of the new NATO strategy the more it caused doubt to be
ii?raised concerning the American nuclear commitment. ' The 
latter realization in turn led to the search for an accept­
able NATO nuclear force.
The view by Washington that it was the best guide for 
making overall policy for the organization is best seen in 
America's readiness to effect an increase in the membership 
of the Alliance. The United States had taken the initiative 
in bringing in Greece, Turkey, and particularly. West Ger­
many. Although West German admittance to NATO was executed 
through a maneuver by Great Britain, from 1950 on the United 
States policy was aimed at rearming Germany.
Again such a view is apparent in the way in which the
United States tied Spain to the defense of the Alliance over
48the protests of some members. Another example is the part 
^^Buchan, NATO In The I960's. op. cit.. p. 1?.
jtQ
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hear­
ings. Mutual Security Act of 1954. 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess
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played by the United States in setting up the principle 
commands such as SACEUE and SAGLANT.^^ However, Washington's 
suggestions that NATO members coordinate their policies out­
side the Alliance area have met with non acceptance by most 
of the Allies. American officials have on several occasions 
urged the NATO members to support the Washington policies in 
areas such as Vietnam and Africa— as if American policies were 
in the common interest of the Alliance, For example, Ambas­
sador George McGee asserted in 1964, that a full partnership 
in the Alliance entailed "increasing contributions in former­
ly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from coun­
tries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the 
ability to contribute.
Speaking to the Overseas Press Club on April 7, 1964, 
Secretary of State Rusk also urged support of American poli­
cies outside the NATO area:
The North Atlantic Nations should also deal coopera­
tively and effectively with communist aggression and 
subversive threats— in Asia, Latin America, and Africa 
. . . especially such countries as Laos and South Vietnam 
which are targets of aggression by Hanoi, with the sup­
port of the Chinese Communists.51
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 3-4; 
Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
i960), pp. 182-183; See also above, pp. 34-42.
ji?See above, p. 37.
^^George C. McGee, "Some American Thoughts On Current 
Issues," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LI, No. 13IO 
(Washington; U.S. G o v e rn m e n t Printing Office, 1964), p. 138.
^^"Documentation: Mr. Dean Rusk And The Atlantic
Alliance," 02.. cit.. p. 20.
199
Under Secretary of State George Ball has argued that the 
Europeans are neglecting world responsibilities by not coor­
dinating their policies with the United States' global re­
sponsibilities.^^
Nevertheless, the European members did not, and do 
not accept the American interpretation of the communist
threat in Southeast Asia as a threat to their security.
Bather, as has been shown, some feel that the real threat to
their security is a general war caused by the United States
policy in that area.
It has already been pointed out how Washington has 
viewed itself as best equipped to control NATO's nuclear 
weapons; Washington has also dominated nuclear strategic 
planning for the Alliance. This, too, was only a natural 
reaction since the United States was for some time the sole 
possessor of atomic weapons. Moreover, the Allies accepted 
the United States' view of its role in the nuclear area even 
after the Soviet Union and Britain had broken the American 
monopoly. With the advent of the Missile delivery system for 
nuclear weapons, the United States experienced non-acceptance 
of its dominating role over NATO's nuclear weapons and nu­
clear weapons strategy. With non-acceptance of American 
domination came the demand from the Allies that they share in
George W. Ball, "NATO And World Responsibility," 
The Atlantic Community Quarterly. Vol. II, No. 2 (Summer, 
1964), p. 215; Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. 
cit., p. 231.
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their nuclear defense— particularly the strategic planning 
based on the United States nuclear deterrent.
This was purely a political problem. Yet between 
i960 and 19651 the United States tried to solve it by tech­
nical methods— the NATO nuclear f o r c e , I n  I965, Washing­
ton, though leaving the door open for a possible NATO nuclear 
force, suggested a political method for solving the politi­
cal problem. Secretary McNamara suggested to the NATO 
defense ministers in June, 1965, that a small group of the 
ministers consult about the nuclear planning problems. This 
led to the establishment of an ad hoc group: the Nuclear
Planning Working Group composed of five Alliance Defense 
Ministers, As a result of four meetings of this group in 
1966, the NATO Council established two permanent organizations 
at its meeting in December, I966— Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee, open to all NATO members, and the Nuclear Planning 
Group, composed of the defense ministers of seven NATO coun­
tries: Canada, Germany. Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
It Is not known at this time whether these two new 
NATO organizations will satisfy the nuclear desires or the
^^For a brief summary of the several technical pro­
posals and recommendations to satisfy the European demands 
for policy making see Secretary McNamara, "NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group Holds First Meeting," U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol. LVI, No, 1453 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, I967), pp. 686-688.
%bid,, p. 68?.
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defense planning desires of the Allies in the long run.^^
It is known that the several proposals for a NATO nuclear 
force was not the answer the Allies wanted. Probably the 
main reason it was not the answer is aptly stated by General 
Norstad before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee:
. . . most of them feel that, regardless of the level 
of nuclear effort which, may be appropriate for the 
Alliance or the form in which that effort may be organ­
ized, they should have a voice in the political process 
by which decisions will be taken governing the use of 
weapons of this type— an influence, an appropriate meas­
ure of control.56
Finally, it should be noted that there has been con­
siderable change in another area in which the United States 
has been dominant; an area in which the United States has 
brought about uneasy strains on the Alliance: in the area
of consultation with the Allies. This too was caused by the 
disparity between the United States and the Allies at the 
founding of NATO. In addition, the United States had been 
the senior Western spokesman at Pottsdam and Yalta, there­
fore, it was normal that she felt she should continue in this 
role, particularly in negotiating with the Kremlin.
Further, the United States has never discounted the 
desire and hope of somehow reaching an accommodation with the 
Soviet Union. This hope and desire is underscored by a number
^^The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group that was held in Washington on April 6, 7, 196?, seemed 
to have positive and satisfactory results. See the "Text of 
Comminique," ibid., pp. 687-688,
56Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 69.
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of efforts in United States Foreign Policy, including the 
present effort respecting the non-proliferation treaty.
This has raised some fears of Washington and Moscow again 
arbitrating Europe's future. If the USSR is ready to come 
to terms concerning Europe's future, then the European 
states— especially and emphatically France— naturally wish 
to do their own bargaining. This point is emphasized by 
French President de Gaulle in his Eighth Press Conference, 
July 29, 1963:
, , . the United States which, since Yalta and Potts­
dam, has nothing . , , to ask from the Soviets, the 
United States sees tempting prospects opening up before 
it. Hence, for instance, all the separate negotiations 
between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which started 
with the limited agreement on nuclear testing, seems 
likely to be extended to other questions, notably Euro­
pean ones, , , , which clearly goes against the views of 
France,57
Although the United States has on occasions initiated 
bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, without prior 
consultations with the Allies, she has realized since the 
1956 Suez Crisis that consultation is an important key to the 
unity of NATO.^® This realization can be seen again in a 
statement by Mr, McNamara before a U,S, Senate Subcommittee;
We are committed to discuss with other members of 
NATO any actions that we propose to take with respect 
to the Soviet Union or the Weursaw Pact, It is only in
5?De Gaulle, Major Addresses, og, cit,. p, 235,
^^U,S, Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXVII,
No, 9^3 (Washington: U,S, Government Printing Office, 1957)»
pp. 135-138,
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that fashion that we believe we can maintain the unity 
that is the foundation of our strength.59
By 1966, Washington recognized that in order to keep 
NATO together the Alliance must be changed to adapt to chang­
ing world conditions; and especially, to changing European 
conditions. The permanent nuclear planning committee was 
evidence of Washington's recognition. Other indications of 
that recognition and the changing United States dominant role 
can be seen in a speech by President Johnson on October 7, 
1966, in which he said, "We are committed and shall remain 
firm. But the Atlantic Alliance is a living Organizm. It 
must adapt to changing conditions.The Alliance must not 
only modernize and streamline its physical structures, it 
must do more. "The Alliance must become a forum for increas­
ingly close consultations. These should cover the full
range of joint concerns— from East-West relations to crisis 
„6lmanagement."
It should also be noted that the attitude of change 
extends to the smaller members of the Organization. Whereas 
the lesser members once viewed the major, perhaps the only, 
purpose of the Alliance to be a defense against external
^^Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 218.
^^"Making Europe Whole; An Unfinished Task," Re­
printed from U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LV, No. 
1426 (October 24, 1966), in The Atlantic Alliance: Current 
Views, op. cit., p. 2.
6llbid.
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aggression, there Is now a general tendency for them to 
emphasize a new Important role for the Organization in world 
affairs. Though maintaining that NATO still serves a valid 
purpose for their security, the smaller members tend to 
emphasize NATO’s validity as an instrument for solving East- 
West differences and a necessary instrument for achieving 
arms control and general disarmament. Though one person or 
country does not speak for all the small members, a statement 
by former Foreign Minister Halvard Lang, Norway, 19^6-1965, 
reflects the general feeling of the lesser states concerning 
the changing nature of NATO. Mr. Lang first asserted that 
the Organization was essential to the smaller countries if 
they were to conduct "fearless" policies vis-a-vis the Commu­
nist bloc nations. "Certainly in the case of my own country, 
Norway, the only solution to our security problem is an in­
ternational, or Allied, one." He then emphasized a new 
purpose for the Alliance;
. . . The Alliance should be better able to deal with 
critical international situations. More positively, it 
should contribute to solving the problems which create 
tension between ourselves and Warsaw Pact countries. It 
should also constantly seek practical ways to achieve arms 
control and disarmament. Such thoughts have been in the 
minds of many of those who call for NATO’s adaption to 
changing conditions. . . .  To alter the "machinery" is 
far less important than to develop a set of policy pri­
orities ^ d  attitudes which are in accord with new con­
ditions.o2
^Halvard Lang, "The Objective Of NATO Cooperation," 
Reprinted from NATO Letter. Vol. XIV, No. 10 (October, i960), 
in The Atlantic Alliance: Current Views, op. cit.. pp. 5-7.
CHAPTER VII 
NATURE OF THE THREAT
The Threat— Myth Or Reality 
When Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power in the 
Soviet Union there was fear in some quarters that the Krem­
lin might reverse its policies and return to the hard line 
of Stalin. However, the new leadership in the Soviet Union 
has done little to diminish the world’s hope for an East- 
West detente. Recently, and for the first time since the 
end of World War II, there was a widespread tendency toward 
accepting the Communists' affirmations of peaceful coexist­
ence and good will as more than mere manipulation aimed at 
weakening the West's defense. There was even expectation 
that through peaceful coexistence the Communist bloc and the 
Western bloc could be moving toward a genuine accommodation. 
At the same time there was much debate on Capital Hill in 
Washington whether United States NATO forces could and should 
be reduced.^
However, in August 1968, the Soviet Union and five
Isee Senator Henry M. Jackson, Hearings. The Atlantic 
Alliance. 0£. c U . , p. 79.
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other Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia with mili­
tary force for the purpose of deposing the new reform Czech-
20Slovak government. Although it is too soon to see the out­
come of this new Soviet move, and it is too soon to know the 
final effects it will have on the movement toward an East- 
West detente, it goes without saying that the movement will 
be affected adversely. As a matter of fact, in the annual 
meeting of finance, defense, and foreign ministers of NATO, 
the occupation of Czechoslovakia took top priority. The 
Western leaders joined in criticizing the Soviet intervention 
and several made new contributions to the Organization, The 
purpose here is not to analyze the effects of the Soviet move 
into her satellite, but to show that the widespread hopes of 
an early detente and a genuine accommodation are based par­
tially, perhaps mostly, on emotions and wishful thinking.
If a man is to retain his sanity in today's nuclear 
age, he must have at least some degree of hope. Yet, in 
order to measure the progress toward accommodation and the 
settlement of the East-West conflict, a more reliable criteri­
on must be adopted. Thus it is necessary to transcend the 
realm of emotions and wishful thinking to the hard, cold
2It is interesting to note that the Czechoslovak in­
vasion came only sixteen months after a Conference of Commu­
nist and Workers Parties of Europe had declared at Karlovy 
Vary, Czechoslovakia, that there must be a "conclusion by all 
European States of a treaty renouncing the use of force or 
threat of force in their relations and interference in inter­
nal affairs, , , ," The Soviet View Of NATO, op, cit., p,
19, (Italics mine)
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facts of national foreign policies which are the basis of 
action and reaction in the international arena.
One of the major issues in dispute among the Alliance 
members hinges on the question of whether the Kremlin's am­
bitions have actually changed. That is, whether the Soviets 
are really willing to practice— and not merely proclaim—  
peaceful coexistence. This issue derives urgency from the 
fact that in the past few years voices have been raised in 
all NATO countries implying that the organization has lost 
its validity because it was formed as a defensive arrange­
ment against Communist aggression. Now that the Soviet Union 
is peacefully inclined NATO has become an anachronism. These 
same voices imply that the most important task of NATO is a 
resolution of the differences with the members of the Warsaw 
Pact because the real threat is a nuclear armed China.^
The differences over the Soviet threat range from 
the belief that overt aggression is possible to the belief 
that the threat is a myth or non-existent. As regards the 
former, it is generally accepted by most that Soviet physi­
cal aggression against a NATO Ally is highly unlikely. As to 
the latter, a former U.S. State Department Consultant on 
Russian Affairs has argued that a Soviet threat has been a
^"Statement on Interdependence By The Signatories 
of The Declaration of Atlantic Unity," NATO Letter. Vol. XV, 
No. 2 (February, 196?), p. 26.
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4myth or non-existent from the beginning. To look back over 
a period of relative European stability and proclaim that 
since there has been no Russian invasion there has been no 
threat is as Aesopian as "a logic which concludes that be­
cause deterrence has been successful, it is no longer neces­
sary. . . But, in any event, the post-war Soviet threat
to the Western nations must be viewed in terms other than 
just overt military aggression. Granted the military threat 
was fresh in Western statesmen’s minds since they had just 
witnessed the use of the Red Army in regard to Czechoslovakia 
in 1948, But there were other dangers which were feared by 
the West: political pressures, internal subversion, and the
possibility of Western Europe falling within the Soviet 
sphere of influence. In this sense the threat was real 
enough, and was no doubt seen as such by both Europe and 
America, NATO itself is the best evidence that the threat 
existed. The fact that fifteen separate national entities, 
after years of disagreement and conflict, were able to
Fred Warner Neal, "The Political Unity of Western 
Europe— Myth or Reality," The Unity of Western Europe, (ed.) 
Jack D, Dowell (Pullman, Washington: Washington State Uni­
versity Press, 1964), p, 5» Professor Neal bases his argu­
ment on George F, Kennon, Russia. The Atom and The West 
(New York; Harper & Brothers, 1958), and the fact that there 
has been no Russian invasion of the West even though NATO 
has never reached minimum force strength,
^U,S, Senate, A Study Submitted by the Subcommittee 
On National Security and International Operations, The 
Atlantic Alliance: Unfinished Business. 90th Cong,, 1st
Sess (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 196?),
p, 2.
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disoard past traditions and create an alliance which holds 
no parallel in their history shows that, whether mythical or 
actual, the Soviet Union threatened their interests. It 
should also be pointed out that military power does not al­
ways take the shape of physical force against one's neigh­
bors. As a matter of fact, political issues of military 
power is still viewed as a fundamental aspect of international 
diplomacy.^
Has the Soviet Union modified its long range aims?
Is the Kremlin in reality willing to practice coexistence to 
the extent that it no longer constitutes a threat to Western 
interests? It has already been pointed out that one of the 
NATO members, Prance, has demonstrated (in I966) that the 
threat has disappeared, or at least a lack of concern over 
possible Soviet aggression, by withdrawing from the Organi­
zation, As a matter of fact, French officials have gone
further and accused NATO of being an instrument for prolonging 
7the Gold War. On the other hand, the remaining fourteen
^Even in the nuclear age, national leaders continue 
to view military force in terms of political advantage. See 
Klaus Knorr, On Uses Of Military Power In The Nuclear Age 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196é); See also 
Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, 
and the Balance of World Power," Journal of International 
Affairs. Vol. XXI, No. 2 (196?), pp. 215-231.
^Former French Premier Georges Pompidou asserts that 
the Organization "is the daughter of the cold war and helps 
to perpetuate it." Full Texts Of Statements On Foreign 
Policy. o£. cit., p. 5.
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members took an opposite view of the threat and the purpose 
of the Organization in their joint declaration, March 18,
1966:
The North Atlantic Treaty and the Organization es­
tablished under it are both alike essential to the secur­
ity of our countries.
The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an 
instrument of defense and deterrence by maintenance in 
peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military 
organization in which . , , the efforts and resources of 
each are combined for the common security of all. We 
are convinced that this organization is essential and 
will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can 
be a substitute.8
The Soviet Union seems, in the 1960's, to have changed 
its views in regard to at least one specific problem area: 
prevention of a general war by communication failures, acci­
dent, or miscalculation. This is reflected in the "Hot line" 
of 1963, the Nuclear Test-ban Treaty of I963, the United 
States-Soviet Consular Agreement of I968, and in the agree­
ment of the Soviet and the United States to discuss reductions 
in ballistic and anti-ballistic missiles systems in June 
1968. However, the Kremlin has not presented any evidence 
that it has given up its effort to bring Europe under Soviet 
hegemony; that it has abandoned its aim to spread Communism 
throughout the world; or that it is ready to negotiate ser­
iously the basic political conflicts with the West.^ Nor has
O
"l4 Nations Declare Alliance Essentied to Common 
Security," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LIV, No. 
1397 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, I966),
p. 536.
^The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 4.
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the Soviet Union changed its policy regarding the destruction 
of the Alliance so that Moscow can deal separately with a 
fragmented Europe. These are the basic issues that have con­
stituted the Soviet threat since the second World War.
On the contrary, the Kremlin presents hard, cold 
evidence that the contest for Europe is still one of its 
basic aims. For example, the Soviet Union continues to in­
vest heavily in arms and research for "major advances in 
critical new w e a p o n s . I n  addition, the USSR continues 
to maintain the most powerful military force in Central 
Europe; 20 divisions in East Germany alone.
It has already been pointed out that the Soviet 
policy of peaceful coexistence is a method of advancing com­
munism by any means short of a general war; that peaceful 
coexistence meant no more than a sensible agreement not to
attempt to settle the ideological battle by use of modern 
11nuclear weapons. This aim has not changed. In fact,
Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev reaffirmed the goals, set by 
Krushchev's peaceful coexistence policy, before the Confer­
ence of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe at Karlovy 
Vary, Czechoslovakia, April 24, 196?. Brezhnev said, "at their 
1957 and i960 conferences, communists drew important con­
clusions about the basic tendencies of modern world develop­
ment. The intervening period has affirmed the correctness
^°Ibid.
^^See above pp. 134-138.
212
Of these conclusions.” He later added, ”As for the Soviet 
Union, our policy in the future will aim, as before, at the 
development of mutually advantageous relations with capital­
ist countries cf Europe on the basis of the principles of 
peaceful coexistence. . . Chairman Brezhnev then went
on to state:
The historic aim of our movement is socialism and 
communism. We are convinced that the working class and 
people of West Europe will sooner or later set out on 
the road to socialism. The communist parties selflessly 
struggle for this very thing, for the only correct road 
guaranteeing the triumph of democracy, peace, and the 
full development of the creative forces of each people.
. . . This is why the communist parties tirelessly strive 
to insure that their policies strengthen the socialist, 
Marxist-Leninist orientation of the working class and 
that they actively and purposefully create favorable 
conditions for the victory of socialism.13
In his speech before the 1967 Conference, Mr.
Brezhnev also issued a clear call to all communist and pro­
gressive forces to make every effort to destroy the North 
Atlantic Pact; an endeavor the Soviets have aimed at since 
the founding of NATO. According to Brezhnev,
. . .  we cannot ignore the fact that in two years 
the governments of the NATO countries will have to decide 
whether NATO is to be extended or not. In our opinion, 
it is quite correct that communist and all progressive 
forces should try to use this circumstance to develop 
still more widely the struggle against the preservation 
of this aggressive bloc.l^
l^The Soviet View of NATO: Speech by Leonid I. 




The destruction of the Organization was again emphasized as 
a high priority in the final statement issued by the 196? 
Conference;
The 20 year period of the validity of the Atlantic 
pact expires in 1969» and this makes possible a clear 
alternative: a Europe without military blocs. This
alternative must be put on the agenda with all earnest­
ness.
No effort should be spared in order to develop a 
broad movement of peace-loving forces of our continent 
against the extension of or any modification of the 
Atlantic Pact.15
The lack of the Soviet Union's readiness to serious­
ly negotiate the basic political conflicts between the East 
and West is shown in the conditions established by the 196? 
Conference in Czechslovakia. A brief look at some of these 
requirements points out that these demands preclude any 
peaceful East-West negotiations. First, in order to set the 
basis for a peaceful settlement based on the principles of 
peaceful coexistence, all states must recognize and accept 
European conditions as they now exist:
This means: Recognition of the inviolability of
existing frontiers in Europe, particularly on the Oder 
and the Neisse, and also of the borders between both 
German states; recognition of the existence of two 
sovereign and equal German states, the GDE and the German 
Federal Republic, which requires of the latter the re­
nunciation of its claim to represent all Germany; pre­
clusion of any opportunity for the German Federal Repub­
lic to gain access to nuclear arms in any form, . . ; 
and recognition of the Munich treaty as invalid from the 
moment of its conclusion,
. . . normalization of relations between all states
15ibid., p. 20.
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and the GDR, and between both German states and between 
the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity.
. . .16
It Is Interesting to note that the only disarmament proposals 
that were of any Interest to the conference were those con­
cerning the "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory 
of European states, liquidation of foreign war bases, estab­
lishment of denuclearized zones In central Europe, In the
Balkans, the territory of Danublan countries. In the Medlter-
17ranean, and In Northern Europe. . . ." ' There Is no doubt 
about West Germany, and very little doubt about the rest of 
the NATO Allies, not accepting the Soviets' conditions for 
European settlement. Nor do the disarmament proposals 
mentioned above, which would In the final analysis destroy 
NATO and remove the United States from Europe, appeal to the 
Western Bloc nations.
Finally, the Soviet threat must be viewed In the 
framework of the Communist Ideology though there Is argument 
that communism as an Ideology Is dead. Zbigniew Brezezlnskl, 
Professor and member of the U.S. State Department Policy 
Planning Council, argues that "communism Is dead as an Ideol­
ogy In the sense that It Is no longer capable of mobilizing
18unified global support." Carrying his argument further Mr.
^^Ibld.. pp. 18-19.
^^Ibld.. p. 19.
^^Zbignlew Brezezlnskl, "The Implications of Change 
For the United States Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of
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Brezezlnskl states:
On the contrary, It Is Increasingly fragmented by 
conflicts among constituent units and parties. This 
has contributed to Ideological disillusionment among 
Its members. Communist states, Communist movements, 
and Communist subversion are still very Important on 
the International scene, but Communist Ideology as a 
vital force Is no longer with us.19
Actually argument could be made that communism has never been 
capable of unifying global support considering how the satel­
lites became communist and considering how they have sup­
ported Russia more or less out of the necessity to survive.
The Invasion of Czechslovakia In 1968 Is a case In point.
Regardless of whether Communist Ideology Is a vital 
force In International relations. It Is a vital force with­
in the Soviet Union— the Communist Party still controls the 
USSR. The Marxist Ideology provides the Kremlin with a con­
ceptual framework for viewing the world. It looks on history 
as a continuous struggle In which forces of progress contend 
with forces of reaction and defeats them. In other words, 
the basis of the Communist faith Is that the capitalistic 
system Is doomed; that Communism Is certain to take Its 
place; and that this process must be aided at all levels. A 
Communist Party that completely discarded the Marxist Ideology 
would not only lose Its reason to be but would lose Its
State Bulletin. Vol. LVII, No. 1462 (Washington: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 196?), p. 20.
19Ibid.
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monopoly on control of government. Therefore the Kremlin's 
beliefs of its total claim to the future will continue to 
influence the outlook and purposes reflected in the Soviet 
policy.
Probably the best evidence that the Soviet Union is 
following the Marxist ideology can be seen in its intention 
to continue to inspire and support uprisings against any 
noncommunist governmental system. Mr, Khrushchev made this 
point quite clear in his speech before the 20th CPSU Confer­
ence, January 6, 196I;
Can such wars flare up in the future? They can.
Can there be such uprisings? There can. But these are 
wars of national uprisings. What is the attitude of the 
Marxists toward uprisings? A most positive one. . . . 
These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, 
against the colonizers. The Communists freely support 
such just wars and march in the front rank with the 
people waging liberation struggles.^®
Mr. Brezhnev reaffirmed this as a major policy of the Soviet
21Union at the 196? Conference in Czechslovakia. From this 
it would seem that the Soviet Union or at least its long- 
range goals do constitute a threat to the Western nations.
On the other hand, it should be noted that Marxist 
theory does not set a time table for the inevitable triumph 
of communism. Nor does Marxist ideology contemplate such a 
thing as "nationalist communism"— that is, national interests
20U.S. Senate, Hearings. Analysis of The Khrushchev 
Speech of January 6. 1961, op. cit.. p. Fsl
^^The Soviet View Of NATO, op. cit.. pp. 2-3.
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taking precedence over theory. Yet, national interests con­
sistently have priority over theory in Russia as well as in 
Communist states which are not under Soviet Russia's control. 
That national interests will override theory in the Soviet 
Union has been evident since early in the history of Commu­
nist Russia: at least since Lenin instituted his "New Eco­
nomic Policy" in 1921. In view of the fact that the Soviet 
Union will place national interests ahead of Marxist theory, 
it is possible to see the basis of the I968 Czechoslovakian 
invasion not as an indication of Russian designs for global 
communism but as an indication of the Kremlin's concern over 
maintaining a specific sphere of influence and protection on 
her borderlands. In any case, in the final analysis, Rus­
sian national interests tend to dictate her foreign policy 
which in turn makes it impossible to say that a Soviet threat 
does or does not actually exist. Nor is it possible to pre­
dict whether an East-West detente can or cannot be established 
in the near future.
Is The Organization Still Needed?
The argument concerning the threat or degree of threat 
naturally leads to the ultimate question of whether or not 
the need for NATO has dissipated. And if so then should not 
the Organization itself be abolished. Here again differences 
span from one extreme to the other. It is not likely that the 
answer to this question can be found in the arguments that
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have been put forth— both sides are convincing. It Is nec= 
essary, therefore, to turn to the purpose, or purposes, of 
the Organization as seen by officials and others of some of 
the member nations. From this source It may not be possible 
to actually discover whether NATO Is needed or not, but It 
will give an Insight Into the attitudes and beliefs that will 
determine whether NATO remains an active Organization.
Washington seems to view NATO as the best. If not the 
only, means of creating the conditions of stability which can 
lead to a solution of East-West differences and thereby the 
reunification of Germany. Though stressing that the security 
of the NATO area and European peace are the main objectives 
of the Organization, there has been a tendency In Washington 
to Include the unification of Germany as an Alliance goal. 
There has also been a tendency In Washington to accept at 
face value the contention that a divided Germany constitutes 
the greatest threat to world peace and therefore German re­
unification Is essential to European peace.
However, these assumptions must be seen In their 
proper perspective. Washington's emphasis on German unifi­
cation stems from the United States' role In getting West 
Germany Involved In NATO and the defense of the West; the 
early acceptance of the West German thesis that a unified 
Germany Is essential to the peace of Europe by Washington; and 
the adoption of German reunification as a policy goal by the 
United States. Emphasis on a unified Germany can also be
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seen as reassuring gestures on the part of Washington toward 
the Federal Republic.
President John F, Kennedy spoke of German reunifica­
tion as a United States Policy goal at a press conference in 
Germany on June 25, 1963.
Quite obviously, the German people wish to be re­
united. If the people of the United States had lost a 
struggle and the Mississippi River divided us, we would 
wish to be reunited. I think the people of the Soviet 
Union, if they experienced a comprable fate, would wish 
to join together. So that is the object of our poli­
cies.̂ 2
President Lyndon Johnson reaffirmed this goal when he 
made it clear in December 1964 that the division of Germany 
was not an acceptable condition for European peace. Presi­
dent Johnson then implied that German reunification should 
be an Alliance objective when he called on the Allies to 
assure the Federal Republic "that there shall be no acceptance 
of the lasting threat to peace which is the forced division 
of G e r m a n y . M r .  Johnson later added that "there can be 
no stable peace in Europe while one part of Germany is denied 
the basic right to choose freely its own destiny and to 
choose . . . reunion with the Germans in the Federal Repub­
lic."24
po"President Kennedy On German Reunification," The 
Bulletin. Vol. XI, No. 23 (Bonn: German Federal Government 
Press and Information Office, 1963), p. 1.
Quoted in The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, op.
,®î ., p. 5 •
^^Ibid.
220
Again on October 7, 1966, President Johnson, in a 
speech to a Conference of Editorial Writers, brought up the 
task that faces the Alliance. i'Ir. Johnson noted that the 
greatest task before this generation was a reconciliation of 
Europe and a United Germany. The first requisite to accomplish 
this task is a modernized NATO along with other strong Atlan­
tic institutions. To put it in the Presidnnt's own words:
In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united.
This remains a vital purpose of American Policy. It 
can only be accomplished through a growing reconcilia­
tion. There is no short cut.
We must move ahead on three fronts:
— First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other 
Atlantic institutions.
— Second, to further the integration of the Western 
European Community.
— Third, to quicken progress in East-West Relations.
Former President Harry S. Truman still feels that
NATO is needed to preserve a stable European environment as
well as to achieve a final settlement of the problems left
from World War II, In a letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations, on July 26, 1966, Mr. Truman stated his feelings
on the need for the organization in the following manner:
It seems to me that there is continued need for NATO to 
guard against the use of force to resolve issues which 
remain 20 years after the War. The United States is as 
concerned in the Just and peaceful settlement of these 
issues as are the nations of Europe, for the peace of all
"Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task," The 
Atlantic Alliemce: Current Views, op. cit., p. 2; See also 
U.Se Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LV, No. 1426 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1966 )̂, 0£. cljt., p. 227.
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of us is involved.
For almost two decades the nations have sought for­
mulas to solve the problem left by the War, The hopeful 
road today is toward creation of an environment in which 
settlement is possible. To that end security, which ex­
cludes domination, is very necessary, I firmly believe 
that NATO offers the best hope of achieving it,26
Up to this point, the emphasis has been on the United 
States view regarding the need for NATO. This is only natural 
since the United States is the Alliance’s core power. A re­
versal in United States attitude on NATO policy could spell 
the end of the Organization or the Alliance itself. Removal 
of United States forces from NATO could end the Organization 
or withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty could 
terminate the Alliance. This is, of course, not a predeter­
mined fact. For example, the United States could withdraw 
its forces from NATO and still remain committed to the terms 
of the Treaty. It can also be argued that an American with­
drawal from the Treaty would not necessarily destroy the 
Alliance. The Western European countries had agreed to ally 
for their common defense before the United States became in­
volved; the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties are cases in 
point. However, since the Soviet Union has become the second 
most powerful nation in the world, and, since the United 
States is the only Western nation that can deal with Russia
Full text of President Truman's letter is found in 
Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance. 0£. cit., p. 22?.
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on a level of parity, the Dunkirk Treaty, Brussels Treaty, 
or the North Atlantic Treaty without the United States would 
be more or less meaningless. The French scholar Raymond Aron 
aptly summed up the meaninglessness of a Western European 
defense without the United States in the following manner;
Let the U.S. withdraw from Europe before the real 
problems are solved, and the risk of Soviet domination 
will appear again, more dangerous than ever. He who 
imagines that Western Europe, grouped around Prance, is 
capable of balancing the Soviet Union is blind or a
megalomaniac.2?
In any case, the obverse side to this coin is the 
fact that the Alliance must serve the interests of all its 
members, not just the core power, if it is to survive. It 
must be granted that the withdrawal of one lesser power—  
even one of the larger ones— will not destroy NATO? France, 
for example. Yet, if several of the lesser states should 
follow France’s lead or if there is disagreement among the 
members in regard to the main purpose of the organization, 
it could lose its reason to be.^® Therefore, other member's 
views concerning the necessity and purpose of NATO are 
relevant.
It has already been noted how West Germany has placed
^^Quoted in Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance, op. 
cit., p. 197.
Z^The Belgian Statesman Paul-Henri Spaak argues that 
the Allies must formulate a unified policy regarding their 
main problems; Germany and Berlin. The Alliance cannot 
survive a division among its members on these problems.
"The Indispensable Alliance," NATO Letter, Vol. XV, No. 11 
(November, 196?), p. 14.
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her future and the settlement of German reunification with
NATO: how Germany's defense is completely tied to NATO,
Needless to say, the Organization is indispensable to Ger- 
29many.  ̂ It has also been shown that Britain now views NATO
as the corner stone of her policy and defense; that NATO is
necessary to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement
in Europe,^® It is not necessary to discuss de Gaulle's
refusal to believe that NATO is a necessary instrument for
achieving a peaceful settlement of the East-West problems.
However, it should be noted that France, distinguishing the
Alliance from NATO, regards membership to the treaty as a
necessary condition until the "fundamental elements of the
31relations between East and West" have changed.
Despite the fact that there is considerable diver­
sity of viewpoints on matters concerning the commitments of 
members in regard to the basic purpose and need for the 
Organization, the smaller members agree that NATO is a 
requisite for the final negotiations of a peaceful settlement 
of East-West differences. They also agree that North America, 
particularly the United States, must have a part in a final 
settlement. The Canadian view of the necessity for NATO is 
representative of this general agreement.
29See above pp. 178-186.
^^See above pp. 186-1?4.
3l"Letter From General de Gaulle To President Lyndon 
Johnson," French Foreign Policy, op. cit.. p. 24.
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Canada's attitude and policy concerning the future of 
NATO can be seen in a speech by the Canadian Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Paul Martin. Speaking at a Nation­
al Newspaper Awards Dinner in Toronto, January 196?, Mr. 
Martin maintained that the Allies had formed an Alliance for 
the purpose of Western defense and to achieve "certain long- 
range objectives beneficial to the whole of E u r o p e . T h e  
Secretary of State went ahead to say that,
. . . The interests of Western Europe and North America 
in these ultimate questions of security and political 
settlement are inextricably mixed. It has been the 
greatest importance . . . that the Atlantic States, 
through NATO and in other ways, should maintain unity 
and develop their common interests as a means of even­
tually achieving a broad European settlement with East­
ern States.
If the final purpose of the NATO arrangements is to
be seen in these terms, then any major military or
political move affecting the Alliance must be considered, 
first and foremost, in terms of whether it will facili­
tate or hinder that ultimate European settlement. . . .33
Mr. Martin also made it clear that the threat which brought
about NATO had not actually dissipated. Though the Soviet
Union may have given up hope for an early establishment of
Communism throughout Europe, she must be judged according to
her basic policies. The Soviet Union has neither changed its
European policy concerning a European settlement nor has she
changed her military policy. As a matter of fact, evidence
32"Documentâtion; Canada and NATO," NATO Letter. 
Vol. XV, No. 1 (January, 196?), p. 21.
33ibid .
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shows that “there has been no weakening or withdrawal in the
‘ik,Soviet position."-'
Another representative view supporting the general 
agreement among the lesser members concerning the purpose and 
necessity for UATO is that of Norway. Norway's view regarding 
the future need for NATO is similar to that of the United 
States. In fact, John Lyng, Norwegian Parliament Foreign 
Minister, recently made a statement in the Norwegian Parlia­
ment in which he fully agreed with President Johnson regard­
ing the objectives of the Alliance. Mr. Lyng viewed Presi­
dent Johnson's stated objectives (October 7» 1966) as the 
basis for "a gradual and balanced" reduction of armed forces 
by both s i d e s . T h e  Foreign Minister told Parliament that 
in his view the Organization had fulfilled its primary role 
by stopping Soviet expansion in Europe, however, NATO had 
now begun a new phase and had another role. In the words of 
Mr. Lyng,
It is natural to regard NATO's role as having en­
tered into a second phase. Inside as well as outside the 
Organization it has been underlined that NATO has now 
entered into a period which should be used to bring about 
detente in Europe and the Atlantic Area. . . .  'We must 
expect that NATO will continue to be a necessary element
Ibid.
^^“Documentation: Norway and NATO," ibid», p. 23»
For President Johnson's stated objectives see "Making Europe 
Whole: An Unfinished Task," The Atlantic Alliance: Current 
Views, op. cit., pp. 105; See also U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol. LV, No. 1426 (U.S. Government Printing Office,
pp. 6&2-025.
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in European development and that there are important and 
essential tasks to be solved by NATO. This presupposes 
the continued opportunity for the individual member coun­
tries to remain standing on that foundation of security 
and strength which is provided for them by NATO.'36
Other views that support the need for NATO in the 
future come from Belgium, Greece, and Denmark. For example, 
Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Statesman, argues that the Allies 
would indeed be stupid if they did not acknowledge the fact 
that the world situation has changed since the signing of 
the Treaty in 1949. However, and more important, the Allies 
must recognize that NATO was perhaps the most important 
factor leading to current changes. He further argues that it 
is most important that the Alliance and NATO adapt themselves 
to world changes:
What can NATO do to show that it is ready to adapt 
itself? Commit suicide? A radical measure, but hardly 
a wise one, and one that the international situation for­
bids, for, whatever the new trends in the Communist 
world, Russia is still powerfully armed and refuses 
. . .  to follow the path of controlled disarmament. It 
would consequently be extremely dangerous if NATO were 
to disappear.
We have only saved ourselves from this disorder be­
cause fourteen countries refuse to follow the fifteenth, 
and the fifteenth can conduct its policy only because 
the fourteen others refuse to follow its example.37
The Greek attitude concerning the need for NATO can 
be seen in a statement by Panayotis Pipinelis, Former Prime 
Minister and Permanent Representative to the NATO Council 
from Greece, in November 1966:
^^"Documentation: Norway and NATO," loo, cit.
^^Paul-Henri Spaak, "The Alliance Must Go On," NATO 
Letter. Vol. XV, No. 3, (March, I967), p. 6.
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. , . the crucial and most dangerous stage in East- 
West relations, far from having been passed, as the 
improvement in the political climate would appear to 
indicate, is waiting for us at the end of the road up 
which we are at the present advancing towards real and 
lasting peace. . . . Meanwhile, is it prudent— or. 
Indeed, conceivable— that we abandon the policy of dip­
lomatic and military cohesion that has served us so well, 
just when it is starting to pay dividends?)^
In January 196?, Denmark’s Prime Minister Otto Krag 
declared the Danish view when he said, "The existence of NATO 
is essential as the basis of all our searching for a detente. 
It must exist as a viable Organization based on mutual trust 
between its member countries." The Prime Minister went on
to say that "a Europe which is not in cooperation with the
3QUnited States is unthinkable." '
Though it is possible to document similar statements 
of agreement from the remaining NATO members supporting the 
general agreement that NATO is still a necessity for Western 
European security, for the solution to European problems, 
and for the eventual achievement of world peace, space does 
not permit it here. In lieu of such declarations probably 
the best statement on the need, purposes and future tasks of 
NATO can be found in a study which was prompted by a propo­
sal from Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel in December
Panayotis Pipinelis, "Integration, Detente and The 
Smaller Countries," ibid.. Vol. XIV, No. 11 (November, 1966),
p. 11.
^^"Pocus On NATO," ibid.. Vol. XV, No. 1 (January,
1967), p. 26.
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1966. The "Harmel Report" which was made to and adopted 
unanimously by the NATO Council in December 196?, acknowl­
edged the fact that the international situation had changed 
considerably since 19^9 and that the political tasks of the 
Organization had taken on new dimensions; that the Soviet 
policy of peaceful coexistence had changed the nature of the 
confrontation with the NATO countries but not the major basic 
problems. In the words of the Report,
The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its 
first . . .  is to maintain adequate military strength and 
political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms 
of pressure and to defend the territory of member coun­
tries if aggression should occur. . . . The possibility 
of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central 
political issues in Europe, first and foremost the Ger­
man question, remains unsolved. Moreover, the situation 
of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced 
reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, 
the Allies will maintain . . .  a suitable military capa­
bility to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating 
a climate of stability, security and confidence.
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second 
function, to pursue the search for progress toward a more 
stable relationship in which the underlying political 
issues can be solved. . . . Collective defense is a 
stabilizing factor in world politics. . . . The way to 
peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the 
use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of
detente.40
The report went on to point out that "the ultimate 
political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a Just and
AoNATO "Harmel Report," The Future Tasks Of The 
Alliance (n.p.: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Informa­
tion Service, 1968), pp. 12-13, For full text of Report see 
also U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security And Inter­
national Operations, The Atlantic Alliance; Future Tasks of 
The Alliance, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1968).
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lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate
kisecurity guarantees.** Further, the report made it clear 
that **no final and stable settlement of Europe is possible
without a solution of the German question which lies at the
koheart of present tensions in Europe." Thus there is gen­
eral agreement among the Alliance members that so long as 
Germany remains divided, the split will insert an unstable 
factor into world as well as European affairs and that NATO 
will remain a necessary instrument for world stability.
It should be noted that France's acceptance of the 
Report and her withdrawal from the Organization are not 
necessarily incongruous. Since France views the Alliance 
and the Organization as two separate entities, she could 
easily interpret any reference to the Allies or Alliance in 
the Report as meaning the Allies as separate independent 
entities. The point is that even though France sees no 
future use for the Organization, she does see the Treaty or 
Alliance as a necessary condition for world stability and 
European security.
Though the above statements seem to imply that the 
smaller nations have agreed that German reunification should 
be a NATO policy, there is no clear evidence that any of the 
smaller NATO members, especially European ones, accept the
^^NATO, The Future Tasks, 0£. cit., pp. l6-l?. 
^^Ibid.. p. 16.
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contention that a unified Germany is essential to European 
peace. There is a great difference in supporting a thesis 
that the German problem should be resolved, and supporting a 
thesis that Germany should be reunified. The above implica­
tions should be viewed more or less as the reflection of the 
dominating influence of the United States, fieunification of 




It now seems clear that NATO Is first and foremost a 
mutual defense alliance. Its primary concern is the security 
of its member nations against external physical force: So­
viet aggression. Being a mutual defense pact, the Alliance 
has been, and is, subjected to most of the problems that 
plague militsLry alliances. The Alliance has suffered diffi­
culties in all three of the broad categories; establishment, 
cohesion, and effectiveness.
The world situation and European economic and polit­
ical conditions were such in 1949 that the Western Europeans 
felt they had no other choice than to subordinate their di­
vergent views within the Alliance. There were, moreover, few 
disagreements among the Allies concerning the need to estab­
lish the Organization in 1951» However, the Allies faced an 
establishment difficulty of crisis nature in regard to the 
accession of West Germany to the treaty.
In the area of cohesion, the Alliance has not been 
excluded from major difficulties. The Allies have disagreed 
on most of the factors which determine cohesiveness. This 
has been so, especially, in regard to the problems of fear
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that the core power will exert hegemony over the lesser 
members, fear of separate agreements by individual members, 
particularly the core power, with the enemy, and the desire 
for greater status within the Alliance. In fact, disagree­
ments regarding these factors form part of the basis for the 
rationale for Prance*s withdrawal from the Organization.
Though NATO strategy to date has been effective—  
there has not been overt Soviet aggression against any member 
country— it has not been as a result of total agreement with­
in the Alliance. Here again NATO members have been at odds. 
As a matter of fact, it Is in the category of effectiveness 
over the matter of strategy that the Alliance has shown its 
greatest disunity. Disagreements over strategy have ranged 
over the complete spectrum from numbers and uses of con­
ventional forces to numbers and uses of nuclear forces. How­
ever, it is the latter that has created NATO's greatest 
problem of developing a credible strategy; the ownership, 
control, and uses of nuclear weapons.
The North Atlantic Alliance osui be classified as a 
"pluralistic security-community." It meets the basic funda­
mental requirements of such a community as established by 
Karl W. Deutsoh et al: The Alliance consists of members
representing legal independent governments and, for the past 
two decades, war among the members has been practically out 
of the question.1 However, the Alliance is not a "political
^On two occasions, Greece and Turkey have come close 
to armed conflict over Cyprus. There have been implications
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union."
There has developed a considerable amount of con­
fusion about the nature of the Alliance— confusion grounded 
in a great deal of wishful thinking about and references to 
an "Atlantic Partnership," "Atlantic Union," or "Atlantic 
Community." If, by the use of these terms, it is meant that 
the members of the Alliance share similar values that origi­
nated in a more or less common heritage; that the members 
hold similar outlooks derived from a high degree of indus­
trial development; and that the members hold common interests 
regarding morals and problems of mankind, the term can then 
have some meaning. However, if it is meant by these terms, 
a Partnership, Community, or Union in which there is a central 
structure to which political decision-making has been dele­
gated by the members, i.e., a structure in which some scheme 
for supranational decision-making has been set up, then an 
"Atlantic Partnership," "Atlantic Union," or "Atlantic Com­
munity" does not exist. In the case of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, there is no central governmental institution with 
delegated powers but rather there is an institutionalized 
council composed of state instructed delegates without power
from different sources that France's determination to develop 
a nuclear force stems from her fears of a resurgent Germany 
rather than from a Soviet threat. See Dean Acheson's testi­
mony before a Senate Subcommittee, Hearings. The Atlantic 
Alliance, op. cit., p. 12; See also Lord Gladwyn, "The New 
World of Maurice Schumann— Some Comments," NATO Letter. Vol. 
XV, No. 1 (January, 196?), p. 12.
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to finalize decision making. Therefore, NATO is not a 
'•political Union."
- One factor is clearly evident from the foregoing
study; The Alliance is going through a transitional period 
and the major concern with which the Allies are grappling is 
the adaptation of the Organization to the many changes that 
have occured in the past and will continue to occur in the 
future. This in turn leaves NATO's future cloudy or at 
least without a clear definition. Therefore, it is not 
possible to definitely say that the Organization still serves 
a valid purpose.
One member (France) sees the Organization as being 
obsolete; an instrument for maintaining the status quo, and 
thus, the perpetuation of the East-West division and thereby 
world tensions. At the same time Prance views the treaty 
as being valid and necessary for the maintenance of world 
stability, at least until some of the basic East-West dif­
ferences have been altered. Moreover, France has opted out 
of the Organization (military part), but remains a member of 
the Alliance.
However, without France, the Organization will con­
tinue, at least until one year after its 20th anniversary.
The other 14 members resoundly affirm the Organization's con­
tinued necessity and its role in the defense of Western 
Europe. "We are convinced that the Organization is essential 
and will continue," declared the 14 in June 1966. Later
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(196?) the NATO Council again affirmed the necessity of the 
Organization by adopting the Harmel Report which set out 
objectives for NATO's future; defend the members against 
external force and to search for solutions to reduce East- 
West tensions.
Thus it is evident that, though NATO is faced with 
many unsolved problems, the "fourteen” members view a col­
lective defense system as the best method by which they can 
maintain their own security and world stability. They are 
not ready to accept de Gaulle's view that NATO has served 
its purpose. It is not difficult to see why the other Allies 
vetoed de Gaulle's alternative. If NATO is too obsolete to 
cope with changing world conditions, de Gaulle's alternative—  
a Prance dominated, nationalistic "Europe of the father­
lands"— belongs further in the past. His ideas of a revital­
ized Europe, based on a collection of strong and proud na­
tional forces, has the ring of past centuries. Or, as The 
Economist succintly described it, "Selfsufficient defense is
not just a delusion: It is the relapse of the addict into
2his delusion."
Close examination reveals that the French distinction 
between the Alliance and Organization seems to be more or 
less a case of "hair-splitting". The Organization, in the
"Look To Your Alliance," The Economist. Vol. CXCIII 
(November 7, 19.59) i p. 489. See also Buchan, NATO In The 
1960's, 0£. cit., p. 85.
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final analysis and applying even a loose interpretation of 
integration, can be seen as no more than a planning agency 
for recommending numbers of troops and types of equipment 
that each member should contribute in the event of an ex­
ternal attack. It has been, and still is, left to the dis­
cretion of the individual nation whether to follow the 
recommendations. The failure of the member countries to 
ever fulfill the recommended force levels in the past should 
be proof enough. This has led some observers to believe 
that France will leave the Alliance itself at the opportune 
time.3 Though France's tenure as a signatory to the treaty 
is unpredictable, it is almost certain that she will remain 
in the Alliance as long as the advantages from being a member 
outweigh the disadvantages. At the present all the weight 
seems to favor the advantageous side of the scale.
Yet all the blame for NATO's problems and unclear 
future cannot be heaped upon de Gaulle. Some of the other 
members must share that blame— particularly Washington and 
especially concerning nuclear weapons and strategic planning. 
The possession of nuclear weapons by certain of the Allies 
would pose far less danger, provided they were jointly con­
trolled in accordance with a feasible and well understood 
strategy, than that danger inherent in fragmentation of
^See John J. MoCloy's testimony before a U.S. Sen­
ate Subcommittee, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., 
pp. 128-129.
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policy and strategy. Washington has tended to disregard the 
latter by its obsession with nuclear diffusion.
The United States has changed its proposals concern­
ing nuclear weapons so often the Allies cannot tell what 
Washington either wants or believes. In sum, Washington has 
assigned submarines to NATO only to have this gesture turn 
out to be the transferring of them from one American command 
to another. In May, 1962, Washington spoke of submarines 
with mixed crews; in December, 1962, the Nassau agreement 
seemed to favor and encourage National strike forces; in May, 
1963, the United States proposed the MLF composed of surface 
vessels; and in I965» Washington suggested committees designed 
specifically to give the Allies a voice in nuclear planning. 
The point is that it is no easy matter for other governments 
to base their military policies on the vacillating policies 
of an ally. In fact, de Gaulle could argue that a separate 
European force is needed to guard against Washington's 
changes of mind.
Only a coherent NATO strategy based on a viable 
system of command, control, and communication can make the 
Organization viable and thus valid for the future, A coherent 
NATO strategy can be brought about by resolving the political 
control and strategic doctrines.
Prom this inquiry it is possible to see that there 
are several factors that must be considered in resolving 
NATO's political and strategic problems, and for planning 
NATO's nuclear weapons policy and strategy for the future.
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(1) The day of America's overwhelming economic and 
nuclear dominance Is gone. Though the United States remains 
the most powerful Individual member, the economic strength of 
Europe plus the establishment of the European Economic Com­
munity means that, both politically and militarily, Europe's 
bargaining power Is now vastly stronger than In NATO's early 
years. Washington will, therefore, find It more and more 
difficult to exercise leadership and management of the Al­
liance.
(2) There has been a change within the European bal­
ance of power. Whereas Prance once sought British support 
as a safeguard agalniît a resurgent West Germany, and one of 
the main reasons the EDC failed was British refusal to give 
such a guarantee. Prance now refuses Britain membership In 
the Common Market, and the Pranco-German treaty for closer 
cooperation poses new problems for the Allies, Moreover, 
there has been a change In the relationship between the Soviet 
bloc and NATO. Though the Soviet Union has not changed Its 
goal to expand communism, the wide consensus once held con­
cerning the nature of the Soviet threat has dissipated with 
economic stability and reduced tensions created by the Russian 
policy of peaceful coexistence. Though the Soviet Interven­
tion In Czechoslovakia In 1968, which signified a reassertlon 
of Russian policy based not on the principle of economic or 
Ideological competition, but rather on overt physical power, 
seems to have breathed new life Into the Alliance, It has
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not rejuvlnated the general consensus— at least France has 
not returned to the Organization.
(3) Whether Americans like it or not, Europe is a 
"third force.” That is, in the manner of being powerful, 
partly because the United States sought to make it so. This 
fact is now beyond the power of America to reverse. The 
United States should accept the recovery and self-assertive­
ness of the Allies with pride. It is, after all, a sign of 
success for the United States policies that came into being 
with the Marshall Plan and NATO.
(4) The nuclear deterrent cannot remain effective un­
less arrangements are made which make it certain that the 
deterrent, in fact, will be used against an attack on either 
Western Europe or North America. Though the Allies have a 
greater voice in NATO’s nuclear strategy, problems in this 
area are likely to remain for two reasons; (a) a voice in 
planning nuclear strategy is not the same as having one's 
own nuclear weapons and (b) short of a supranational solution 
through a surrender of national sovereignty, it is inevita­
bly difficult for a large group of countries to develop a 
common and efficient strategy as well as balanced military 
forces. And for the same reasons the spread of nuclear wea­
pons, though possibly checked momentarily by the nonprolif­
eration treaty, will continue to be a problem for the Allies.
(5) Finally, political union or integration within 
the Alliance is not a reality. In fact the trend seems to be
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against political integration. French President de Gaulle 
refuses to accept even token integration in the military 
commands. In addition, Washington does not desire a genuine 
partnership. Two important factors point this up; (a) If 
the United States actually desired a political union, a 
proposal for discarding America's national sovereignty would 
have been forthcoming. To this date it has not been offi­
cially discussed, (b) Washington's demand for freedom out­
side the NATO area and unwillingness to bind itself in that 
respect.
It is conclusive that NATO is a defense alliance 
that rests upon the security interests common to all members. 
At the present NATO is an alliance of free and sovereign 
states that view the Organization in terms of their own 
national interests. Moreover, each member's government will 
continue to be influenced by its own domestic political 
problems and constraints when it develops its policies to­
ward NATO. Therefore, NATO stands or falls by the added 
sense of security it gives its members. If the need for 
security no longer holds its members together, NATO's soli­
darity cannot be restored by pretending it is a more braodly 
based community or by trying to redefine its purposes.
With these considerations in view, the momentaous 
question before the Allies is not whether the Organization is 
an end in itself or an anachronism, but rather how to solve 
the political and strategic differences so as to achieve as
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much security as possible for the peoples of the Alliance 
area. Until such time as there is a reasonable and meaning­
ful effort in arms reduction and a peaceful settlement of 
East-West differences, the NATO defenses should not be 
weakened. Nor, under any circumstances should the American 
commitment be weakened or withdrawn.
It is believed by the writer that the framework es­
tablished in the "Introduction" of this inquiry can be a 
helpful guide for the study of mutual defense pacts. It is 
not possible through application of the framework to exact 
factual information for definite predictions concerning the 
breakup, the continuance, or the development of political 
integration within an alliance. It can, however, help one 
to understand better the possibilities concerning these 
factors, i.e., whether a defense pact will break up, con­
tinue, or evolve into a political community.
APPENDIX
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY^ 
April 4, 1949
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the pur­
pose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
Governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the 
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law.
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the 
North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collec­
tive defense and for the preservation of peace and security.
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes 
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice are 
not endangered, and to refrain in their international rela­
tions from the threat or use of force in any manner incon­
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further devel­
opment of peaceful and friendly international relations by 
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Dec­
ade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents. 1941-WI 
Wist Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1950), pp. 1328-1331.
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better understanding of the principles upon which these in­
stitutions are founded and by promoting conditions of sta­
bility and well-being. They seek to eliminate conflict in 
their international economic policies and will encourage 
economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means 
of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrety, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 
the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North At­
lantic area.
Any such attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. 
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain in­
ternational peace and security.
Article 6
For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one 
or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack 
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North 
America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occu­
pation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under 
the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area 
north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels of aircraft 
in this area of any of the Parties.
2#
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be in­
terpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obliga­
tions under the Charter of the Parties which are members of 
the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international 
engagements now in force between it and any other of the 
Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions 
of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any inter­
national engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a council, on which 
each of them shall be represented to consider matters con­
cerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall 
be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. 
The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the 
implementation of Articles 3 and j.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European State in a position to further the principles 
of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so 
invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its 
instrument of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America. The Government of the United States of 
America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of 
each such instrument of accession.
Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions 
Carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respec­
tive constitutional processes. The instruments of ratifica­
tion shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Govern­
ment of the United States of America, which will notify all 
the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall 
enter into force between the States which have ratified it 
as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signa­
tories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada,
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France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, have been deposited and shall come into 
effect with respect to other States on the deposit of their 
ratifications.
Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years or 
at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so 
requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the 
Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace 
and security in the North Atlantic area, including the 
development of universal as well as regional arrangements 
under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, 
any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice 
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the 
United States of America, which will inform the Governments 
of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denun­
ciation.
Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts 
are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of 
the Government of the United States of America. Duly certi­
fied copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government 
to the Governments of the other signatories.
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